Diaspora, migration and the Caucasus.

ABSTRACT

Circassians that have been expelled from their ancient homeland in the Caucasus in 1864 by the Russian Empire, dispersed and scattered throughout the lands of the Ottoman Empire. With the emergence of new states on the Ottoman territory after WWI and establishment of Israel in 1949, Circassians of diaspora became the citizens of different countries, like Turkey, Syria, Israel, Jordan which remained closed and time to time hostile to each other. Members of the Circassian diaspora had a loose connection among themselves due to limitations of the new World order; however, in 2000’s digital capitalism connected diaspora members to each other with the web of the internet.

In the second year of the Syrian Civil War, the news of Syrian Circassian villages trapped in between the Syrian Regime and Opposition Forces spread through social media around the Circassian diaspora. In the year 2013, Circassians of Turkey mobilized for pulling them out of the warzone and delivering help. This mobilization ranged from placing Syrian Circassians to the donated houses in the Circassian villages in Turkey to transferring them to Turkey with five commercial aircraft by forming an airbridge.

One could assume that members of a global ethnic diaspora would show solidarity among themselves in times of crisis, such as the humanitarian crisis. However, the debates among the civil society organizations of the Circassians in Turkey during the airbridge operation indicates that what it means to be Circassian is re-negotiated among the representatives of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey including some even opposing to the airbridge operation. Therefore, this thesis argues that boundary markers of being Circassian in Turkey work both for and against addressing the humanitarian crisis of Syrian Circassians during the airbridge operation. The boundary markers of diasporic ethnic identity such as language, religion, and culture were both mobilized creating commonality among Circassians in Turkey and Syria, but they were also re-negotiated among the Circassian groups in Turkey to exclude and include “true” Circassians from Syria or in Turkey.

viii ÖZET

1864 yılında Rusya İmparatorluğu tarafından Kafkasya'daki eski vatanlarından sürülen Çerkesler, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu topraklarına dağıtıldılar. Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Osmanlı topraklarında yeni devletlerin ortaya çıkması ve 1949'da İsrail'in kurulmasıyla, diasporanın Çerkesleri, Türkiye, Suriye, İsrail ve Ürdün gibi zaman zaman birbirine düşman kalan farklı ülkelerin vatandaşları haline geldiler. Çerkes diasporası üyeleri yeni Dünya düzeninin kısıtlamaları nedeniyle belli belirsiz bir bağ ile birbilerine bağlıydılar. Bununla birlikte, 2000’lerde dijital kapitalizm diaspora üyelerini internet ağı ile birbirine bağladı.

Suriye İç Savaşı'nın ikinci yılında, Suriye Çerkes köylerinin Suriye Rejimi ve Muhalefet Güçleri arasında sıkıştığı ve köylülerin mahsur kaldıkları haberi Çerkes diasporasında sosyal medya aracılığıyla yayıldı. 2013 yılında Türkiye Çerkesleri Suriye Çerkeslerini savaş alanından çıkarmak ve yardım sağlamak için harekete geçirdi. Bu seferberliğin alanı, Suriye Çerkesleri’nin Türkiye'deki Çerkes köylerinde bağışlanan evlere yerleştirilmesinden, hava yolu oluşturarak beş yolcu uçağı Türkiye'ye nakledilmelerine kadar uzanıyordu.

Küresel etnik diaspora üyelerinin, insani krizler gibi kriz zamanlarında kendi aralarında dayanışma göstereceği varsayılabilir. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye'deki Çerkeslerin sivil toplum örgütleri arasında ‘hava köprüsü operasyonu’ sırasındaki tartışmalar, Türkiye Çerkes Diasporası üyeleri arasında Çerkes olamanın ne demek olduğunun ve sınırlarının yeniden müzakere edildiğini göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, bu tez, Türkiye'de Çerkes olmasının sınır belirteçlerinin, Suriye Çerkesleri ile dayanışma-insani yardım çalışmaları esnasında kurulan ‘hava köprüsü operasyonu’nun yanında ve karşısında çalıştığını savunuyor. Dil, din ve kültür gibi diasporik etnik kimliğin sınır belirteçleri hem Türkiye'de hem de Suriye'de Çerkesler arasında ortak alanlar oluşturarak mobilize edildi, ama aynı zamanda bu etnik kimliğin sınır belirteçleri Türkiye Çerkesleri arasında ‘gerçek’ Çerkesler ve olmayanların ayrımlanmasında yeniden müzakere edildiler.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Global and Local Context

On the evening of March 28, 2013, a commercial aircraft landed at Raffic Hariri Airport in Beirut, Lebanon which was listed to depart to Russia. For passengers securing a seat on this flight meant more than purchasing the flight ticket; it meant a proof of their Circassian identity. Utterance of a few words spoken in a nearly forgotten ancient language; recognition of family surnames which would then possibly lead to an identification of one of the Circassian tribes; or simply having the Circassian flag, now connect this diaspora that has lived and survived in different places for over 150 years. Feeling fairly confident that a level of commonality has been reached, the passengers end their long and silent waiting period and, “the stressful atmosphere left its place to a relaxed environment”1 as the aircraft took off.

The aircraft carrying the members of the Circassian diaspora from Syria was now on its way to Nizip II Refugee Camp, located in Gaziantep in the southeast of Turkey. Pulled out of the war zone in Syria, the recently built container camp would temporarily serve as a safe haven for them. In anticipation of their arrival, an aid committee set by Circassians of Turkey applied to the Turkish state and a special district within the camp called “mahalle” had already been prepared and reserved for the Circassians of Syria. For this committee the humanitarian crisis bore an urgency for pulling these Syrian Circassians from the hot war zone. The Turkish

1 İha News Agency; Suriye’de Çerkes Operasyonu; https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-suriyede cerkes- operasyonu-269985/, 28 March 2013 12;28

Circassian community had limited resources so they decided to apply to the Turkish state for using their last option, the refugee camps. Therefore, such flights from Lebanon to Turkey took place carrying nearly 800 Syrian Circassians called “The Airbridge Operation” in 2013. The coordination of this airbridge was undertaken by a civil society organization called “World Circassians Solidarity Committee” in Turkey with the sole purpose of rescuing the Syrian citizens of the Circassian diaspora.

1.2. Research Question

One could assume that members of a global ethnic diaspora would show Solidarity among themselves in times of crisis, such as the humanitarian crisis of Circassians in Syria. However, the debates among the civil society organizations of the Circassians in Turkey during the airbridge operation indicates that; what it means to be Circassian was being re-negotiated while some of the representatives of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey were involved in organizing, others were opposing to the airbridge operation. For instance, an informal group organized around a web site 2 calling themselves Cerkesya Yurtseverleri [The Circassian Patriots] campaigned against the airbridge operation. They published and distributed an Arabic Facebook post calling Syrian Circassians “not to go in the dirty camps,” and not to be part of an “Operation of state of Turkey.” Therefore 180 individuals canceled their flights, which was the first flight of the airbridge operation, in fear of becoming “prisoned” in camps while risking their lives in Syria. As a result, the airbridge operation organized and privately financed by World Circassians Solidarity Committee with the purpose of pulling the Syrian Circassians out of the war zone came to a complete halt weeks before the first flight. KAFFED [Caucasus

2 www.cerkesya.org

Organizations Federation] of Turkey, which is the largest Circassian organization in Turkey, refused to be a part of the joint aid group unless the management and coordination is carried out by KAFFED. The request of equally joining the decision making processes of the joint-aid group was also refused by KAFFED; therefore, KAFFED did not get involved in the airbridge operation.

Thus, the research question of this thesis is as follows: How has the boundary markers of Circassian identity been mobilized during the Airbridge of Syrian Circassians to Turkey among the Circassian networks in Turkey? It provides counter-evidence for the assumption that under times of crisis differences within the global ethnic diaspora would be overlooked. However, this thesis argues that the boundary markers of being Circassian in Turkey worked both for and against addressing the humanitarian crisis of the Syrian Circassians during the airbridge operation. The boundary markers of diasporic ethnic identity such as language, religion, and culture were both mobilized creating commonality among Circassians in Turkey and Syria, but they were also re-negotiated among the Circassian groups in Turkey to exclude and include “true” Circassians from Syria or in Turkey. In each chapter of this study, boundary markers of the Circassian identity are examined through a comparative research design by focusing on the re-negotiation process that took place after the Syrian refugee crisis.

1.3 State of the Art: Ethnic Groups and Its Boundaries

To analyze the ethnic identity of Circassians, I first discuss two theories on ethnicity to evaluate the ones illuminating the case of Syrian Circassians and the civil society organizations set by Circassians of Turkey. The primordialist and constructivist approaches are the two main analytical schemas for the study of ethnicity. The first one is the so-called primordialist that focuses on the innate characteristics of ethnic

identity as unchanging. This approach captures the sentimental aspect of individual commitment for ethnicity but neglects to account for the flexibility of ethnic affiliation. The second constructivist schema developed by Barth and Cohen provides a relational and flexible analysis, which accounts for the changes among ethnic categories(Barth, 1969a)(Barth, 1969a)(Barth, 1969a)(Barth, 1969a)(Barth, 1969a)(Barth, 1969a) (Barth, 1969a). Barth’s model focuses on the social, organizational dimension as the crucial variable to understand ethnicity and empowers individuals, while Cohen favors political organization that brings in power relations and resource allocation to questions of ethnicity.

Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils (Smith, 1996) have elaborated Max Weber’s primordialist approach to ethnicity. Geertz and Shils emphasize the importance of cultural “givens” typically associated with ethnicity such as religion, language, race, and customs. These givens take on a primordial status within their cultural context. This primordialist approach to understanding ethnicity highlights the emotional attachment to these cultural “givens”. However, the primordialist approach has been severely criticized by Jack Eller and Reed Coughlan as aprioristic and asociological, reducing ethnicity to inherent bonds within a fluctuating enviroment (Eller and Coughlan, 1993). Due to the recent Syrian crisis, the boundaries of the ethnic Circassian identity has been renegotiated by the Circassian civil society organizations in Turkey. In this context, Circassian groups are trying to redefine their own ethnic identity. In addition to criticisms of essentialization of the primordialist approach, it fails to account for the changing context in which Circassians live.

Fredrik Barth and Abner Cohen have put forth constructivist approaches to ethnicity (Barth, 1969a). These theories conceptualize ethnicity as an accommodation to social change. They argue that for groups to be “ethnic,” they must have contact with an “other” and believe that this “other” is culturally different. Constructivism views ethnicity as a relationship between groups rather than the

property of a single group. Frederik Barth describes ethnic categories as “organizational vessels that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems” (Barth, 1969a). Barth treats ethnicity as constant categories with changing content due to the systematic shifting imagined conceptions of “us” and “them” (Barth, 1969b).

In the cultural apparatuses of ethnic groups, such as education, media, music, and rituals; cultural differences are constructed and circulated among members. Moreover, the boundary between “us” and “them” is negotiated through this process. The Circassians in Turkey reclaim and redefine the boundaries of being Circassian through religious, linguistic, and cultural differences. The ethnic difference, therefore, is mediated and not fixed. The organizational vessel of ethnicity, however, becomes rigid when competition arises over limited resources. According to this approach, Circassians in Turkey constructed their ethnic identity through the contestation and negotiation of their various dimensions of their ethnic boundary markers. In some cases, the order of significance between the religious, linguistic, and cultural boundary markers varies according to the Circassian organization. In other cases, each group defines what it means to be Circassian through the relationship with their significant “other”.

Members of social groups use their ethnic identity to pursue individual interests. For Barth the individual is in power to choose his ethnicity according to his needs and benefits through acculturation, assimilation, or focusing on ethnic boundaries to resist the “other”. In this thesis, Syrian Circassians who took the flights of the “Airbridge Operation” presented themselves more as a Circassian to qualify for a seat on these flights to flee the war in Syria. In other cases, some of the individuals in the Circassian networks in Turkey engaged in a power struggle to represent “true” Circassian identity. This is a rather individualistic approach to ethnic belonging. The deep tribal loyalties in this area make it difficult for individuals to switch all cultural markers and join another ethnic group. However, according to Barth

ethnicity is not entirely dependent on the cultural differences among different culture-bearing social organizations. Culture-bearing units become ethnic groups when some of these differences are self-ascribed and therefore made significant. These cultural traits form the boundaries of ethnic groups. Barth conceptualizes ethnicity as a vessel within which many cultural traits could differ. The cultural traits that form the boundary either preserve its ethnic identity or change to allow merging or shifting ethnic identity. Barth, however, does not explain the reasons behind communal choice of certain cultural traits as ethnic boundary markers.

Although Barth’s view of ethnicity explains many aspects of Circassian identity, it has limitations. For example, some Circassians who live in Turkey prefer to under- emphasize their ethnic affiliation to others, such as the activist Circassians during the Air Bridge Operation promote their ethnic belonging. These relationships to ethnic identity serve as a form of resistance against the unfavorable assimilation and decomposition politics. Abner Cohen’s view of ethnicity is useful for understanding the shift in ‘othering’. He argues that ethnic identities develop in response to functional organizational requirements (Cohen, 1996). Like Barth, he also sees ethnicity as a response to a relationship rather than a natural trait. For Barth it is the organization that endures, but for Cohen the ethnic traits are essential. Traits are used strategically to promote the interest of the ethnic group, which is essentially a political organization. Cohen defines ethnicity as a particular form of informal political organization where cultural boundaries are invoked to secure a group’s resources and “symbolic capital”. In accordance with Cohen’s model, the Circassian organizations in Turkey also engage in political debates while appealing to Circassian ethnic identity. They define what it means to be a “true” Circassian in this process.

1.3.1 Recent Literature on Circassians

On the one hand, Circassian diaspora is a relatively young diaspora when compared to the Jewish diaspora which has a 2500-year-old diaspora experience. Accordingly, as a discipline, “Diaspora Studies” is also a young field. Setenay Nil Dogan’s dissertation submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences at Sabanci University in 2009 was one of the first extensive research about the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey. In her dissertation titled as “Formations of Diaspora Nationalism: The Case of Circassians in Turkey”, Dogan is drafting her thesis on four axes around the following questions: How is diaspora nationalism formed? Through which processes is it formed, and what are its configurations?”. She focuses on the questions of “how Circassians in Turkey regard Turkish Nationalism, and how Circassian Diaspora activists view nationalism in general? How do they maneuver Turkish nationalism as the activists of a diasporic community?” (Doğan, 2009, p. 3). She later expands her argument over “...whether if diaspora’s and the host countries relation is based on direct and total opposition or whether if it is based on strategic and contextual bargains, flirts, and cooperation?”. Dogan, also discusses the notion of “homeland” and hence “Circassian Diaspora’s and the activists’ relations with the homeland”. In her conclusion, she describes the aim of the study as; “taking diaspora as the crossroads where nationalism, ethnicity, globalization meet and cross each other, this dissertation is an attempt to better understand these crossroads” (Doğan, 2009, p. 4).

Another prominent publication on the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey belongs to Prof. Ayhan Kaya. Kaya’s article; “Political Participation Strategies of the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey” and his book; “Circassians in Turkey; the re- invention of the tradition in the diaspora” (Türkiye’de Çerkesler, Diasporada geleneğin yeniden icadı) published in 2011 is among the primary sources of this thesis.

In his book, Kaya (2011) drafts his ideas again within the framework of “what the diaspora is; traditional and modern diasporas”, as well as “diasporic identities”. He expands his framework by explaining the paradigms in the field of migration studies, and later discusses the following question: “Is it possible to understand the other?”. In this framework, Kaya conceptualizes the Circassian diaspora on the historical and ethnocultural base by expanding the discussion to the transformation of the Circassian identity in diaspora.

Although, Kaya’s book is written in a period where the EU integration process of Turkey was on hold, the impacts of the new dimensions acquired during the integration process are still visible. Kaya focuses on nationalism and diaspora discussions by taking the question to “the EU integration of Turkey and nationalism discussion” among Circassians. He concludes his book with a unique focus on the Circassians of Turkey; a field study over Circassians about the “meaning world of Circassians” (Kaya, 2011). Through field study, he explores the narratives of Circassians about their identities, the re-invention of Circassian tradition, the reality of a transnational space, language, religion, and the “other” on the axis of otherness, and on the differentiation of rural versus urban life.

Lars Funch Hansen’s Ph.D. thesis at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, with the title; “The Circassian Revival; A Quest for Recognition” has been another source for my research. Rather than the previous two sources of Kaya and Dogan focusing on Circassian Diaspora in Turkey; Hansen (2014)’s dissertation focuses on a more comprehensive over-all Circassian diaspora not only in Turkey but also among other countries. In his work, like Dogan (2009) and Kaya (2011), Hansen also gives an insight into the diaspora formation of the scattered Circassians. Through Hansen’s study, the reader could explore the very contemporary and current issues of Circassian diaspora within the time frame it was written, such as the diaspora mobilization and contemporary diaspora trends. Hansen also highlights three particular “marks”, which created narratives and will have their very own

place in the cumulative memory of the Circassians; May 21 demonstrations; Recognition of the Circassian Genocide by The Parliament of Georgia and NoSochi2014 campaign against Sochi Olympics. The most important aspect of Hansen’s study is the term he invents, “iCircassia”, which is the virtual re- territorialization of the “homeland” of Circassians on the internet. Zeynel Abidin Besleney’s book titled “The Political History of Circassian Diaspora in Turkey” around the same time brings out some other “markers” of the Circassians of Turkey that led to the production of tactics to cope with the authority, with the discourse of the Nation-State; such as Circassians’ role in the independence war of the Turkish Republic; the uprising of Circassians of against Kemal Ataturk’s Parliament; the case of Ethem the Circassian and the periods of military coups of Turkey.

According to Safran; a diasporic group “regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return—when conditions are appropriate" (Safran, 1991). Jade Cemre Erciyes, in her dissertation, unveils “the dual transnationalism of ancestral return migrants [members of the Circassian diaspora moving to the territory where they define as the ‘homeland’]” (Erciyes, 2014). In her ethnographic study, Erciyes carries out research on “both ends of the migration route” (Erciyes, 2014) of the Circassians by using “theories related to transnationalism, diaspora and return migrant adaptation” (Erciyes, 2014).

The recent research about the subject of the Syrian Crisis and Circassian Solidarity is Emir Fatih Akbulut’s MA Thesis dated 2017, titled as; “International Migration Paths and Solidarity; The meeting of Syria’s and Turkey’s Circassians: Istanbul and Balikkesir and Atköy settlement places example”. The primary importance of the study of Akbulut is the presentation of a well-drafted chronology of the incidents that Circassians of Syria went through and the reactions of Circassians in Turkey. Akbulut is also maintaining an insight about the Syrian-Circassian refugees living in Turkey. Unfortunately, Akbulut (2017) is skipping a significant incident which

is the transfer of Syrian Circassians from the war zone with privately rented four commercial aircrafts called the Air Bridge Operation. In my study; this incident is also tagged as a “turning point” in the collective memory of the Circassian diaspora.

Orsam’s report about the Circassians of Syria is another source, and the only official source of the Turkish government defining Circassians of Syria, which is used in this thesis. Kaya (2011)’s, Dogan (2009)’s, Besleney (2014)’s, Hansen (2014)’s as well as Erciyes (2014)’s studies can be considered, among the very first studies that were written about the Circassian diaspora, mainly the diaspora in Turkey. Each one of these studies focus on or examine Circassians in a certain time frame.

Therefore, each study is reflecting the dynamics on certain or several periods on a visual timeline for exploring the history of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey. However, there is a gap in the literature, which is the interrelations of the Circassian diaspora members during and after the Syrian crisis. By focusing on the impact of Syrian Circassian’s arrival to Turkey among the Circassians in Turkey, this study aims to contribute to the “visual timeline” which scholars has so far formed with their aforementioned studies about the Circassians.

1.4. Rationale of the Research

This study uses the constructivist tools of analysis for understanding the complex ways in which the boundary of the Circassian identity is (re)drawn among the Circassian groups in Turkey. Although Circassians in Turkey have largely assimilated into the ethnic Turkish identity, the Circassian activist groups make strong claims over what it means to be Circassian beyond being Turkish. As a case study, I focus on the intensified claims and debates among Circassian activist groups in Turkey on what it means to be Circassian; who is a “true” Circassian and

who is “less” Circassian while transporting Circassians from Syria to Turkey, the so called Air Bridge Operation.

In order to illustrate the details of this identity negotiation process, this thesis compares three Circassian diaspora associations in Turkey. There are more Circassian organizations in Turkey, but these three were the most active and outspoken ones for and against the airbridge: (1) Circassian Solidarity Group, which later became Circassian Associations Federation or CERKESFED; (2) Caucasian Associations Federation or KAFFED; and (3) Circassian Patriots or Çerkesya Yurtseverleri. These three groups are all diaspora-based organizations, however they plan their activities in their own ways based on what is essential for being Circassian for them. In broad strokes, the general approach of these three groups can be described as follows:

The Circassian Solidarity-CERKESFED has a more political, conservative, globally diasporic, and moderate Muslim character. Their official discourse focuses on the injustice that the Circassians were subjected to by the Russian Empire, which they view reached its peak with the Circassian Genocide of 1864. They coordinate some of their events with the transnational Circassian diaspora living in Turkey, the USA, Jordan, Israel and Europe among others. They organized summer camps for the Circassian youth at Circassian villages in the Golan Heights, Israel. They also have organized protests against human rights violations in the Caucaus in coordination with Circassians in the U.S. Publishing and distributing books about Circassian culture, history as well as politics are examples of their activities. Some of their leading members are known to be pious Sunni Muslims, but they have members from secular Circassian circles as well. Their focus is on the whole North Caucasus region and its peoples, rather than a single ethnic group.

KAFFED has a more cultural approach to being Circassian, which makes them focus more on dance, food, and traditions to maintain Circassian identity in Turkey.

Although they tend to remain apolitical and stay away from politically contentious issues, in recent years they appear to have closer relations with Republican Peoples Party or CHP. They have close ties to the Circassian homeland in the Caucasus where they organize summer camps and trips.

The Circassian Patriots are formed of members who have far left activism background and their approach seems to reflect that. They are active on the internet and are organized around a website and several social media groups. They are gathered around a “supreme” leader (Abide, 2012) known only by a nickname until recently. They have their own virtual Circassian parliament. They actively promote micro-nationalist approach among Circassians by forefronting Adyghe ethnicity among other Caucasian ethnic groups.

These remarks indicate the interests and priorities of these organizations in broad strokes, but these three groups also indicate a diversity of perspectives in what it means to be Circassian and this was negotiated during the Airbridge operation. The Airbridge operation was organized by the “World Circassians Solidarity Committee” group [here in after Circassian Solidarity] in 2013 in order to pull out Circassians living in Syria and which later evolved into “Circassian Associations Federation” [CERKESFED] . As an addition to the Airbridge operation, Circassian Solidarity group was also active in welcoming, transferring, accommodating and housing of Syrian Circassians as well as finding, organizing and delivering social support and financial aid. “Caucasian Associations Federation” [Here in after KAFFED] formed another group titled as "KAFFED Syria Crisis Management Committee" in order to organize the social and financial support of Circassians in Turkey for Syrian Circassians. So, there were also two organizations which set up a “crisis management committee” for Syrian Circassians. In addition to these aid organizations there were also other Circassian social networks, pressure groups which ran campaigns about the future of Syrian Circassians. Some of these groups ran campaigns actively, visibly lobbying against supporting Syrian Circassians in

Turkey such as the “Circassian Patriots” [Here in after Patrioots]. In this study, I have focused on the three most active Circassian networks in Turkey that ran a campaign for or against the Airbridge operation.

1.5. Methodology

The data collection of this thesis involved several sources. Firstly, as a young activist, I have been to all of the major meetings during the establishment of the Solidarity group and KAFFED Crisis Management Committee. I have personal contacts with the members of these groups. I was an active member of the Solidarity network and had first-hand experience of the airbridge operation and the debates among Circassians in Turkey. Moreover, I was personally involved in the process and active in the field.

Consequently, I used my personal memories and notes which gives the thesis an autho-ethnographic feauture. My activist role, personal involvement starting at an early age and contact with participants has advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, as an active member of the Circassian community in Turkey, I am aware of the advantages and disadvantages this may have on my research. I have tried to compensate for the disadvantages of my subjectivity and take advantage of the advantages. For instance, I have reflected intensively on my subjective position not to misrepresent the position of other Circassian networks with the feedback from my advisors and keeping an open mind listening to alternative reasonings and point of views. I have made extensive effort to reach out to all the activists in other groups for my research and I have managed to carry out interviews with members of KAFFED and Circassian Patriots who opposed or distanced themselves from the Airbridge operation.

Secondly, I have carried out interviews with representatives of all three groups to fully represent their perspectives. I have carried out ten interviews with leading members in total. Seven of them were with the Solidarity group. I have tried to reach out to members of the other groups but have managed to interview three of them in total. In order to compensate for that, I have used their online resources to reflect their views in greater depth. Although I have been involved in the discussions and conflicts among these groups over Syrian Circassians, I have managed to interview some of the people that I had opposing views during the Airbridge operation.

During the interviews I have asked the following open-ended interview questions to capture all the different positions and let the interviewee express themselves freely:

 How do you define yourself?  Why did you want to help the Syrian Circassians?  What did the Circassians experience during the Syrian civil war? What were your feelings and thoughts about these events?  What did you think about the Syrian civil war?  Can you please tell us about the Airbridge operation of Syrian Circassians and the process?  What kind of activities did you carry out to support Syrian Circassians?  Can you please talk about the difficulties you experienced in this process?  What are your feelings about being involved in the Airbridge operation?  What do you think about being involved in helping Syrian Circassians?  What is the importance of Xabze for Circassians, especially for Syrian Circassians?  What is the role of the Circassian Language for Circassians, especially for the Circassians of Syria and more specifically during the Airbridge operation?  What was the importance of kinship and family relations for helping Syrian Circassians?  Who are Syrian Circassians for you? Why did you want to help them?  Why did you or your group not join a Circassian group for managing the aid organization to support Syrian Circassians brought to Turkey?  Finally, is there anything else you would like to add?

Third, I have used secondary data based on the publications and internet sources provided by all three groups. I have used the archive database of CERKESFED including screenshots of the Facebook group discussions and articles published on the web sites of KAFFED and Circassian Patriots as well as website archive of the ‘dcdk.org’, the official, and currently offline, website of the Circassian Solidarity. I have also used information published on the Facebook groups of the Circassian Patriots.

During my study for constructing the interviews and questions, I used “The Content Analysis Guidebook” of Kimberly Neuendorf (Neuendorf, 2002) and “Qualitative Inquiry& Research Design” of John Creswell (Creswell, 2013) and I used “Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences” of Catherine Riessman (Riessman, 2008) as a tool for analyzing the data that I had collected.

On the one hand, being an active member gave me the opportunity to access the rich inside data about discussions of what it means to be a Circassian for the Circassian networks in Turkey. It can be challenging for non-Circassian outsiders to access a closed social group, like Circassians in Turkey. On the other hand, I am aware that an insider role may raise concerns about my positionality as the researcher. This work carries autoethnographic features as its research method. According to Anderson, the key features of an autoethnographic study are; “the complete member status of a researcher, the analytic reflexivity, the narrative visibility of the researcher’s self, the dialogue with informants beyond the self, and

commitment to theoretical analysis” (Anderson, 2006) Therefore, even though as a researcher, I carry a complete member status during the data collection period of the study, I intentionally distanced myself from the participants by staying passive. I placed upmost importance of keeping my role as an objective researcher, which requires maintaining a distanced position to the subject and having a nonjudgmental attitude towards the participants.

Nevertheless, I am fully aware that my position as a member of the community may limit the participants through intentionally or unintentionally silencing a criticism or a negative comment. Due to my positionality, I am fully aware that the thesis contains autoethnografic features. Autoethnography is a form of ethnography that uses the self as a lens to understand a wider culture and in exchage, uses others’ experiences to grow a better understand the self. Therefore, I acknowledge that although I did apply autoethnography as the research method consciously, during the study I developed a better understanding of myself, coming to conclusions which I used to oppose with my activist role.

1.6. The Scope of the Study

Based on this research design and data collection methodology, the following thesis chapters are outlined as follows. After the Introduction, in the first chapter, I provide the theoretical debates on diaspora and ethnic identity and provide the historical context of Circassian diaspora in Turkey in a timeline. The second chapter expands on how religion was used as an identity marker among the Circassian groups in Turkey for and against the Airbridge operation. The third chapter illustrates how the Circassian language was evoked as another ethnic identity marker to include and exclude Circassians. In the same chapter, I examine how kinship ties were used in this process. And lastly how Xabze [the Circassian

etiquette] became part of the debates during the process of negotiating Circassian identity. The thesis ends with a conclusion drawing together the most important findings together and what this means for the Circassian identity in Turkey today through the case of the Airbridge operation.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY BACKGROUND OF

CIRCASSIAN DIASPORA

2.1. The Historical Background: The Circassians

“Etymologically, the word 'Diaspora' [διασπορά] derives dia ['through'] and speirein ['to sow, scatter'] (Encyclopedia.com, 2019). Alternatively, the word is also explained as “sowing of seeds”. Based on the study of the Jewish historical experience, William Safran in his article ‘Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homelands and Return’ (Safran, 1991), tried to establish the criteria in order to define a typology, according to which a community could be, or not, categorized as a diaspora. According to his often quoted six points, Safran defines a diasporic group as “a minority community whose members share several of the following characteristics;

1) They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original ‘center’ to two or more ‘peripheral’, or foreign regions;

2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland—its physical location, history, and achievements;

3) they believe that they are not—and perhaps cannot be—fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it;

4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would [or should] eventually return—when conditions are appropriate;

5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and its safety and prosperity; and

6) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and the existence of such a relationship importantly defines their ethno-communal consciousness and Solidarity” (Safran, 1991).

Though the diasporas are heterogenous and contested spaces, every diaspora constantly constructs a collective identity, a “common we” (Doğan, 2009). This “common we” for Circassians was produced within frozen state borders. With the effect of the Internet and globalization, Circassians in diaspora started to interact with each other. There were clashes as well as a reproduction of the narrative in a more comprehensive way.

The result of this new situational set up for Circassians in the diaspora, now having found themselves living in various lands, would yield them to follow and adapt to marry their own self-identified cultural norms they brought with them with those found existing in the host countries which they had settled. A further result of this displacement meant new narratives formed by each of these different subgroups. Although early diaspora has been identified as the ‘Circassian’, there was now this backdrop of their host countries having impacted and influenced this diasporic minority group, encasing the unique Circassian identity, within the confines of the host countries they had been living in for nearly three generations. The Circassians of Turkey were unique to the Circassians of Jordan, to those Circassians in Syria- yet, the bond among all found with the diaspora was the commonality of the violent expulsion from their native homeland of the Caucasus at the height of the war in

1864.

Each Circassians subgroup found in diaspora found themselves in the highly fluid, often harsh circumstances, of needing to adapt to events occurring in the Middle East and Turkey. These young nation-states were going through their painful stages of finding their own footings in the political and social context. The fairly newly- arrived, displaced Circassians came from their own traumatic and chaotic background looking to stabilize themselves by attempting to find the compromise between self and the group identity of what defined them as Circassians, within their host countries. They were struggling to find and identify their own pathways to self-identity. The convergence of these two worlds, caused Circassians to find ways to adapt to their new environments and circumstances- to create reflexes and maneuver around and amid difficult situations. Consciously or unconsciously, Circassians invented ways of incorporating with the systems (Kaya, 2004).

After 149 years in diaspora, Circassian subgroups eventually became citizens of the countries they had been living in for 3 or 4 generations, were now emerging with the influence of this narration of self identification. This exercise of expression come to full display in an arena provided by the Internet, where both conflict and commonality became public. Separation of nearly 149 years from each other, initially having been expelled from their homeland the Caucasusus under traumatic circumstances, has had a real impact on their identity.

The war in Syria was a devastating mark that had a great impact across Circassians living in diaspora. Distant family members in a literal sense, others in the collective sense, were found suddenly trapped between various forces within the country that threatened their lives. The previous time war and mortality to this magnitude and scale endured was of the mass, forced migration from the native homeland of Caucasus, onto Ottoman lands of the latter half of the 19th century. However unlike their ancestors loosing contact with the family members, there was now a key element involved which maintained communication along Circassians. This key element was the technology which enabled everyone to receive real time-status

changes on the ground. News from outlet sources and social media kept those within the war-torn country, and outside up-to-date communication with each other. This invaluable tool is what enabled the Circassians of Turkey effectively organize and produce reflexive and instant tactics that would benefit some Syrian Circassians who were able to leave the chaos and mayhem of the war in Syria. Circassians of Turkey used an operational tactic in order to rescue the Circassians of Syria from the war zone by providing free commercial flights which would deliver them to safety in Turkey.

The study explores how ethnic identity is not fixed but negotiated and renegotiated under different circumstances during the Airbridge operation. Today, even if individuals are separated by more than 150 years, they can find ways to re-connect by mobilizing the markers of their ethnic identity. In order to examine how the boundary markers of Circassian identity was mobilized, in the first section, I will first demonstrate in-depth the twenty events and incidents in the history that had direct effects to Circassian identity in Turkey. Following this section, based on first- hand information from a Syrian Circassian, I will summarize the events in Syria from the perspective of Syrian Circassians, leading Circassians of Turkey mobilize to organize the Airbridge operation to save Syrian Circassians from the war in Syria.

2.2. The Emergence of the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey

This section sums the main historical events which affect Circassian collective memory and can still be found in the contemporary narrations on the boundaries of Circassian identity. Therefore, I first outline how the indigenous people of the Caucasus became the Circassian diaspora by starting from the great exile and the Circassian genocide in 1864 until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

2.2.1. 1864 Circassians as 'The Muhajirin' and the Early Settlements

A hundred-year long bloody struggle between the armies of the Russian Empire and the indigenous people of the Caucasus came to an end in the year 1864. Starting from 1858 (Taşbaş 2018, p. 141) especially following the declaration of the conquest of the Caucasus by the Russian Empire in 1864, as described in Ottoman archive documents, a flood of ‘Cerkes Muhajirin’ (Akyuz, 2009) [Circassian Immigrants] ran into the lands of the Ottomans.

It was a challenge for the Empire to manage the large numbers of arrivals. “The Circassian exiles were settled in the Ottoman Empire under a plan based on demographic and strategic considerations. The aims were to strengthen border defenses and increase the proportion of Moslems in predominantly non-Moslem areas [e.g., the Balkans] (Bas, Nusret Baj and Bas, Didem. Arici, 2008)

The settlements in the western part of the Anatolia were mainly scattered [within the Marmara Region of today's Turkey] in a form that surrounds Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. ‘Circassian Muhajirin’ in Anatolia were placed in a linear line starting from the Black-Sea and ranging through the Middle East, as far as today's Jordan. When the settlements plotted on a map, it becomes clear that the intention of planning was forming an invisible wall between the east and west of Anatolia, as well as around Istanbul where the Sultan was living.

According to the archive documents, Circassian groups were settled and resettled within the regions they were placed during the early settlement period (Taşbaş, 2018). The geographical specifications of the settlement places show us that the Muhajirin preferred to settle in locations where it looks similar to the places they had once lived in the Caucasus. Rather than a romantic attachment to the lands they left, this specific choice can be evaluated as evidence for the “forcefulness” of mass migration; therefore, the expulsion Circassians experienced. For instance, Canbolat

Village of today's Tokat city of Turkey, Circassian immigrants lived in tents for a while, without building houses3. They had the intention of returning to the Caucasus. They were seeking every possible opportunity. Yet, Circassians were the first to go to the front in each war of the Ottoman Empire with the Russian armies.

2.2.2. 1877-1878 Ottoman Russian war; Re-placement of the Circassians in Balkans

“In the year 1876, waves of immigration from the Crimea, [following after 1853- 1856 Crimean- Ottoman war] and from the Caucasus [1864 Russian-Caucasus war] to Anatolia decreased gradually to a couple of convoys in a year” (Yazıcı, Hakkı, 2006). “During the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war, a significant number of young men among Circassians, Chechens, Abkhazians, and other Caucasian Moslems joined the Ottoman army [to fight against Russians]. Moreover, the ones still living in the Caucasus rebelled against Russia. When the Russian forces won the war, revenge was taken from the Circassians, Chechens, Abkhazians, and others who had not left the Caucasus. A new wave of migration began. Circassians from the Caucasus once again landed in Trabzon, Samsun, Sinop or Dobruca to be placed into Anatolia and Syria (Yazıcı, Hakkı, 2006). Moreover, at the end of 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war, the Circassians who had settled in the Balkans before once again became refugees on the roads through Anatolia (Yazıcı Hakkı; Süleyman Erkan, 1996). The Circassians who once were placed in the Balkans were now relocated to the Middle-East, mainly today's Syria.

Circassians decision of joining the Ottoman army to fight against Russians could be translated into their vision of considering the war as an opportunity for returning, by getting their homeland; the Caucasus back. However, with the defeat of the Ottoman army, Circassians once again faced several tragedies. There were only old

3 According to personal oral family history

and sick men left in the villages. Finding men for burying the dead and holding the Janazah [Funeral in Islamic practice] was encountering difficulties for the ones left behind. 4 Beside a generation mourning to their young men, Circassians in the Balkans which are today's Syrian Circassians became refugees again in the harsh geography of the Middle East. Therefore, 1877-1878 Ottoman Russian war was one of the primary, early period experiences of the Circassians, turning them into a diasporic community.

According to diaspora criteria set by William Safran, one of the elements of a diasporic community is that they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would [or should) eventually return—when conditions are appropriate (Safran, 1991). Therefore, components of the tragic diaspora experiences of Circassians during and as the consequences of the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War indicate; a dream of the homeland, struggle for returning, the tragedy of sacrificing lives and becoming refugees again.

2.2.3. 1917 Russian Revolution

Russian Revolution is also called the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In February imperial government was overthrown and in October the Bolsheviks came to power.

4 According to personal oral family history

2.2.4. 1918 Foundation of Caucasus Mountaineers Republic

On May 11, 1918, seven districts of the Caucasus; [Dagestan, Kabardey, Ossetia, Chechenia, Karachay-Balkar, Adygea, and Abkhazia) united and declared independence. The Declaration of Independence was as follows;

“Nations [People] of the United North Caucasus declares their foundation of an independent state by being separated from Russia. The geographical borders of the new state as follows; from the North, Dagestan, Terek, Stavropol, Kuban and Black sea, from the East; Caspian Sea and from South the border is going to be set depending on the mutual agreements of Transcaucasia governments. Therefore, we, assigned below, declare to the free world that the North Caucasus Republic has been founded legally by today.” (Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyetinin Bağımsızlık İlanı,

2018)

This document is signed by Abdulmecit Chermoy, as the Head of the Government and Haydar Bammat as the Minister of Foreign Relations. Two weeks later, neighboring regions; Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, followed the same path and declared that they were leaving Russia (Jabagi, 1952).

According to kuzeykafkasya.org, the official website of the international conference organized in 2018 in Istanbul in order to celebrate the 100th year of the establishment of the North Caucasus Republic, the officials of the North Caucasus Republic visited several countries and attended several meetings with high-rank officials, including the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

The declaration of independence was broadcasted to the world through the National Telegraph Agency of the Ottoman Empire. The head authority of the National

Telegraph Agency was Shapli5 Huseyin Tosun, who was also among the leaders of the Circassian Alliance and Solidarity Association and North Caucasus Association both of which were established in Turkey. These diaspora associations also served as an intermediary between the North Caucasus Republic and the Ottoman Empire.

As the National Telegraph Agency broadcasted the news to the world, the news of the establishment of the North Caucasus Republic took its place in numerous newspapers in Europe. Another diaspora actor was Miralay Rauf Orbay. Mr. Orbay was a member of the Circassian Diaspora as well as the representative of the Ottoman Empire in Trabzon Congress. The officials of the North Caucasus Republic as well as supporting and backing diaspora members; Ottoman Empire and the North Caucasus Republic signed a friendship - mutual assistance treaty on June 8, 1918. The second line of the treaty was as follows; “When requested by the Government of the Republic of North Caucasus, the Ottoman Empire will assist with the necessary military force to ensure internal security and order.”

On October 13, 1918, the flag of the North Caucasus was raised with a special ceremony to the Derbent government building. [Head of the North Caucasus State and Government] Abdulmecid Chermoy, [the Commander of the Caucasian Army assigned by the Ottoman Empire] Met6 Yusuf İzzet Pasha [representative of the Caucasian people in diaspora] and Nuri Pasha [the commander of the Caucasian Islamic Army of Ottoman Empire] who came to Derbent from Baku a day ago made speeches (‘Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyeti’nin Direnişi ve Hazin Son’, 2018). However, with the Mondoros Treaty, the Ottoman Empire lost WWI, and the order of withdrawal was sent to the commander of the Caucasus Army, Met Yusuf Izzet Pasha. Met Yusuf İzzet Pasha did not declare this order to his subordinates for a

5 Circassian family name

6 Circassian family name

while. He was counting on gaining a little time for the North Caucasus Republic Government (‘Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyeti’nin Direnişi ve Hazin Son’, 2018).

2.2.5. 1921 Treaties of Kars & Moscow: Establishment of the Borders

“The October Revolution and the following withdrawal of Russia from the First World War drastically changed the political and international situation in the Black Sea-Caspian region” (Tsvetkova, 2018, p. 78). “Being in isolation, the newly established government of Mustafa Kemal was ready to cooperate with the Soviet regime as both were more or less exposed to similar threats. Having been once the most serious enemy, now the Russians in the face of the Soviet regime were seen as the most natural ally” (Tsvetkova, 2018). The Soviets accepted the revolution in Turkey as close to theirs or the same as it was directed against the imperialists. In his article, the editor of Izvestiya newspaper, Yuri Steklov “characterized the Turkish revolution as a counterpart and an elongation of the October Revolution” (Steklov, 1919).

“The Turkish national cadres had an important role in sovietisation of the mentioned territories in order to turn the Caucasus from a hostile barrier into a bridge for mutual cooperation” (Tsvetkova, 2018, p. 84). “In 1920, Lenin was offering the latter to establish diplomatic relations and to fight together against imperialism. In order to strengthen their power for the struggle with the enemy, financial support was requested from the Soviets - five million Turkish liras in gold, arms, and military supplies, military-technical means, and medical materials, as well as food for the Turkish forces” (Tsvetkova, 2018, p. 84). Moreover, “the fact is that it very clearly depicted proven facts, namely – the request for the material and financial support, which was received by the Turks from the Bolsheviks” (Tsvetkova, 2018, p. 84).

Moscow Treaty [Treaty of Brotherhood) was a friendship agreement done mutually between Bolsheviks and Ankara Government, which both were not officially in power in 1921. With the treaty the eastern border of todays Turkey was set. Following after the Moscow Treaty, Treaty of Kars was signed between the Ankara Government with the newly independent states of Georgia and Azerbaijan. According to the official web-site of the international conference held in Istanbul in 2018 for the 100th year of North Caucasus Republic; Moscow Treaty aimed cutting external support for the resistance in the North Caucasus. According to the article 8th of the Moscow Treaty; "Parties agree on refusing, [or not accepting) the placement of communities that established an entity that has a government function within the territories of each part"7. Even though Soviet Russia has never complied with this article, in Turkey especially between the years of 1920s and 1930s, article 8th became a ground for pressure on political immigrants from North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Crimea, Volga-Ural, and Turkestan have sought refuge in Turkey.

Circassians of the homeland and Circassians in Anatolia were now separated from each other with clear-cut borders. Prior to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the future power authority cadre cut the support given to the North Caucasus Republic by Ottomans. To conclude, in the process of the establishment of modern Turkey, Circassians had lost its most valuable ally of their first modern state.

2.2.6. 1921 Treaty of Ankara: Establishment of the Borders

In October 20, 1921 the Treaty of Ankara was signed between Ankara Government of Turkey and France. The significance of the Treaty of Ankara for Circassian

7 www.kuzeykafkasyacumhuriyeti.org

diaspora was the interruption of the connection between Circassians living in the Anatolia and in the Middle East due to the establishment of Turkey's Middle East border.

Circassians being expelled from their native land, the Caucasus, to the lands of Ottoman Empire, which later divided into separate nation-states is another reason to categorize Circassians as a diasporic society. According to William Safran's definition of a classic diaspora a diasporic community is; "a minority community whose members share several of the following characteristics: They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original "center" to two or more "peripheral," or foreign, regions” (Safran, 1991).

2.2.7. 1921 End of North Caucasus Republic

The North Caucasus Republic, the only modern and independent state of Circassians, as well as people of North Caucasus established in the historical territory of Circassians destroyed by the White Army and then later the Red Army during Russian Civil War. The North Caucasus Republic collapsed in 1921.

2.3. 1923 Establishment of Republic of Turkey

In this section, in order to explain the ecology of the Circassian diaspora of Turkey, I outline the backround of the Circassian settlement in Turkey during the emergence of the Turkish Republic and afterwards.

2.3.1. The Betrayer, Ethem the Circassian

Ethem the Circassian and his brother Resit Bey had played a crucial role in the ‘Independence War’ and in the “National Struggle” of the Turkish Republic. However, in the first years of the young republic, Ethem got annihilated by the central authority and labeled as " the betrayer." The label “betrayer” was not used for Ethem as an individual; instead, Ethem was also identified as “The Betrayer Circassian” there by implicating all Circassians of the newly found Republic. The betrayer or traitor Circassian label remained in history textbooks of elementary, secondary and high schools of Turkey until the 1990s.

“The identification of another person as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgment” (Barth, 1969a, p. 11). According to Barth; “dichotomization of others as strangers, as members of another ethnic group, implies a recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgment of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest” (Barth, 1969a). Therefore, all Circassians of Turkey was identified as ‘the betrayer other’ through an individual name, Ethem the Circassian and punished.

2.3.2. 1920-1923 Forced Immigration of Manyas Circassians

The years of 1920 and 1923 were the years of liquidation and exile for the Circassians. Between those years, fourteen Circassian villages 8 in Gönen and

8 Names of the banished Manyas-Gönen Circassian villages: Üçpınar, Muratlar, Sızıköy, Dereköy, Keçeler, Kızıl Kilise, Yeniköy, Dümbe, Ilıca, Karaçalılık, Bölceağaç, Değirmen Boğazı, Hacı Osman, Mürrüvetler (Ozden, 2018).

Manyas regions of Turkey banished and the properties of the residents of the other thirty Circassian villages were confiscated. Even though there were other [Muslim] groups who rebelled against the forces of Ankara during the years of National Struggle, only the Circassians were treated harshly. Today, the Circassian community is symbolically trying to heal the wounds of the exile, which began on May 21, 1864. However, it seems they have also pushed what happened between 1920 and 1923 subconsciously into their collective memory. Therefore, according to Erciyes, “The tension between the traitor identity and the superiority of the ethnic identity has shaken the grounds of belonging here [Turkey]…” (Erciyes, 2014). The accusations of 'Ethem the Circassian' committing treason against the state has put a significant burden on the Circassian community. Murat Ozden’s words, a Circassian activist from Southern-Marmara Region of Turkey, are exemplary in this sense: “When I was a child, I witnessed that our elders were talking secretly with each other about something, sometime called ‘lexanem-exile time’ a period which I felt that very bad things had happened. As a child, I could not make sense of what they have been talking about” (Ozden, 2018). Ozden continues his memories as follows: “We are among the Southern-Marmara Circassians. The villagers were sent to exile because of Ethem the Circassian and Anzavur incidents. My wife's family was deported to Kilis [Syrian border of Turkey] where they later returned back. They lost lives during the exile. Incidents of kidnapping happened. There were grievances among the Circassians of this [Gönen-Manyas] region” (Ozden,

2018).

According to Barth; “The persistence of ethnic groups in contact implies not only criteria and signals for identification, but also a structuring of interaction which allows the persistence of cultural differences” (Barth, 1969a). Signaling of who is in the group and out of the group sets the boundaries. Therefore, as a boundary, the Circassian language was also banned. “Unaware of this situation, or unconsciously, I heard many memories. For example, in a tea garden in Gönen, if one of them were talking in Circassian language, others were warning as; "we should not speak in

Circassian, these men [the others] consider us gavur [Non-Muslim, enemy, Greek] they can squeal us". From my childhood, although my father was not an enemy of CHP, I have a great dislike for İsmet İnönü. I cannot tolerate CHP" (Ozden, 2018).

2.3.3 The list of 150s

Following the Lausanne Peace Conference, the Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed on July 24, 1923. The treaty included general amnesty, laws, protocols as well as many sub-agreements and conventions, for those involved in the crimes of war and committed crimes during ‘the Armenian Exile’ [between August 1, 1914, and November 20, 1922]. During discussions, Circassians were among the minorities mentioned and whose future was discussed in the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1923. The British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon offered Circassians to be recognized as a minority. However, Ismet Pasha identified Circassians as "our brothers" as well as Kurds. After long debates, the Government of the Republic of Turkey gained the right of excluding the 150 people from the scope of the amnesty which had allied with the Entente powers during the National Struggle. However, Turkey could not impose any punishment on these people. The only penalty was to alienate them if they are still residing in Turkey or to ban their entrance into Turkey and prohibit them from living in Turkey if they are abroad. The question of defining treason against the National Struggle was determined, and a list of 150 people who betrayed Turkey is prepared after series of meetings “behind the closed doors…” with "personal convictions and suspicions" (Aydemir, 2005). Some of the speeches about the Circassians in the discussions held in the Parliament of Republic of Turkey in the preparation of the ‘list of 150s’ are as follows:

“..."Ferit Bey [Continued]: Yes, Captain Sami, Halil Ibrahim the Circassian. Hulusi Bey [Karesi MEP]: He is not Circassian, sir. [That is to say, he should not

enter the list because he is not Circassian]

Ragıp Bey [Kütahya MEP]: For example...are entering, but I could not see Mayor Hulusi of Ushak city.

Hulusi Bey: One of the Circassians you have said is a person like a whole battalion.

İsmet Bey [Çorum MEP]: In the list, there is a man who manages all of the measures of Vahdettin. Treasurer Refik. There is no one here to take his place, equal to him. Refik should be in the list, and a Circassian is needed to be taken out… Such delegates of the Circassian Congress, ‘Lajpat’ Yakup, ‘Kumpat’ Hafiz Sait, they use their names with Grek names"

These names are not Greek, but Circassian family names. Even today, these names are enough to find out this deputies identities” (Aydemir, 2005).

Therefore; these historical facts exemplify the interaction of the modern Turkish state and Circassians of Turkey in the early years of the Republic. These treatments provide evidence for one of the six points of the William Safran's definition of a classical diaspora in which: “they believe that they are not—and perhaps cannot be—entirely accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it” (Safran, 1991).

2.3.4. 1950s Foundation of the first Circassian NGO in Turkey

Circassians had a silence period starting from 1923 to 1950s (Alankus, 2009). Urbanization, migrating from villages to cities for education and work formed a

new, and when compared with closed community life in the village, highly diverse platform for Circassian identity to be reproduced. After 30 years of a silent period, Circassians established culture clubs with a somewhat folkloric theme in the 1950s.

“The Circassian urban elite and intellectuals incorporated themselves into the dominant nationalist discourse, avoided their ethnic identity and background in public life while preserving, to some extent, a [weakening] memory of their ethnic culture in their private lives. The rural areas, where most of the Circassians lived at that time, had been a refuge for the preservation of the Circassian culture, thanks to their economic and social isolation” (Alankus, 2009).

2.4. Trasnational Diasporic Encounters of the Circassians

2.4.1. 1992 Abkhazian Georgian war / 1994-1996, 1st Chechen war

Another corresponding evident of why Circassians are a diasporic community by William Safran's definition of a diasporic Community is the Circassians reactions against ‘foreign’ invasions of the present Caucasus. During the 90s two central conflicts arouse in the Caucasus. Both conflicts contained the elements of an invasion of the territory which diaspora members feel connected to. Therefore, the Abkhazian-Georgian and the Russian-Chechen wars had profound effects on the Circassian Diaspora. Circassians from Turkey, Jordan, and Syria volunteered to fight in order to defend "the homeland"9. Circassians acted according to Safran's definition of a diasporic community where they are a minority and "they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and its safety and prosperity" (Safran, 1991). In 1992 and

9 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/turist-olarak-geldi-general-oldu-26436240

1994, the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia, Chechenia and Russia unveiled the cultural memory of Circassians. The notion of homeland under occupation made Circassians form new political platforms in addition to culture-based associations.

2.4.2. 1998, the trip to the Caucasus; Prince Ali of Jordan

In 1998, the 23-year-old son of King Hussein of Jordan, Prince Ali bin Al Hussein, accomplished a symbolic trip on horseback to the Caucasus by starting his journey from Amman of Jordan. Prince Ali and his friends were as if "fictitious fairy tale heroes coming behind the Kaf Mountain” (Kaya, 2011) realizing a reverse migration of Circassians since the exile in 1864. The cavaliers and the convoy following them traveled along on the migration route and settlement locations of the Circassians through Syria and Turkey until they reach their final destination; the Caucasus. On the way at each stop, crowds of people in Syria and Turkey welcomed the convoy, but this time not as the Turks or the Syrians but as the Circassians. There were sentimental scenes of “elders…trying to touch these cavalries with their hands as if they want to try to convince themselves about what they have seen is real (Kaya, 2010).

Indeed, during my visit to Tokat city for welcoming Prince Ali, I also have witnessed a senior woman, unconsciously approaching to the Circassian Dagger [Kama] of one of horseman among the group of the Prince and standing still only by holding the dagger. The trip to Caucasus of Prince Ali contained symbols of a diasporic society either in the form of the imaginary noble heroes coming out of the tales or in “realization of the lost relatives in the ‘Arabian lands’ which they time to time hear tenuous information” (Kaya, 2011, p. 83).

Kaya in his book titled “Circassians in Turkey” underlines the fact of distribution of the documentary film of the trip of Prince Ali of Jordan among the Circassian associations as an example of the “electronic capitalism” forming a “community of sentiments” which reproduced Circassian identity (Kaya, 2011, p. 84).

2.4.3. 1999 the Establishment of a New Diasporic Platform; iCircassia

Turkey has met with the Internet in late 1993. Through the 2000s, dial-up connection left its place to ADSL. Via digital capitalism, this time, local Circassian identity has evolved into a new transnational identity. My first experience with other diaspora members was through MIRC chatroom founded by an Israeli Circassian, Edris Abzach, which was among the first examples of online personal interaction of diaspora members. These chatrooms let Circassians from different geographical locations encounter with each other and discover their commonalities. There were strict rules of the common and private chat rooms, which were run by the admins. These rules were mainly built in and around the notion of Xabze10. As a fifteen-year-old then, when compared with other chatrooms, Abzakh's chatroom was safe in terms of the adult and child interaction. Even though the participants are using nicknames rather than their real names, when a new person entered the chatroom, the members automatically asked the tribe and family name of the newcomer to identify him as Circassian. If the participant was not a Circassian, according to my observation, he or she was politely banned.

Through the chat rooms, the online connection of the diaspora has time to time produced international marriages among the members of the Circassian diaspora. Therefore, after 1999, especially for the Circassians in Turkey out of the encounter

10 Circassian Etiquette

with Circassians on a transnational level, became a platform for Circassians within Turkey to stay connected.

In 2014, Lars Funch Hansen developed the terminology of "iCircassia," identifying the online presence of Circassians as "Circassian Digital Diaspora" around the concept of the Benedict Andersons "imagined communities". According to Hansen, "iCircassia is an imagined community that contains a number of the same features that modern nations and ethnic groups- despite diverging power implications- and "iCircassia" still is a relatively new accomplishment of transnational endeavors among the geographically scattered Circassians" (Hansen, 2014). Therefore, through the Internet, the isolated Circassians had the opportunity and a third space, ‘iCircassia’, to explore, influence, and mobilize each other.

2.4.4. 2007 Remembrance of 1864; was it a Genocide? Protests in front of the Russian Embassy on May 21

The tragedy Circassians experienced in 1864 was widely being defined as "the Great Circassian Exile" in the majority of the literature. However, whether if the tragedy was an exile, an exodus, a voluntary migration, or a genocide, has remained as a topic of an ongoing discussion. On May 21's around the world, Circassians gather around specific events in order to remember their ancestors. These commemoration events are around certain rituals such as leaving flowers to the Bosphorus and the Black Sea mainly from the ports which Circassian refugees, the ones managed to survive, first stepped on land from the Black Sea.

In 2007, Circassians performed an organized protest in front of the Russian Embassy for the first time, [even though time to time there were protests done by small groups], under the name of ‘the North Caucasus Platform.’ This group was

carrying labels such as; ‘Do not be ashamed, tell them we wanted the genocide voluntarily". After 2007, the protests in front of the Russian Embassy, especially on each May 21, was going to be a new ritual for the Circassian diaspora in Turkey.

2.2.5. 2008 Harvard Conference

In 2007, a Circassian group from New Jersey, with the leadership of Syrian Circassians Iyad Youghar and Zack Barsıq refuged to the U.S. after Arab-Israel war, donated their taxes to a US-based Think-tank in Washington DC and funded a small round table meeting about Circassian in the headquarters of the think-tank organization. The keynote speaker of the event was Prof. Kemal Karpat. Following the Washington DC meeting, a conference in Carr Center, Harvard Kennedy School was held in 2008.

The Circassian diaspora members who met previously over the Internet and whose common reference was commemorating "the injustice which their ancestors have gone through" joined the event. There were Circassians from Turkey among the participants. With Harvard Conference, Circassians who were out of the focus presented their unknown history for the first time on such a platform.

2.4.6 2011 Georgia Officially Recognized the Circassian Genocide

Rose Revolution in 2003 has shifted the political direction of Georgia. Therefore, rather than Russia, especially under Michael Saakashvili's presidency, Georgia turned its face to the United States and the European Union. “ At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that a clumsy Bush-led effort

to confer NATO membership on Georgia and Ukraine would constitute a ‘direct threat’ to Russia's security” (Stronki, Paul. Vreeman, 2017).

In 2008, Saakashvili attempted to solve the conflict with the so-called "the separatists" Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which had been fighting for their independence for over a decade, by using military power. However, the Russian State got involved in the conflict by not only driving the Georgian forces out of South Ossetia but going even further recognizing the independence of Abkhazia.

The fact that Abkhazians and Adiga's are speaking different languages and far relatives of each other, they have many times been identified as the 'Circassian' in the diaspora. This term evolved into identifying Adiga's as the Circassian, and Abkhazians as the Abaza as a result of the rhetorics produced especially during the independence struggle of Abkhazia.

In 2011 Georgian Parliament officially recognized the Circassian Genocide. During the pre-conferences and meetings leading to the recognition, in the end, Russia's historic "the invader of the Caucasus" role underlined and a call for the people of Caucasus to solve their own problems was made. A genocide memorial was erected to the Anaklia shore of the Black Sea, neighboring Abkhazia. Therefore, the official recognition of the genocide of the Russian Empire committed over Circassians consolidated the term ‘Circassian Genocide’.

2.5. 2013 Syrian Civil War: Syrian Circassians

In 2010 series of public demonstrations and uprisings against governments in the Middle East in a domino move had its peak in terms of the humanitarian crisis in Syria. While there were Circassians in the Assad government, such as the Internal

Minister Bassam Beroqo Abdel Majeed, the Circassians in public remained neutral, actively supporting neither the Syrian Government nor the Syrian Opposition.

However, as the crisis escalated, Circassians in Syria started to seek ways to flee. Circassians in Turkey were also seeking ways of establishing a safer life for Syrian Circassians. In the end, two aid committees were established for Syrian Circassians; one by a federation of Circassians of Turkey and another by an independent group. These two aid committees were active however they time to time confronted each other. Each group had organized aids including welcoming Syrian Circassians at the airport and even renting private aircraft and transporting them to Turkey from Syria via Lebanon.

The compulsory movement of Circassians in Syria has been a reproduction process for the Circassian identity among the Circassian diaspora, which used to have minimal connections until then. This time, not only the ones who have a passport and are able to travel or the ones who can use the Internet, but Circassians living in the villages also had the chance of engaging with their diasporic identity through the common references they share with the Syrian Circassian refugees settled in their village. However, conflicts, and misunderstandings due to Syrian and Turkish identities these people had were hard to avoid.

2.5.1. Syria-Turkey: The Airbridge Operation

As the civil war in Syria continued, the situation of the Circassians in Syria became a more important topic of discussion. In 2007, with a group of Circassians from Turkey, I traveled to Syria by bus to attend a Circassian festival in Damascus. I had the chance of visiting Circassian villages at the Israeli Border named Beriqa and Ber Ajem. Our group was hosted by the Minister of Interior of Syria who was also

identifying himself as Circassian and able to speak Circassian fluently, Bassam Abdel Majid. Moreover, I had the opportunity of meeting with Cevdet Said who is one of the well-known Islamic authorities in Syria who is also known with his views against violence in the entire Islamic World, in one of these villages during our visit. At the beginning of the Civil War, while Bassam Abdel Majid took a stand by the Assad regime, Said was among the 20 signatories of the open letter expressing concerns about the violent practices against Syrian citizens. Said and Abdel Majid were both Circassians from the same village.

I interviewed Tsey, aged 50, who moved to Turkey seven years ago and was active in supporting the Circassians in Syria since the war began (Tsey, 2019). He self- identifies himself as a Syrian Circassian and was in a central position of the airbridge operation where he took part voluntarily. As someone from the field, he reported that there are not even fifty-thousand Circassians living [scattered throughout] Syria. He mentioned that there are 25 Circassian villages in Syria in the following areas: Humus, Golan hills, Aleppo, and Haseke. He added that there is no region in Syria where the Circassian population is concentrated. On the other hand, ORSAM 2012 report which is one of the first reports published in Turkey about Syrian Circassians estimates the population of Circassians in Syria between ninety thousand to a hundred thousand (Kushabiev, 2012).

Tsey was among the first Syrian-Circassians living abroad. He had been living in Turkey for seven years when the Syrian conflict broke up. In the interview I made, Tsey explained in detail what the Syrian Circassians went through in the beginning of the conflict up to the airbridge operation. Since this information is being documented for the first time, the whole interview is included in the study.

In the early days of the war, I made a call in 2011; "If there's a civil war, we can't do anything. It will be difficult for us to protect ourselves...prepare passports. If you have your own property, your own

home, land, sell them and return to the Caucasus" I said. [Tsey, Solidarity]

According to Willim Safran, a diasporic society “regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would [or should] eventually return—when conditions are appropriate”(Safran, 1991). At the beginning of the conflict, Tsey warned his fellows to get ready and try to return to their homeland, the Caucasus. As a member of the diaspora, the first spot he considered as a safe haven was the historic homeland and for him, it was allready a task to accomplish.

Because I did not think of another place. Turkey, for example, did not come to my mind. Refugees coming to Turkey, or will go to Jordan or Lebanon. I never thought of it. It was the shortest way to return to the Caucasus, and it was the place where there was a high chance of being accepted. Of course, I knew that 50,000 Circassians in one year or 6 months would be impossible to return. Russia would not accept. However, people needed to get ready. [Tsey, Solidarity]

However Circassians in Syria had the confidence of not being affected by the dispute, though some members had already planned to return to the historic homeland, the Caucasus.

Nobody listened to me. "There will be no such thing. Nothing is going to happen in Syria. Nothing big will happen. In two months, this problem will end in three months, as in Libya," they said. How is the old policy of Syria? How is the new policy? We all know. But people lived in hope. They thought nothing was going to happen. However, friends like me [living out of Syria] were considering it the same way, with the same approach. Some people lived in Syria and were aware of the situation, but they were very few. They already had a plan to return to the Caucasus. They were slowly getting ready. My uncle is one of them. A few months later, the civil war started, and it was small at first. There was still nothing in the Circassian areas, there was no risk. But obviously, this fire was growing slowly. In 2012, a year later, on the Golan Heights, in the villages of Humus, in the villages of Aleppo... [Tsey, Solidarity]

According to Tsey, Circassians were in a neutral position, and their stand was known, accepted and in some sense respected by the other parties of Syria.

However, they were not fighting. No. The Circassians did not enter the war. They did not enter the war, but why? Because there are few Circassians. Very few, compared to the Syrian population. Their villages are scattered and not close together. They have no political goals. Some Circassians support the regime, and there were supporters of the opposition. However, the majority of Circassians was not supporting any side. They did not want war because war is something horrible. Then, if they enter the war, they would need weapons. Who will support? Who will provide the weapons? The Circassians refused to accept slavery. Because they know, the one who is going to give me a gun will now give me, and then he will control me after a while. So they did not want to get into this game. In my opinion, I think they did a good thing... Whether it was the regime side or the opposition party, they showed great respect to the Circassians. If the opposition had arrested a soldier and this soldier happened to be a Circassian, they did not really do anything. Because they know the Circassians, they know that there will be no harm coming from this Circassian soldier. Because he is a soldier, he must hold a gun. He was forced to join the army, but his purpose is not to kill people...There were Circassians who fought among the opposition. But how? For example, he does military service, but he sees this cruelty and how bad it is. He runs away. There are such young people. However, the majority of Circassians were in the middle. They did not support the regime or the opposition. [Tsey, Solidarity]

Eventually, after Syrian Circassians living in villages in the Golan area got trapped in between the Syrian Opposition forces and the Regime forces, Syrian Circassians were in need of a safe haven until the war ends. Therefore, the Airbridge operation decision was given. According to the news report of IHA News agency, “…Circassians of Turkey needed to take action as the Syrian Circassians mainly living in Damascus, Homs, and Ber-Acem; Beriqa and Kisva villages of Golan area on the Israeli Border, got stuck in between the Syrian Army and Syrian Opposition… Pressure and tension began to build and heighten among the Circassians living in Syria as the bombing of these villages and cities in which they reside began to increase. As this pressure increased, the need for an extensive operation to help Circassians of Syria clearly emerged. Through the use of various social media platforms, messages for help and assistance was broadcasted across all three languages: Arabic, Turkish, and Circassian. Lists containing the names of Syrian Circassians were intending to flee the violence which had erupted in the country began to form” (IHA, 2013)11.

Tsey as a Syrian Circassian living in Turkey for seven years was the first person to get information from the warzone. Therefore, he was invited to speak at a conference held by Circassians in Turkey wishing to deliver aid to Circassians in Syria which they feel an attachment and an obligation for and which they identify within the “common we” (Doğan, 2009) as Dogan defines.

In 2012, a conference was held in Cevahir Hotel...Cevdet Said's brother's son from Golan Heights was there. This young man managed to reach Lebanon. I immediately called him. "Come tell [what has been going on] in this conference," I said. That night, he left his wife and daughter in Lebanon and came to Istanbul. So, he gave a speech at the conference. During that time on the Golan Heights; Ber Acem and Berika villages were occupied. Families were stranded. My uncles and aunts were among those stranded. [Tsey, Solidarity]

According to Tsey; Circassians were at a crossfire in Syria between the Opposition and Regime forces managed to escape and found safety in Damascus, as Tsey explains, over there they were able to “disappear” among “the others”. Therefore by disappearing, they were not being identified with their ethnic markers.

Our villages at Golan are Ber Ajem, Berika, and Mudariyye. There are three Circassian villages on the hill. Golan hills are generally not forested, but those hills are in the woodlands and at the border. It is entirely adjacent to the [Israeli] border. There are 2-3 km between in each village, but there are no Arab villages in between them. The opposing soldiers [to the Syrian Regime] and families fled from another region and asked to pass through Jabali Sheikh Mountain to Dar'a. They had to pass through this forested area. And Ber Ajem, Beriqa, and

11 İha News Agency; Suriye’de Çerkes Operasyonu; https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-suriyede- cerkes-operasyonu-269985/, 28 March 2013 12;28

Mudariyye were in the forest. They sat in the woods to hide. The regime soldiers opened fire on them with bombs, airplane, and tanks. And our people; Circassian families were stranded between the two sides. In between the Opposition in the mountain and the Regime was below and Circassian families in the village, [in the middle]. They were stranded for one week or two weeks. They stayed in bunkers. No bread left. No water. They were not able to go out. There were snipers of both sides. [Tsey, Solidarity]

Opposition forces could enter the village. There was no problem between them. There was no problem between the people and the Opposition. Some Circassians Thamade's [refers to respected elders] asked opposition fighters to leave the village. They said, "We are not able to get out". Their goal was to go to the Dar'a, but the regime forces were on the way. We did not understand what precisely the Regime wanted. There was something like a game. My relatives right after they got out of there told us what happened. The game was this: The Regime had the idea of a massacre of Circassians. And they would put the blame on the Opposition. Therefore, the rest of the Circassians would oppose the Opposition forces. They played such a game. As the villagers realized this, they got scared and said that we should leave this village no matter what. While the village was under fire, a veil of mist and fog covered the village. At that time, the villagers decided at once, they got out of bunkers and fled into the desert. Of course, snipers targeted them. But Allah has protected everyone. How did the villagers understand this game? Now there are two villages. Ber Ajem and Berika [both Circassian villages]. Half of Berika is under the control of the Regime, and Ber Ajem is under the control of the Opposition. Villagers were able to talk to the regime forces. Our young people living in Damascus, Qutsaya got mobilized, "It has been a week after people went to the shelter. Something has to be done" they said. They talked to the regime forces. They said, "Something needs to be done, the food needs to be sent," but soldiers said, "It is forbidden." One day later the Regime's own television station came. The Regime then called our youth and said that they were allowed to take aid to the village. These were the things that happened before the people escaped into the desert. Then the young people entered the road between the two villages. So who is recording in the meantime? Syrian Television. Immediately in the border of the regimes control zone, these cars were mowed down. Who opened fire? Unknown. The opposition fighters were two miles away. There is 2 km between Ber Ajem and Beriqa. Cars were out of sight of the opposition forces. That day my cousin died in that car. The other vehicle continued without stopping. Therefore, if the Opposition had opened fire, how could the car ahead was able to continue? That car reached to the

Circassians who remained in Ber Ajem. Opposition fighters reached them immediately. "Did anything happen to you?" They asked. In other words, the car behind was shot in the border of Beriqa, but the one ahead drive straight through, through the oppositions [control zone]. They entered the village. Nobody opened fire there. How could the second car be able to continue to if the Opposition indeed opened this fire? At that very moment, the Regime's television was also recording. My uncle was among the ones hiding in the bunker; his name was Samir. "Your son was coming to save you, but they shot him dead," they said. A few days later, when there was fog, they came out of the bunker and fled into the desert under fire. Those who escaped came to Damascus. After they arrived at Damascus, no one was hurt. Because the Circassians were not holding a gun in their hands. In Damascus, they disappeared among other people [They were not able to be identified through their ethnic identity]. [Tsey, Solidarity]

Tsey was also the first-hand witness to the birth of the Airbridge operation. He explains in detail how this idea was born.

When all these were happening, Cevdet Said's nephew came to the Conference. He told all of these at the Conference. In the Conference Dr. Nusret, Kenan, Erol, Murat together established here in Turkey, the Solidarity Committee [World Circassians Solidarity Committee], KAFFED [Caucasian Associations Federation]. There were other associations. I didn't know what the difference between them was. That day, they raised funds at the Conference. They talked about aid assistance and support plans for Circassians from Syria. Then I didn't know what kind of support they'd make. My goal was to see how Syrian Circassians could get out of Syria. Then the committee started to work, they asked for my help. I began to inform the Circassians in Syria through Facebook, phone and social media. I said, "if you are afraid or have a concern about your life" The door of Circassians in Turkey is open for you," I said. The Circassians could not believe this for a couple of months. Gradually families began to arrive. At that time, Circassians lived in Damascus. Then there was no risk in Damascus. Again, hope began to grow. I told them that, there was no war in your village, but it will start. The fire is slowly growing. There may be massacres, bombs, human kidnapping. Syria will be a lawless country. How can our mothers, sisters live in such an environment? You need to go somewhere safe. Yes, there is no war in Damascus, but there can be any moment. [Tsey, Solidarity]

According to my interview with Tsey, the Circassians in Syria started to come to Turkey in growing numbers “In a few months, we don't know exactly, but there were 200 to 300 families” he says. The increasing hardship of setting up a life for each family and limited resources forced committee members to find alternative resources. “It was the State's business. That's a big thing. It was not something on the level of an association”. Therefore the Solidarity Committee asked help from the Turkish authorities. In 2013, the president of the Solidarity Committee called Tsey to get his first-hand opinion as a Syrian Circassian who was receiving information about the region on a daily basis:

There is a new camp in Gaziantep. There are 2000 containers. They can give all of them to Circassians. What is your opinion?" Dr. said. [During that period] I was talking to Dr. Nusret every day for two months. At first I was against this [camp] idea. Because Syrian Circassians, the Circassians could accept to die, but it was difficult for them to live in a camp. Of course, the first camps were tents. There were images of impoverished people on TV [from the camps in Jordan and Turkey]. Moreover, when Circassians [in the Arab-Israeli War in 1962] migrated from Golan [Syria], there were no houses there. There were tents. They didn't want to re-live this. "We do not want to be a refugee again, we can die in Syria," they decided”. “If I make such a call [for the camp], one day they can look at me as a traitor. They would say "How did Tsey accept this? How did he put us in such a situation?" I didn't know what to do. Then I talked to a friend of mine. He also said, “There are many people in very bad condition. Maybe they could settle for the camp. We can not live in this war", he said. He said,"we need to decide now, There are 2000 containers, but we have to make a decision. Otherwise, it will be canceled", And I said, "Do not cancel. But keep 200 containers. That place would be a stop over. First Syrian Circassians will get there, then maybe houses will be found for them. The doctor said..." [The container camp] would be a temporary settlement for having a sigh of relief. [Tsey, Solidarity]

Tsey had passed through difficult inner discussions. When the war spread to Homs and Aleppo, which are among the Circassian settlements in Syria, Tsey and his Syrian Circassian friends living in Turkey decided to accept the camp idea. However, there was a refugee flood coming toward Turkey as the heat of the war

increased. The president of the Committee, Dr.Nusret informed Tsey that the newly built container camp offered by the Turkish authorities for Syrian Circassians to settle is going to be opened to all refugees, therefore if there is no decision, the project was about to be canceled. Tsey immediately started informing Syrian Circassians through Facebook and Social Media together with another Syrian Circassian living in Lebanon, Janti Kim.

Container Camp as a place of safe haven for Syrian Circassians where they will stay temporarily was secured by the Solidarity Committee. However, this time, the transfer of the Circassians in the Golan area became another question. The residents of the containers should get their containers as soon as possible before the refugee flow. The committee evaluated two options of transfer; by ferry from Lebanon or by plane. In each case, Syrian Circassians were supposed to pass the Syrian- Lebanon border. Committee rented a commercial aircraft to go back and forth four times to transfer Syrian Circassians who immediately needed to get out of the war zone. The members of the Solidarity Committee, including Tsey flew to Lebanon. In a hotel room in Beirut, they prepared a list of 180 Syrian Circassians from the applications made via social media.

Then one day, a call was posted on Facebook for Syrian Circassians in Arabic. It was published by Syrian Circassian living in Hatay [Turkey]. “Beware! Never come to Turkey! This is a lie! There is nothing over there! When you arrive at camp, they will immediately take your passports. There is no food! There is no going out [of the camp]. This is a jail. You will be refugees!” was written on the post. [Tsey, Solidarity]

In the Facebook post published to prevent Syrian Circassians from coming to Turkey with the Airbridge operation of Solidarity Committee, the images of tents and peoples pictures who were about to die from hunger were also posted alongside.

Then we immediately called the head of the camp. I asked him. “Give me a promise. Is this really a place like this?" The camps manager sent me pictures. Then I wrote that "this post is a lie! These are the real pictures". Then I researched, I talked with the man who wrote the post. This man was told by the President of Reyhaniye Association [From Circassian Patriots]. Their president told him to write that post. How will they pay for this sin? What happened then? 180 people canceled. [Tsey, Solidarity]

The team responsible for taking this momentous project of transporting Syrian Circassians to Turkey, working tirelessly accomplished re-organizing the first 180 families who would begin a series of trips between the two countries. A commercial aircraft was rented for this trip. The team had meetings with officials from the Foreign Ministry of Turkey and the Internal Ministry, Disaster and Management Authority [AFAD]. A place for Syrian Circassians to stay was finally secured. “…a guarantee is taken for hosting these people for a certain period in a camp in Gaziantep” (‘IHA’, 2013) 12 . Having completed all the necessary governmental procedures, a message was sent out on March 23, 2013 to families who had been identified as willing to make the trip. The message relayed to inform the Syrian Circassian families to make their way to the airport in Beirut. “The group had a long and weary land journey [passed the Syria-Lebanon border] arrived in Beirut. By 21:00, the ones who already have passed from the passport control kept on waiting in fear” (Aygun, 2013). Large groups began to descend upon the airport and boarded to aircraft, when finally, “Everyone had a sigh of relief, as the aircraft carrying the 178 Syrian Circassian refugees, including 66 children, left the ground.”(‘IHA’, 2013)13 .

After the boarding; a link of a web site, showing the live route of aircraft was shared from Facebook. Members of Circassian diaspora in Turkey was following the flight

12 İha News Agency; Suriye’de Çerkes Operasyonu; https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-suriyede- cerkes-operasyonu-269985/, 28 March 2013 12;28

online. A serious moment of relief was expressed by those on board and by those whom were following the flight online when the aircraft crossed over Cyprus and updated its destination information to Turkey rather than Russia as previously listed.

Awaiting the Syrian Circassian groups’ arrival to the destination at Gaziantep, a counterpart group of Circassians of Turkey from the Solidarity network had formed to prepare for their welcome. These individuals traveled from several regions and the cities within the country and had coined themselves, forming the group; “Circassian Solidarity”. This very group come to operate and organize a total of four separate flights for pulling Circassians out of war-torn Syria, to seek refuge in Turkey. Both groups had never met before but share commonalities as they were both descendants of the indigenous people of the North Caucasus who were spread and dispersed throughout Ottoman lands over 149 years ago. Despite the perils of the time, both counterpart groups shared the common tragedy, a common idea of a homeland and a common culture. These would be the bonds serve to connect everyone together. However, as an ethnic diaspora the Circassians of Syria and Turkey were subjected to different local ecologies; therefore they reflect a history of adaptation to their previous environments as well as the external circumstances to which actors must accommodate themselves (Barth, 1969a).

To recapitulate, the historical boundaries of Circassian Diaspora identity in Turkey have emerged through the collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires and the emergence of the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union. The historical, social, and political context of each nation-state within the boundaries of former empires had a long-lasting impact on the rise and evolution of ethnic minority and diaspora identities, including the Circassians.

Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire has left the emergence of many nation-states and ethnic diasporas. Circassians were among them. Now, rather than being only the indigenous people of a particular territory, the Caucasus, Circassians became an

ethnic diaspora, as Safran defines, by being “dispersed from a specific original ‘center’ to two or more ‘peripheral’, or foreign regions” (Safran, 1991). Yet, with the collapse of the Czarist Russia, Circassians had their independent state for only three years. In the early years of 1918 with the Soviet regime, the North Caucasus Republic disappeared on the map but not in the minds and hearts of the Circassian diaspora.

Safran also lays out the characteristics of a diasporic society through the host societies’ encounters with them. The top-down nationalist policies of the early Turkish Republic oppressed and denied the Circassian language and identity. Therefore, under Safran’s description, due to the dichotomized state policies, Circassians of Turkey lost their belief of being “fully accepted by their host society, and therefore they feel [felt] partly alienated and insulated from it” (Safran, 1991). This has led to an inward-oriented and silent period of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey in the 1950s. Through the democratization process, Circassians have started to self organize and mobilize themselves as a distinct cultural group starting in the 1950s. Moreover, the wars in the Caucasus in the 1990’s revitalized the Circassian identity and its claim to a homeland. Anti-Russian sentiments have become mainly a common ground to define what the Circassians are not.

The latest crisis for the Circassian diaspora in Turkey has been a result of the war in Syria since 2011. Along with many ethnic and sectarian groups, Circassians of Syria have started to seek refuge in Turkey. As Circassians were trapped between the Opposition and the Syrian Regime in Syria, they decided to flee the country. Meanwhile, the Circassian diaspora in Turkey mobilized to airlift their co-ethnics from Syria, the so-called the Airbridge operation in 2013. The boundaries of the Circassian identity has again been negotiated among the Circassians in Turkey during the Airbridge operation. Next chapter will examine how religion is mobilized as an ethnic boundary marker for the Circassians in Turkey during the Syrian crisis and the Airbridge operation.

CHAPTER III

RELIGION AS A CIRCASSIAN IDENTITY BOUNDARY MARKER

3.1. Introduction

This chapter examines how religion in general and Islam, in particular, is used to define the Circassian identity. It begins by giving a brief theoretical perspective on religion as an ethnic boundary marker from the constructivist approach. Next, it provides historical and contemporary background on Circassians’ relationship with Islam. Then compares and contrast the three Circassian networks [Circassian Solidarity, KAFFED, and Patriots] in order to illuminate how religion is treated as an ethnic boundary marker, especially during the Airbridge operation.

3.2. Theory; Ethnic Groups and Religion

The first established model for understanding ethnicity is the primordialist approach in which ethnicity is treated as a natural character of a group of people who are assumed to have culturally distinctive shared traits that define it as an ethnic group. Max Weber’s metaphor of “bed, blood, and cult” lays out the fundamental criteria for describing an ethnic group according to this approach. Weber acknowledges that a social group believes they share these traits central to their identity after forming a political entity. The metaphor of blood stands for the fact that all ethnic groups consider themselves to be biologically self-perpetuating and as having a shared ancestry; (bed) that they practice endogamy; and (cult) that they have a shared religion. The sense of belonging is naturally given to the individual through these ‘objective’ traits.

In his book titled “Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives”, Thomas H. Eriksen (2010) lays out the main theoretical discussions on ethnicity mainly from an anthropological perspective. His presentation begins with the subjective and constructed character of ethnicity as opposed to a primordialist approach, which treats ethnicity as an inherent quality of cultural difference to be mapped out. Eriksen challenges the primordialist approach by arguing that ethnic organization and identity, rather than having inherent, unchanging, and “natural” characteristics, are flexible and responsive to social changes through boundary shifts (Eriksen, 2010). It is frequently reactions to processes of modernization. Capitalism and nation-state, he argues, create an environment in which cultural differences among groups are constructed as boundaries between ethnic entities. Nevertheless, this chapter compares how the Solidarity, KAFFED, and Patriots groups treat religion in general and during the airbridge operation in particular as a boundary marker for being Circassian.

Scholars like Fredrik Barth treats ethnic categories, as such, as constant but their content changes because of the systematically imagined categories of “us” and “them”. Religion is often used to create the categories of “us” and “them” even among the rival Circassian groups in Turkey on being Circassian. Each group refers to religious elements such as rituals, religiously interpreted gender relations, and symbols such as headscarf to construct cultural differences, circulated among its members and distinguish themselves as representatives of “true” Circassians as opposed to others.

3.3. Circassian Identity and Islam

The Caucasus has been an area of passage for many ideas and forces throughout history including religions and Circassians living here have been influenced by them. Most notably for our purposes, Islam has entered the North Caucasus in the 8th century through Dagestan region by the Arabs. Islam came along with the army of Ebu-Muslim and settled in North-eastern Caucasus. However, Islam has been widely accepted in the west relatively later in the east and became the main religion of the North-western Caucasus which was result of the relations with Crimea between the 15-17th century.

In time, the peoples of the Caucasus have interpreted and practiced Islam according to their local ways. For instance, according to the notes of the Ottoman traveller Evliya Celebi (1611-1685), Circassians has their own and unique way of Islam: “They are not unbelievers nor Muslims. If one call them as kafir [non-Muslim] they will get angry. They close their one eye if you call them as Muslim. They deny Hashr and Neshr [Judgement Day]. They say Lailaheillallah14. But they eat the pigs from the pans. They do not fast, they do not pray” (Evliya Celebi 1970: 268).

According to a Russian official report sent to Moscow in the 19th century from the Caucasus, most of the Circassians were far from the shariah15 rules and worship (Tavkul, 1998). These reports are further supported by academic works as well. “Circassians are from the religion of the prophet Muhammad, but they do not care much about religion. As in the case of Lezgi and the Chechens, they are no shariah enthusiasts” (Kasumov 1995: 32).

14 Meaning; ‘There is no god but Allah’ in Arabic. 15 Encyclopedia Britannica: “Sharīʿah, also spelled Sharia, the fundamental religious concept

of Islam—namely, its law.

The religious law of Islam is seen as the expression of God’s command for Muslims and, in application, constitutes a system of duties that are incumbent upon all Muslims by virtue of their religious belief. Known as the Sharīʿah [literally, “the path leading to the watering place”], the law represents a divinely ordained path of conduct that guides Muslims toward a practical expression of religious conviction in this world and the goal of divine favour in the world to come. (Noel James Coulson and Ahmed El Shamsy, 2019)

It looks like there were differences in the way they practiced Islam as well. For instance Tavkul reports that Circassians' approach to Islamic social order and sharia rules differed according to the tribes (Tavkul, 1998). According to Tavkul, Islam had a lot of influences on the social structure of Caucasian peoples and caused them to change. Islam, which led to the weakening of aristocracy in the Western Caucasus. The development of the idea of equality between the social strata, delayed the occupation of Russia in the Caucasus in the 19th century for many years. Islam also led to unity and solidarity among the peoples of the Caucasus.

The role of Islam as a political force epitomized as it emerged as an ethnic identity marker against the non-Muslim Russians. The people of the Caucasus has gathered around the idealization of the "United Caucasus" and Islam served as a bonding force among the different ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in the Caucasus.

3.3.1. Islam and the Circassians: Contemporary Brief

Today the majority of Circassian diaspora in Turkey as well as other countries such as Syria, Israel, Europe and the USA are Sunni Muslims. Circassians kept practicing their religious faith in the lands they have settled in the way they know, even if some of those practices are in contradiction with the local understanding of Islam. As a result, they preserved many cultural beliefs and practices for a long time even though practicing those was not allowed in Islam. Left overs from the former religions can still be observed to the some extend in diaspora. Nevertheless, “The reason of leaving cultural / religious practices can be explained through the need of negotiating as a result of not being able to overcome the contradiction they had been experiencing” (Eser, 1999, p. 86).

Circassians living in the Caucasus went through a long oppression period during the Soviet rule over practicing religious beliefs, in comparison with the Circassians in the diaspora, and they re-established religious institutions, mosques quite recently. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need for Islamic education among the public was an open field for outside influences such as Wahhabism and Salafism. Despite the external influences, to a large extent, the Circassians living in the Caucasus have managed to stand against extremism through the Islamic teachings they learned from their ancestors. However, Circassian Islamic scholars living in diaspora were contributing to Islamic understanding in the countries they live in. Mahmut Bayram 16 in Turkey and Cevdet Said 17 in Syria are among the examples of Islamic scholars preaching a peaceful, anti-violent interpretation of Islam in contrast to Wahhabi and Salafi movements.

While among some Circassians, the traditions are more at the front and preferred, some other Circassian groups prefer purist Islamic interpretation. For example, the traditional Circassian dances are performed by men and women together such as the Wuig dance. Wuig has its roots in the polytheist religions of the Circassians and is still being performed today in order to open and end celebrations. However, “In 1965, according to the anonymos decision given at a meeting with the attendence of Thamades [the respected elders] of the [Circassian] villages of the Uzunyayla

16 Mazhar Mahmut Bayram was born in 1914 in Bayramic village of Gonen district of Balıkesir province. Bayram’s father, Salih Hodja, was born in the North Caucasus and from Adyghe’s Bechiy family. He settled to the village of Bayramic during great Circassian Exile in the year 1864. In the year 1930, Mahmut Bayram started his Quran citing lessons. Mahmut Hodja preached for many years in various mosques and especially in Kızıl Minaret mosque in Aksaray, Istanbul. His primary duty was to train students. Mahmut Bayram never lost his ties with the village he was born in and with Circassians. He died in 1997. (Kafkas Evi Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi)

17 Cevdet Said was born in 1931 in Ber Acem village in the Golan region of Syria. He became famous as a distinguished student and follower of a noted Islamic scholar, Algerian Malik Binnebi. Said [before fleeing to Turkey] spent his life away from the big city, where he identifies the source of degeneracy, in the Ber Acem village with two cows he fed. His main view is to resist violence and brute force, to revive the philosophical and cultural values of the Islamic world by returning to the essence (Özgür Çerkes).

region of Turkey, [the ritual of the performance of] the wuig dance during weddings was abolished (Özkurt, 2018, p. 200). Özkurt mentions the reason declared for the abolition of the dance was the abuse of the environment of free communication and joking among men and women by the non-Circassian participants. Furthermore, as Özkurt states, although, after 1965, the criticisms of the imams who served in this region and the neighboring people did not directly affect the Circassian traditions in general, in particular, contributed to the abolition of wuig dance [by regarding the practice of the wuig dance as non-islamic]. Similar desicion is also observed among the Circassians of the Black-sea region of Turkey. In Canbolat Village from the region, wuigs disappearance is explained by the villagers as “elders removing it by considering the dance as haram18”.

Circassians in Kfar Kama, Israel rejected an Arab Imam to be appointed to their mosque and they preferred an Imam from among themselves, which is another proof of not feeling comfortable with a religious man who does not know the Circassian way of understanding and practicing Islam along with the Circassian traditions.

3.3.2. Comparing Religious Markers among the Circassian Organizations in Turkey

In this thesis, I have studied the boundary markers of the Circassian identity of the Circassian organizations in Turkey which actively participated in the organization of the help or performed campaigns as a response to the difficult position of Circassians in Syria during the Syrian crisis. KAFFED and Circassian Solidarity

18 Oxford Dictionary: Forbidden or proscribed by Islamic law (Dictionary) .

[Later evolved into CERKESFED] were the two major groups involved in the aid organization. The “airbridge operation” which is the subject of the thesis is organized and funded by Circassian Solidarity. However, Circassian Patriots was an online group that actively campaigned against airbridge operation to an extend of nearly causing the complete cancellation of Syrian Circassians to be pulled out of war zone in Syria and transported to Turkey by aircrafts. Circassian Solidarity network appears to be positioning religion as the forefront boundary marker of Circassian identity compared to KAFFED and Circassian Patriots.

3.3.3. Commemorations

Circassians in the diaspora commemorate their ancestors who were killed in the massacres and on the way during the great exile of 1864. These commemoration ceremonies vary from leaving flowers to the Black-sea, to spending overnight in Kefken shore of Black-sea which is one of the shores that Circassian immigrants first stepped on land, and where there is a cemetery nearby that the immigrants buried their lost ones.

Circassian Solidarity formed for the sole purpose of helping Syrian Circassians, which later led to the establishment of CERKESFED as an umbrella association. CERKESFED included in its commemoration programs an additional but relatively small Mevlid ceremony, where the imam reads the holy book Quran and prays for the souls of the lost ones during the great Circassian exile of 1864. This kind of Islamic ceremonies are routinely being performed in Turkey following a persons’ death. However, the significance of CERKESFED’s commemoration ceremonies is that the imam prays for their ancestors in Circassian language.

3.3.4. Alcohol Consumption

Drinking alcohol is strictly banned in Islam. When religion is studied as an identity boundary marker of Circassians, alcohol consumption appears to be a topic interpreted differently among the Circassians. For example, in the article titled “Traditions and beliefs about North Caucasus Dining Culture” published on the official web site of CERKESFED (cerkesfed.org) a reference has been given to the traditional drink of the Circassians, Maksime, and the ceremonial style of drinking it has been briefly explained. On the one hand, the author criticizes the current drinking custom referencing Caucasus as; “…That is the drinking table manners of Circassians. Alcohol is not used at our dinner tables. Drinking custom, which is said to have been practiced in the Caucasus today as the Circassian table manner, is seen in all of Russia. It seems that this procedure is not an arrangement of the Circassians and instead of a general practice of the Russians19 [as in folk dances].”

As an addition, although there is no declared obligatory prevention of alcoholic beverages, alcohol has also never been served in any organization of the Circassian Solidarity and later CERKESFED. Even some founding members who publicly consume alcohol in their daily life prefer not to consume it in gatherings. On the other hand, in another article published on the same website about a famous side dish served along with alcohol in Turkey “Cerkes Tavugu” [Circassian Chicken], the author evaluates the alcohol consumption within the borders as “us” versus “them”, “our’s versus “their’s”. “This dish has nothing to do with the Classical Circassian Chicken. It is not realistic for Circassians to cook and name such a side- dish type. Because in Turkey until the 1960s, our countrymen would never drink alcohol and the ones who consume alcoholic beverages used to be condemned. Recently, alcoholic beverages have become widespread. Before the period of

19 http://www.cerkesfed.org/2016/03/29/kuzey-kafkas-yemek-kulturuyle-ilgili-gelenek-gorenek- ve-inanislar/

communism in the Caucasus, drinking alcoholic drinks was not acceptable too. Adyghe’s used to drink a sour drink made from corn flour called ‘Shote’. Only Kabardians used to drink a beverage called “maksima” made from maize, which makes the person a little dizzy”20.

When compared with the Solidarity group, alcohol consumption in KAFFED meetings and organizations is visible and considered as a tradition of Circassians. In comparison, Circassian Patriots, the Circassian network which campaigned against the airbridge operation, overcommunicate the drinking custom. According to an article by Tsıpıne Aslen on the web site of Patriots, wine is valued as “god’s drink” by attributing to the heroic characters of the Nart Mythology and how the wine resuscitated the Nart: “Because alcohol is banned according to Islam, for a long time our people have been in conflict because they’ve been pressured to quit drinking. However, Adyghes remained as Adyghe. By accepting that the Islamic religion has forbidden to drink the products of fruit trees, then they believed that they would not be contradicting with the religion by drinking the maksima made from the maze that they had learned from Thağaleg. Do you remember that our ancestors fasted during the day, broke the fast with maksime?”21

3.3.4. Headscarf

Although there are discussions about what hijab 22 means in the Islamic world. Scholars discuss if it’s an obligation of Islam or a custom as well as how to practice

20 https://www.cerkesfed.org/2016/11/01/marka-olmus-yemegimiz-cerkes-tavugu-hangisi/

21 http://www.cherkessia.net/makale_detay.php?id=3763

22 The word Hijab comes from the Arabic root word 'Hajaba', which means to conceal or cover. In an Islamic context, Hijab refers to the dress code required for Muslim females (IPamphlets, 2019).

it. In traditional interpretations, hijab is considered as an Islamic practice. At the events organized by CERKESFED women covering their hair with headscarves can be observed in the audience. This normalizes the use of headscarf. A participant woman using headscarf can easily blend in. There are more women wearing a headscarf in the audience of KAFFED organized events than CERKESFED. Instead, there are examples of participants using headscarf in their daily lives preferring to cover their hair with a sharxon, a traditional male Circassian head-covering during these events.

Reflecting on a personal experience, in an audience where the majority of the members were associated with KAFFED, a woman wearing a headscarf, Bajaph, was giving a speech as a founding member of a Circassian organization. During her speech, a woman doctor, in her fifties, raised her hand and interrupted Bajaph’s speech and commented as “Madam, from bottom to your neck you look very fashionable but the head. Not with the thing on your head. You cannot represent Circassians with the headscarf of the Arabs”.

Although, Bajaph didn’t say anything in shock, the President of the Association responded explaining that Bajaph is a well-educated and valued member of the Circassian community. Due to the tension, Bajaph didn’t deliver the rest of her speech. While the audience, which among them there were numerous members that practice Islamic rituals in their daily lives, kept silent, neither approving nor disapproving any of the comments.

As this public incident indicates; in the commentary of the doctor, headscarf is treated as a boundary marker to identify non-Circassians. Although, presidents’ comment was in support of Bajaph’s headscarf, she did not challenge the discriminatory remarks on headscarf but instead she argued that she still qualifies

to be a valued member of the community because of her activism, status and contribution. The audience indirectly remaining silent reaffirms that rather than religious symbol, headscarf is treated as a symbol representing the Arab culture as opposed to being Circassian.

Such discussions do not appear to be one time incidents. For instance, when Bajaph attended an international conference representing a Circassian organization, under a Facebook post about the meeting with a picture of her, wearing headscarf, there was a long debate on headscarf and Circassians. On the one hand comments critical of her headscarf argued that she cannot represent the Circassian community with a headscarf, because it is an Arab tradition. On the other hand, comments in support of her argued that she is a valued, and active member of the Circassian community.

According to one of the interviewees, there were Islamaphobic and political arguments among the members of Circassians in Turkey campaigning against the Airbridge operation. He exemplifies how some other members of the Circassian community in Turkey exclude the Circassians coming from Syria referring to the headscarf as a boundary marker defining who the “true” Circassians are.

“I am a socialist, a leftist revolutionary person. There are people among Circassians [who are] socialists [or] conservative [or] democrats. People should not think in political terms when they consider saving lives from the war. We need to look in the middle [be objective]. We need to move through concrete reality. Some people [some Circassians in Turkey] said "Circassians' most hardheads, the most bigotted ones came. Look, all the women came are covered [with headscarves] " such and such...Brother, covered women live in Turkey as well. This is not the issue. It's not like that. Among those people, some people think differently. Right? Not necessarily all of them are Muslims, although at that time ISIS movement hasn't started yet, who is opposition, who is pro-sharia, who is pro-regime or against the [Syrian] regime, this should not be questioned. People came all the way here [to Turkey]. They [Syrian Circassians] think that; here we have Circassian brothers and sisters. Circassians have taken care of us. They welcomed us. They arranged a container city for us. People think they're [Circassians in

Turkey] are helping us as much as they can. But in Turkey, some of our self-opinionated screwballs did so many strange things in order to criticize, to humiliate us. So much was going to our strength at that time. This was hurting us a lot”. [Guler, Solidarity]

3.4. Religion as Boundary Marker During the Airbridge Operation

In this section, the re-negotiation pathways of ‘religion’ as an identity boundary marker of Circassians in Turkey among the three groups who were involved for or against the Airbridge operation is examined with a comparative approach. Circassian Solidarity was the organization that planned and coordinated the Airbridge operation and is referred to in this study as the ‘Solidarity’. On the other hand, Caucasus Organizations Federation or KAFFED is that set an aid committee but stood against the ‘airbridge’ operation. The third group Circassian Patriots or Patriots in short that did not get involve in any humanitarian aid for Syrian Circassians, but actively campaigned against the Airbridge operation.

During the interviews I carried with the members of Solidarity, KAFFED and Patriots the example of ‘Ansar and Muhajirin’ brotherhood, the brotherhood of Mekke and Medine Muslims during Prophet Muhammad's time and ‘Haremlik and Selamlık’ practice was among the religious practices defining ‘us’ and ‘them’ during the Airbridge operation as an ethnic identity boundary marker.

3.4.1. The Example of “Ansar and Muhajirin”

The term of Ansar and Muhajirin is an expression used in Turkey rooted in an important example of brotherhood in Islamic history. This expression sometimes is used to show the degree of brotherhood. Ansar and Muhajirin brotherhood is the incident of Meccan Muslims taking refuge to the city of Madina from their Meccan

opponents. They had to leave all assets and belongings behind. Muslims of Madina welcomed and looked after them by sharing their belongings and assets. Solidarity used the terminology of the Ansar and the Muhajirin brotherhood in the meetings held before the Airbridge operation. This terminology was also used by the members of the Solidarity who self identify themselves only as Circassian without referring to Islam.

According to the information published on ozgurcerkes.com; “The Committee of Solidarity of the World Circassians, which was established about a month ago and completed the preparatory work, held its first widely participated meeting in Istanbul Grand Cevahir Hotel on Sunday, November 12, 2012. The president Dr. Nusret Bas began his speech by explaining why such a committee is needed. ‘When the fire surrounding Syria included our relatives, coming to their aid became a duty for us. After a large-scaled consultation, this Committee has been established’ he said. As Bas explained, in the beginning, the Committee was first considered to be serving only for Syrian Circassians with name of the Solidarity Committee of Syrian Circassians, but taking into account of a possible need of aid in the case of an expansion of the regional crisis, they preferred the name of Solidarity Committee of the World Circassians. Nusret Bas stated that the mission of the Committee was to pull their brothers and sisters out of the war zone and wrap their wounds. Bas said that they had taken the example of the brother-sisterhood which was praised by the Prophet comparing to the Ansar and Muhajirin brotherhood. He added that they knew other groups and organizations were working on this subject and all of them doing ‘praiseworthy’ works. However, as Bas said ‘the wound is so large, and the ointment on hand is so little, we need to try to increase it. That's what we're trying to do, too’ ” (Kuşba, 2013).

The participants identified the committee as the Committee for Solidarity of the World Circassians be ready for these kinds of possible crises in the future. The committee held its first major meeting on November 12, 2012, at Istanbul Grand Cevahir Hotel. Participants from several cities of Turkey; Samsun, Duzce, Kayseri attended. It was an important, valuable meeting. Cevdet Said's nephew Gifar Said joined the meeting as an observer; Gifar Said joined from Syria. There were emotional moments. The author Elbruz Aksoy, whose wife is Syrian, made an emotional speech in tears. A decision came out from this meeting; There are a lot of empty houses in the Circassian villages in Turkey. The idea of the establishment of our Syrian relatives in these empty houses came to the fore. Also, a Circassian family, who considers each self-conscious, would acquire a brotherly family, like The Ansar and Muhajirin in Islam. On that day in the meeting, there was a large amount of donation and pledges. Some said they would welcome the arrivals. Some gave their house, some donated. For the first time, Circassians were be able to acquire a result in the first meeting they made seriously [Habracu, Solidarity].

As a bias of the positionality of the researcher, the patriot member criticized the use of the Ansar and the Muhajir terminology, which Patriots had criticized sharply, in a softened tone. She stated that the concept of the Wunekosh rather than the Ansar and the Muhajir is correct to use in the case of the Syrian Circassians.

I didn't have a Wunekosh practice [during Syrian crisis]. There were things that I have only observed. For example, I observed in Yalova, in Reyhanlı. I was invited to a festival there that year. There were things I witnessed. Actually, we shouldn't miss one point here. For example, the "Ansar" and the "Wunekosh" are different things. In other words, the Ansar brotherhood, as far as I know, expresses the brotherhood and solidarity of those who are from the same religion. I don't know if I'm beng wrong, however, "Wunekosh" is more of a sanctioned rule of Xabze. In other words, a Circassian who has means of support and not backing off a Wunekhos in need, would not be acting by the rules of Xabze. And would be accused of performing a shameful act by the Circassian society. I mean, it is still a shame. They will criticize him as; "He doesn't support this guy." This degregates his reputation seriously, at least there is a sanction like degregating the reputation. "his Wunekosh is still in need, but he didn't help him even he had the opportunity” [Qube, the Patriots].

3.4.2. United Caucasus Ecole; Muridism

During the struggle with Russian Empire’s army in 19th century, the muridism movement was the major uniting force of the independently living ethnic groups and tribes of the Caucasus. Muridism is defined in Oxford Dictionary as “An Islamic revival movement active in the Caucasus throughout the 19th century, which advocated the rising of Muslims against their religious and political Russian opponents.”23 In this respect, “The muridism was a military-political ideology that was based on the Sufi teaching of Naqshbandiyyia-Khalidiyya; bred by internal socio-political transformations in the North Caucasian communities and external political factors; connected with the change of the geopolitical situation, and international influence in North Caucasus” (Tsvetkova, 2017). As Tsvetkova lays out in her article JOCAS24, muridism “...developed a system of leadership within the framework of an established state and united population irrespective of ethnic origin”. Furthermore; “united by religion, under the leadership of the Imam, the mountaineers were inspired to fight for achieving a common goal without reference to their ethnical difference” (Tsvetkova, 2017, p. 96). Tavkul also highlights the effect of Islam through muridism over inter-ethnic relations among the Caucasians and the way it unifies them serving as a bonding medium. According to Tavkul “With the emergence of Islam as an ‘ethnic identity’ against Russians, the people of Caucasus gathered around the idealization of ‘United Caucasus’ (Tavkul, 1998). Therefore, muridism movement, and the United Caucasus Ecole it had generated served as a boundary marker, including and excluding factor, of Circassians as a byproduct of their encounters with Russians.

First it comes the Circassians and then the Caucasians. Because the people of Caucasus may be descended from different ethnic groups, in

23 “Muridism.” Oxforddictionaries, Oxford University Press, en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/muridism.

24 Journal of Caucasian Studies

other words, the Caucasians may belong to different ethnicities; however, it [the Caucasia] is actually a cultural sphere. All of these people fall in the same cultural sphere. Of course, there are different cultures and cultural differences, however, if we draw a larger circle around, all these cultures appear similar to each other. Hence, throughout history they have always been interested and cared and sympathized for one another. Therefore, who are the people making these discussions? Such as; "who is the Circassian?", "Does Circassian means just Adyghe people? Or is it a more comprehensive concept? What is it? We do not stick around any of these questions. When we say "Circassians," we do not consider this to be an ethnic thing, but as people in the same cultural sphere. Therefore, we feel close to them. During such disasters, this affirmation naturally involves people who are in that cultural sphere and brings them closer to each other. It stimulates the feeling of doing something for them. This is what happened in Syria. There were also the [Turkic] Karachays among those who came from Syria. There were the [Turkic] Balkars. They are in some way together with the Circassians, and even some of the Karachays identify themselves as the Circassian. However, this is not an issue. They had shared a common fate. And they again were together in such a time [a disaster period]. Therefore, we feel an affinity to the people of Caucasus. Moreover, this sympathy, especially in these kinds of disasters, causes us to empathize with them in conflicts, wars, and grievances. Maybe that's what it is. [Shogen, Solidarity]

Therefore, the Solidarity member stands the homogenous common-Caucasian culture and fellowship in fate as a bond and a boundary marker rather than race and ethnicity.

…Then the officials started to check the suitcases of people arriving again [as Syrian Circassians arrived at the airport during the airbridge]. We assisted them. We formed an order because there were also non- Circassians, but our kinsmen among them. What I mean is those people are Caucasian but not Circassian. There was a Chechen uncle. There were people of Abkhazian origin. But most of the people who come here [to airport during the airbridge operation] were talking in Shapsugh dialect of Circassian [language]. And there was a Karachay Uncle. Then we made him the mayor of the camp. [Guler, Solidarity]

Islam's unification of the Caucasian nations and tribes left an Ecole behind by keeping the unification notion. While Islam becomes indistinct, the united Caucasus

Ecole remains through the notion of common culture and fellowship in fate in their encounters with the “others”. Therefore, Solidarity group over communicates the united Caucasus Ecole by not focusing on the particular ethnicities while Patriots are entirely against the idea in an us-them relationship: by articulating the conflict and competition between "us" and "them" through advocacy of micro-nationalism.

That is to say, what I mean by an ideological difference; there is tendency towards to the right [ideologies] or left [ideologies], or a perception of ethno-nationalism. I think this point is importart. I believe that there was a perception of Caucasianism and Circassianism. I think this [perception] is a mistake. Usually, our [Circassians of Turkey] mainly are based on the Caucasus unity ideology. We [Circassians in Turkey] positioned ourselves equally to different ethnic groups. But what we have been neglecting has appeared. Something that we've been losing; our national consciousness. First, [you must] arrange your own garden then take care of the others garden. Abhazians, Chechens, the national consciousness already exist in those. It's a regional unification. But the awareness of being Circassian, the Circassian national thought is more important than the other nations in the Caucasus. Because the Circassian nation paid a higher price compared to the other nations. Chechens recently experienced a similar genocide, but Chechen geography was not divided into pieces. Only an Ingush Republic was founded. I think it's a handicap. [Akgun, Patriots]

The indigenous tribal nations of the Caucasus speaking different languages from different ethnic origins united under an umbrella during their resistance against Russians, especially with the effect of the Muridism movement. Their interaction with the threat of the ‘other’; the occupation of the Russian Empire got them unified in a sense, bearing the united Caucasus ecole. In one sense the Ecole’s visibility explains Circassian Solidarities understanding of delivering aid to Circassians as well as other Caucasians. Solidarity defining themselves through a shared culture as a boundary marker for differentiating “us” versus “them” rather than ethnicity is in the same line with the critics of Barth to the current understanding of ethnic categorization. However, the Patriots who campaigned against the Airbridge operation is also against the united Caucasus Ecole and they set the identity

boundary marker for defining who Circassian through a classic ethnic-nationalistic perception.

3.4.3. “Haremlik and Selamlık” Practices in the Guesthouses

During the Syria crisis, Circassian civil society in Turkey got mobilized around three primary duties in terms of helping the Syrian Circassians. Those duties were; welcoming and picking the Syrian Circassians from the airport; trying to find a permanent place for them to stay; and hosting the guests temporarily in their homes. This permanent housing was sometimes a donated or rented apartment by a sponsor, or a house in a Circassian village. At one point, as the number of arrivals increased, hosting them became a problematic solution. For that reason, after a while, both Solidarity Committee and the KAFFED committee rented guesthouses for the accommodation of the Syrian Circassians coming to Istanbul, sometimes without a notice for the committee members to be prepared. Therefore, the time between arrival and the sheltering of the guests needed to be managed. However, the Haremlik and Selamlik practice demand of some guests became an issue of contention illustrating the different interpretations Islam as a boundary marker among the Circassian networks delivering aid to Syrian Circassians.

Haremlik and Selamlik practice of Islam sets certain regulations on the relations of men and women who are not married and not first-degree relatives to each other. Solidarity and KAFFED’s perspectives towards the “Haremlik and Selamlık” practice of Syrian Circassians differ in terms of defining ‘us’ versus ‘them’.

If there were such kind of demands for harem and selam practice in the guesthouse, I would respect it. At one time, while there were families there [in the guest house], 3 young men came from Syria. They were going to go to Abhazia by staying overnight [in Istanbul]. I didn't take the young men to the guest house to stay with the families; instead, I

took them to my house. Yes, I also have a family; however, there was no host or homeowner in the guesthouse, because it was a guesthouse. Xabze can adapt to the conditions of the day, conditions of the person. There can be different people in a community, there can be people of different faiths. They can interpret Xabze differently. This case in accordance with our social structure. We cannot become Pagans just because our ancestors were. I don't think Circassianness and religion are alternatives of each other. [Kushba, Solidarity]

While the members of Solidarity group oversee and normalize the likely demand of a ‘Harem and Selam’ practice in the guest house, the member of the KAFFED Committee articulates this demand as conflicting to Circassian customs and traditions.

But we've had an issue like that. I mean, for example, I also relate this to war psychology. There were a mother and son that we have accommodated at our guesthouse. We have informed them early on as follows: ‘Look! this is a guesthouse. You can stay here in Istanbul until you set your life. We're giving you a duty. We're giving you a job. Stay here. But know that people will come and go. Host them. We will tell you to cook for them. But if you cook, we will pay for it. We don't tell you to serve. You are not a servant, but [when there are guests] you'll stay in one room together. Any guests may stay in other rooms’. Even they said OK at the beginning, that was not the case. They made problems at the arrival of each guest to the guesthouse. We didn't place anybody in the long run. The son protested as; ‘my mother is wearing a hijab how come a foreign guest [man] can enter the house?’ This is something that irritates me as a Circassian. As a Circassian. Because my mother doesn't cover her head, but Grandma covered hers. It's not something we are not familiar among our family. A Circassian woman doesn't behave like this. She doesn't say; ‘There is no man in the house so I cannot let you in’ instead she'll say; ‘My husband has gone from Kayseri to Ankara’. However, If the guests came to the village to stay overnight, she cooks for them, makes the bed. She hosts the guests, welcomes them in. There is nothing to question this among the Circassians. However, we had troubles with that mother and son. I am mentioning this as an anecdote. They brought a problem with everyone who arrived at that house. They caused trouble. Our patience, all our strength is up to a certain extent. All of them were constantly tested during that period. But none of us has given up. None of us gave up. I don't believe that there was that type of a human [among us]. We didn't say “let's leave them! let them by themselves”. None of us said it. There were times, when we got very bothered, for example, the mother-son I was talking about bothered us a lot. Did it grow a dislike among us about the Syrian [Circassians]? We beared. Because basically, this was Xabze. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

The religion theme as an identity marker appears to be correlated with the ethnic other, ‘the Arab’. Rather than a belief system, it is considered as a boundary of ethnicity. Islamic practices such as headscarf, ‘haremlik and selamlik’ is considered as the practice of ‘others’. However, Solidarity group [CERKESFED] seemed to welcom Islamic practices relatively more than the other groups. It differentiated the Islamic practice without attributing to the ethnic other and also built boundaries with religion through the lens of the Circassian traditions and customs.

CHAPTER IV

LANGUAGE ‘ADİGABZE’, ‘KINSHIP’ and CIRCASSIAN ETIQUETTE ‘XABZE’ AS CIRCASSIAN IDENTITIY BOUNDARY MARKERS

4.1. The Circassian Language ‘Adigabze’ as an Indentity Boundary Marker

Language is one of the strongest determinants of ethnic and national identity. Ethnic diasporas maintain their distinctive identity through their language. More specifically, in the context of the Turkish Republic where the majority of the population and in the Circassian diaspora share a common religion [i.e., Sunni- Islam] the significance of language as a distinctive marker of Circassian identity is highlighted.

This chapter introduces the Adigabze from a linguistic perspective and the role it plays to create a common ‘we’ among the Circassian diaspora. Next, it overviews the historical debates on the evolution and the alphabet of the ‘Adigabze’ in Turkey. Then, it compares and contrasts how Circassian networks in Turkey utilizes language to create bonding with Syrian Circassians while also, being critical of others for not giving this distinctive boundary marker its due.

4.1.1 Backgroud

North Caucasus has long been a melting pot of languages and diverse ethnic cultures due to its geographical position. For ages, the Caucasus has been serving as a passage between Asia, Europe and the Middle East where each civilization that passes through, left a bit of itself behind. According to Catford, "since Herodotus's day, writers have commented on the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Caucasus"

(Catford, 1977, p. 283). Traveler, a historian, and a geographer Al Masudi in his texts referring to the Caucasus illustrates the region as the "Jebel al-Alsun" [mountain of tongues]. Strabo and Evliya Celebi are among the travelers and historians, although they have exaggerated the number of languages being spoken, affirming their amazement of the linguistic diversity of the Caucasus. Catford and Colarusso give an estimation of the number of languages being spoken "in the Caucasian mountain valleys, in the foothills, and the closely adjoining plains" as more than fifty (Catford, 1977), each having sub-dialects (Colarusso, 1992, p. 1).

There are thirty-seven languages which are believed to have been spoken in the Caucasus area for at least 4000 years. These "indigenous" or "autochthonous" languages comprise the language group generally identified as the ‘Caucasic’ (Catford, 1977). Caucasic languages do not belong to any of the three major language families; Semitic, Indo-European or Altaic; instead its contextualized within itself. Circassian language [Adyghean, Adigabze] is among the indigenous languages falling into the Northwest Caucasic language family. Therefore Circassian language having forty-eight consonants in most dialects25 has its own uniqueness not only because of being "extraordinarily complex by any linguistic standard," (Colarusso, 1992, p. 2) but also for being an indigenous, an archaic and also a peculiar language defined among the Caucasic languages.

25The sub-dialects of the Circassian language [Adyghean, Adigabze] listed by linguist John Colarusso are; [West] Natukhay, Shapsugh, Hakuchi, Bzhedukh, Chemgwi, Hatukay, Yegereguay [East] Besleney and Kabardian (Colarusso, 1992).

4.1.2. The Circassian Language: a Contemporary Brief

In a rare study run in 1993 among the 160 Circassian Villages in Kayseri City of Turkey, 95% of the participants stated that they use Circassian in their daily life in the village. All of them stated that they have learned the language in the family and in the surrounding environment. None of them have indicated that they have learned the language only in the surrounding environment. 0.5% of the participants who stated that they could not speak the language are also the ones who state themselves as living in the city (Eser, 1999, p. 122). According to Eser's study, speaking Circassian is considered as a "measure of being Circassian" (Eser, 1999, p. 121). Another field study about Circassians was ran by Ayhan Kaya in 2002 among 559 Circassian participants in Turkey. According to Kaya "unless a 'mother tongue education' is maintained, the Circassian language is expected to disappear in a short time as a result of assimilation, modernization and urbanization" (Kaya, 2011, p.

161).

Instead of learning through modern ways of language education, Circassians in Turkey learn their language skills primarily by only hearing in the family. They do not have a standard or shared alphabet for writing. Most of the written sources are produced in the Caucasus of today's Russia and they are written in an adapted form of the Cyrillic alphabet which is a severe obstacle to learn reading as the first step of the language education through written materials.

Which alphabet to read and write in the Circassian language has been another debated issue among Circassians. Today, there is one association established focusing only on Circassian Language in Konya, Turkey named Adyghe Bze Xase [Adyghe Dil Derneği] that is trying to develop a Latin based alphabet for maintaining the survival of the language. Adyghe Bze Xase also developed 'danef.com' which is the first online Circassian dictionary containing 108.000 Circassian words and its translations to English, Turkish, German and Arabic.

4.1.3. Language as an Ethnic Boundary Marker Structuring the Interaction Between Circassians of Syria and Turkey

In this study, I have carried out interviews with the leading members of three Circassian networks in Turkey: Circassian Solidarity, KAFFED, and Circassian Patriots. Patriots did not get involved in the humanitarian aid organization; however, they actively campaigned against Syrian Circassians to be brought to Turkey during the Airbridge operation. They performed campaigns for Syrian Circassians to go to their ancient homeland in the Caucasus, which is a territory within the borders of Russia. Nevertheless, with the efforts of the Solidarity Committee, Turkey was accepting Circassians of Syria while Russia was returning the applications.

In this section, I have examined 'the Circassian Language' as a boundary marker of the Circassian identity. Participants often identified 'the Circassian Language' as 'Adigabze' which is how Circassians call their own language in Circassian. Several themes on the subject of ‘the language’ derived from the interviews of the three groups in response of the question of “What is the importance of the Circassian Language, Adigabze for the Circassians, especially for the Circassians of Syria? How did it become functional in the process?”

Apart from the using language as a primary source of communication during the Airbridge operation, Solidarity network appears to be using language as a strong marker of Circassian identity, in the form of a zone of common sentiments with Syrian Circassians. The leading members of the Solidarity Committee, were all able to communicate in the Circassian language except one who was an as ethnic Abhaz. Therefore, their ability to connect with Syrian Circassians directly without needing an interpreter in between and experience the "common we" through the language became one of their primary motivations.

The elements of the common sentiment zone formed between Syrian Circassians and Circassians of Turkey was the feeling of trust and safety for the Syrian Circassians, and feeling of being obligated in the form of obligations felt towards a close relative for Circassians of Turkey.

4.1.4. Circassian Language during the Airbridge Operation

During the interviews, I have derived the themes below from the participants among the three groups that have referred to ‘the Circassian Language’. Circassian Language was considered as a tool and a medium; for communication of the diaspora members [weakest], for the survival of the Circassian culture [vital], to identify or prove being Circassian as an identity marker differentiating “us” versus “them”, for creating a zone of commonness, “common sentiments” among the ones in the Caucasus and in diaspora. The major sentiments are of the “common sentiments zone of trust and kinship. Circassian language was also mentioned as an indicator of the level of Circassianness.

4.1.5. A Comparative Assesment of Language during the Airbridge Operation

All members of the Solidarity group [except one] are able to communicate in Adigabze; therefore they over communicate the Circassian language as a ‘tool for communication’ during the airbridge operation.

The language [Circassian, Adigabze] was so essential in which if I could not be able to understand or not speak, it would not be possible for me to maintain contact with the Syrian Circassians and carry out such an operation. In general, the native language is the most crucial tool for a person to express and realize himself/herself. [Meretiqo, Solidarity]

There was the ease of speaking the same language. Because we do not know Arabic, they do not speak Turkish. Therefore, our common language is Adigabze, Circassian. Consequently, we have benefited from this. Of course, to communicate with them...[Habracu, Solidarity]

Some of the [Syrian Circassians] who came [to Turkey] during the Syrian Civil War were still able to speak Circassian, some of them... and some of those who came were from Abzeh, from Shapsugh [tribes of Circassians also speaking their own dialects of the Circassian language]. Those mentioned speak the sub-dialects of Adyghe Language. I'm a Kabardian. However, I've been able to understand them, a majority of [what they speak]…This assimilation is everywhere. So this is what happened in Syria. Although with some of them we were able to understand each other with Adigabze, that is, we could not communicate with others. They only knew Arabic. However, they were aware that they were Circassians…However, if we consider the current situation, to give something statistical probably there were 25-30% or about 40% of people were able to speak their mother language. So we communicated with them. If they were speaking with Abzeh dialect, I understood 80% of the things they talk. They recognized 80% of what I say because it is, in fact, the same language; Abzeh language, Kabardian language, Beslenei, Chemgui, and Hatqoi languages. All of them belong to the same language [Circassian, Adigabze]. They are the different dialects of a single language [Circassian, Adigabze]. [Shogen, Solidarity]

When language was used as a communication tool, if one of the sides does not have enough language skills, misunderstanding were becoming a challenge for the both parties.

When I phoned them, we communicated half in Circassian, half in Turkish. Then I was making a joke, and the person in front of me gets offended. I was talking with the conditions of Turkey, and I make a joke. So the one I talked to, apart from the Circassian traditions, carries the traditions of Arabs. So he considered by words under the Arab culture. So they feel all French [Greek] to the things I talk. [Guldal, Solidarity]

In comparison, the interviewee who was one of the responsible people among the Syrian Crisis Management Committee of KAFFED, and the President of KAFFED

was not able to speak in Circassian as much as to hold a conversation. However, they used alternative methods for communication.

Therefore, if someone speaks [in Circassian] by my side, I understand things such as; what is he/she talking about? What's the topic? Is he/she talking about the house? Is he talking about business? Is he hungry? Is he thirsty? However, for example, one of the meetings of the KAFFED, they invited two young Syrian men. At that time, I was not a board member of the KAFFED [but a member of the Crisis Management Committee]. I attended that meeting because the Syrian crisis committee was gathered. President was brother Vacit. Vacit is my relative. He knows my mother very well. However, even brother Vacit had thought that I am fluent in Circassian. Because he thought about me as "he couldn't do it any other way" [Dealing with Syrian Circassians]. He called two young men. He said, "Now Altheskir, ask them what the problem is, can they tell us about the region?" I said; "Brother, my Circassian is not enough to ask them." Then one person there carried the conversation and saved me. He [later] said; "Where should I know? I thought you have somehow learned Circassian in the village". However, all of the Syrians [Syrian Circassians], I don't know how young people manage to do it though. Maybe this should be studied. It should be studied to solve our problem with Circassian language. Young people all were able to speak English. Such that, even a homemaker living in the village could be able to communicate in English as much as to talk about what she needs. I do not know if there is a similar case in Turkey [A villager talking in English] I've always solved my problem with English. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

The participants who are in a leading position in the Patriots group campaigned against the Airbirdge operation mentioned that they were not involved in aid organizations, instead only have personal observations. One of the leading participant mentioned that he can not contribute to the language subject.

No one in my family knows the language. Therefore, my father was also assimilated. In that respect, I cannot speak much to that [language subject]. I don't have much to do with language. I don't know Circassian anyway, but I'm trying to learn. I'm trying to learn a little. [Akgun, Patriots]

During the Airbridge operation; Circassian language united people, feeling of commonness and common sentiments for both sides as Circassians of Syria, and Circassians of Turkey was one of the main motivations of the Solidarity Commitee. The group over communicated these sentiments as the feeling of “trust and safety” on behalf of Syrian Circassians, and as the feeling of being obliged that the ‘kinship’ culture of Circassians which imposes certain obligations on behalf of themselves and on behalf of Circassians of Turkey.

When you speak the same language, you feel like as if you are talking to a very close relative, someone close to you. The expression of the feelings in each language is different. Only the person who understands Circassian can understand my emotions. When I meet a Circassian speaker, I feel like I've known him for 40 years. [Baj, Solidarity]

Kushba, the active member of the Solidarity mainly managing aids and the needs of the Circassians of Syria acommodating them in Istanbul and organizing their transfers to Abkhazia and the Circassian villages around Turkey underlines language as an adaptation tool.

First of all, it [Circassian language] was the most important means that made the parties feel confident [Syrian Circassians and Circassians of Turkey]. A few words, even if they not correctly articulat, established a sense of assurance on the both sides. The helper has given his hand comfortably, and the receiver received what the helper gives comfortably. The language [Circassian] was a tool of trust. Both parties communicated more easily with each other. They immediately managed to establish contact with their environment. It was a very robust tool for their adaptation. [Kushba, Solidarity]

In a real-life example, the participant who played a central role in the airbridge operation highlights the essentiality of Circassian language for Syrian Circassians as medium making them feel secure. According to the participant, “the language fact is the most crucial element of a nation, reflecting on everything through its own values, through the world of emotions, and is an element of trust”.

Syrian Circassians experienced the advantages of being able to speak the language. First of all, it helped them in establishing contact. However, most importantly, we were able to transfer our mutual feelings to each other. Emotions mutually touched us. If we had done this in Turkish, I do not think that I can live the same feelings that I have experienced. A 90-year-old woman, her daughter between 65-70 years old and her granddaughter. Three [Syrian Circassian] ladies. I went to meet them at the airport. I was going to bring them to my house to spend the night. After that, we were going to transfer them to their new home, a [donated] house in a village that we have organized. When I went to the airport, I was expecting to see three ladies. However, there was only one lady aged over 90 years old, staring around with confused eyes. I was wondering if she was among the ones who came to us; I said to myself, "But she should not be alone". As time went on, I went nearby and asked her, "Wu Adiga?” ["Are you Circassian?"] She replied; "Thash to psh’a? Tham Keguaqua...?” ["How did you know? Did Allah send you?"]. So I asked; "Wu za qua...?" [“are you alone? Where is your daughter?"] Then they came along too. I picked them and drove to my house. My wife had prepared some food for them in the main room. We served and hosted them. In the double sofa, the grandmother and his daughter were sitting. In the armchair, her granddaughter was sitting by herself. The old lady asked me in Circassian; "Can I come by you?”. She came and sat by me. She placed her head on my shoulder and slept. It was a very emotional moment. Just think of this; [it was only because of] us being Circassian and speaking in Circassian. She hadn't slept for three days. They were on the road. Three ladies were running from the war. The fact of us speaking in Circassian gave her level of confidence and made her feel comfortable. She leaned on my shoulder and slept there. Not just only for communication. Language is the bearer of the culture, of the society, of the human values. It is not possible to feel or make one another feel these feelings in another language. With this incident, this fact becomes concrete. The language fact is the most crucial element of a nation, reflecting on everything through its own values, through the world of emotions, and is an element of trust. [Meretiqo, Solidarity]

The participant from KAFFED, took part actively in KAFFED’s Crisis Management Committee for Syrian Circassians mentions importance of having working knowledge of the Circassian language for using it as a tool for forming mutual commonality through common sentiments. The participant over communicated how essential it is to be able to use the right words, short cuts for entering into the common sentiment zone. Phrases like “calm down” for Syrian Circassians and “Here is my homeland” for the Circassians in the Caucasus are among the short cuts he uses. He over communicates the “soothing” effect of the language for Syrian Circassians:

I believe a lot in the magic of the language. Maybe it worked in calming, in soothing. For example, as a physician, I know what it is meant if you say "Wumegumech" in western dialect. It means ‘Calm down. Don't worry’ in Kabardian dialect; the word is; "Wumeguzabe". I also use these words as a physician. I'm seeing a patient, [who is] in panic, she is Abzekh from Reyhanli [a district in Syrian border of Turkey]. I say; "Wumegumech". Her lines in the face get softer. She responds to me in Adiga [Circassian] language. I understand some of it. I’ve had a lot of experiences like this. For example, a woman reaching me by phone, in panic, crying, telling me something. I am trying to understand what she is talking about. There are times I do understand, and there are times that I do not understand. But I understand the dialect. Is this Abzeh? Western dialect? Is it Kabardian? I know she says; "We came. We have no one. We don't know what to do. I have a child". When I reply to her as “Wumıgumech” she immediately calms down and starts speaking word by word. This was a method that I used in this period. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

The participant who was a managing member of the Patriots, evaluates through her personal observations she has seen in her village and around. According to the participant, Circassian language served as a “band-aid” for Syrian Circassians in their new areas of settlements in Turkey.

If I refer in terms of language to Syrian Circassians; they have clung to the Circassian community and have established a more secure connection in their new habitats. Again there can be exceptions.

Therefore, I make this statement through the examples I've seen. Syrian Circassians have established a more secure and attentive connection with the Circassians in different geographies, in their new places of living. After that, there might be many complications. However, those are separate issues. In the very beginning, the Circassian language was a good band-aid. [Qube]

All members of the Circassian networks who worked for or against the Airbridge operation over-communicated language as an element of being a ‘nation’. Participants considered ‘Circassian national consciousness’ at front in the order of importance than the revival of the Circassian language. Here, participants refer to “language as a medium for communication”. Therefore, language’s vitality comes from; rather than as a tool for communication, as a boundary of the Circassian identity.

Language is something that keeps a nation, a people existing. [Shogen, Solidarity]

Language is vital. Now, of course, When the term ‘nation’ is described; here is the commonness of the language, commonness of the territory, the commonness of the geography. These are elements that make a nation "a Nation". At the front of all these [elements] is the language, it bring consciousness [Özden, Solidarity].

Language is an element that connects a nation… When I spoke with Syrian Circassian in Circassian beyond Turkey and Syria, a third space is being formed, where I consider myself as members of a common nation. Even if we live in separate states, you find yourself as a member of the same community. [Baj, Solidarity]

A culture that has survived bonding people in different territories provided an awakening of the national identity. The combination of a living culture in different geographies provided an awakening in national identity. The fact of an idle language that they haven't been using suddenly becoming life-saving and that has grown a sympathy for their own culture and language. This situation brought about a revival in national consciousness. [Kushba, Solidarity]

A person who does not speak his mother tongue but another language will grow a perception about the world, about his own values, about his own nation reflecting the views of the language that he/she speaks in. [Meretiqo, Solidarity]

A person who is conscious about his/her identity, or has become aware of the national identity, may also pursue to learn the ‘Circassian’ language. Learns the culture and makes efforts for it. Even if [he/she]

cannot teach [him/herself], in the case [he/she] has the opportunity he/she can teach the language to his/her child. [Qube, Patriots]

The leader of the Patriots and some founding members are not able to speak Circassian. However, one of the participants who were in a leading position in the group identified her Circassianness through her high skills and knowledge of the Circassian language. The participant over communicates the essentiality of the continuity of the conversation by using language as a tool for communication.

Though, I don't consider someone as a Circassian speaker if that person is speaking "half". I define a Circassian speaker, speakers like the ones like me. Who knows the language thoroughly, who can talk about what's in mind, to talk about all of the issues in the world in Circassian. Speaking a little Circassian might be nice for greeting, but there is no point if there is no continuation. [Qube, Patriots]

Another participant criticizes the societies judgment of knowledge of the Circassian language as a boundary marker for defining the level of Circassianness or the "Circassian" and the "other". For him, the Syrian Circassians issue is a case for questioning the concreteness of this boundary marker.

For [Syrian Circassians] there was no single spot on our bodies that don't sweat because of tiredness. As I visit [my wife's] village for the Sacrifice Feast26, people were talking in Circassian language and telling; "this year we have donated for sacrificing an animal in Myanmar" and then they talk to you in Circassian. If you accidentally don't get what he says, you are labeled as the assimilated son-in-law...That's the problem in Circassian associations as well. You struggle with all your strength, but after a while, they stick the label on you as “he doesn't speak”... In other words, this was probably my biggest motivation for learning

26 The Sacrifice Feast is one of the oldest Islamic holidays in Turkey. It commemorates the story about Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) who showed obedience to God by agreeing to sacrifice his son. God then sent him a ram to be sacrificed instead. Traditionally, on the first day of the Sacrifice Feast in Turkey, men of each family go to a mosque for special morning prayer. Then the sacrifice ritual begins. In recent years, some Turkish people started making donations to charity organizations instead of sacrificing animals. Many people in Turkey take special care to help the poor during the Sacrifice Feast.People usually wear their best clothes during the Sacrifice Feast. They welcome guests to their homes or visit relatives or friends during the holiday (timeanddate.com, 2019).

Circassian. My first motivation was being mute [not able to communicate] in the Caucasus, making my father smile was my second motivation, and this is my third motivation... If you are not worried about the problems of your people, if you do not have the slightest effort to repair to cure, if your first priority is yourself, if your first priority is the brand of the car you use, what happens if you speak Circassian or not? [Altheskir, KAFFED]

The participant from the Patriots group who articulates himself as not having any understanding of the Circassian language delivers the utopia of an independent state and national institutions enforcing Circassian language education.

In order for a society to survive, there must be a homeland country, and they must reach a specific concentration in their homeland. There must be a state support dominating all state institutions through cultural and linguistic policies. In other words, if language is not in a mandatory position kept by the state, then the language will melt away and disappear as time goes by. And that society will gradually disappear after the language. That is why I always say; Language policy should be a state policy and is not a repressive attitude on this issue without being left to [ordinary] people. There's no such thing as not accepting it. [The member of the society] must accept and the state should teach language. [Akgun, Patriots]

To recapitulate, Circassian language nearly becoming idle had played a crucial role in the encounter of Syrian Circassians and Circassians of Turkey. Language was a tool of communication for the parties that speak Turkish and Arabic. Language has also formed a common sentiment zone ensuring Syrian Circassians to feel safer and comfortable, therefore increasing their ability to adapt quickly to a Circassian speaking environment, especially in Circassian villages in Turkey. The language also has become a tool for the identification of ‘the Circassian’ and ‘the other’ during the Airbridge operation. Solidarity members were fluent in the Circassian language, which let them experience deep feelings of ‘the common sentiment zone’ unique to the language.

Non-Circassian speaking KAFFED participant underlined the essentiality; even if the person is not able to speak Circassian, one-sentence short cuts entered them in

the common sentiment zone. However, he communicated the priority of Circassian national consciousness, through the connection to the homeland, culture, and Xabze and was critical about the native speakers understanding of ‘Circassianness’ without having Circassian national consciousness. Therefore, language is a strong identity boundary marker

4.2. ‘Kinship’ as a Circassian Identity Boundary Marker

Apart from the blood boned kinship ties, Circassians have also fictive kinship practice under the idiom of “brotherhood”. British Traveller Longworth analyses this practice in his memoirs dating back to 1840s, as “mutual aid” and “alliance” groups (Manning, 2009). These kinship and fictive kinship groups and therefore the practice were so strong in which, according to Manning, it was the constituting parts of an “acephalous kinship state” (Manning, 2009). Also,“these fictive kinship groups united by status, and that their real bonds were quintessentially liberal ties of contract” (Manning, 2009). Therefore, “the sole bound of union [of these societies] was an oath, imposing, in the absence of all other ties, obligations of a most sacred character” (Manning, 2009). The members of these communities all regard each other as brothers and sisters. Moreover, in order to strengthen being [fictive] kins to each other, their families are not allowed to intermarry. As Longworth describes “this is a regulation so rigidly observed, that even where the society is composed of many thousands, as in the case of the powerful one of Natquo27, it still holds good, and a marriage between two individuals of it is looked upon as incestuous” (Manning, 2009). Atalik, becoming kins through fostering and Wunekosh traditions are among the traditional fictive kinship ties bonding families to each other. |

27 A Circassian tribe name

4.2.1. Comparing Kinship Markers among the Circassian Organizations in Turkey

In this section, referring to the testimonies of the persons I interviewed, I discuss the relevance of the kinship tradition among the members of the three Circassian networks that stood for and against the Airbridge operation. Blood bond and fictive forms of the kinship tradition is still visible among all of the participants. This kinship tradition is positioned as a “cultural trait” which has been used as a boundary marker for identifying and differentiating the “other”. However, in practice, this other is not necessarily the “ethnic other”.

The kinship ties can easily be detected among the Circassians. People who do not have any contact can easily find their kins even by going back to 100 years, 200 years. They can identify where they originated from. They have family names that have not changed for centuries. They mostly know which regions they were from in the Caucasus [before they were subjected to the exile by the Russian Empire]. They can easily establish contact with the remaining relatives there. Even outside [of the Caucasus] in diaspora, they can easily find each other through these common family names, even if they live in separate countries. After a short conversation, they can reveal the pattern of their connection and from which descent line they are connected to. Also, if they don't have a blood bond, they declare each other as "Wunekosh" as a brother, as a sister, and they establish mutual Solidarity without expecting anything in exchange. [Kushba, Solidarity]

Kinship is powerful among our Circassians. Anyone from the same lineage, from the Baj family, is your relative, and everyone from the family Habracu is my relative. It doesn't matter if they live in the Caucasus or Jordan. [Habracu, Solidarity]

Kinship has a very respectable position in terms of Circassian identity. Even the absence of the consanguineous marriage among the Circassians is a great sign of dignity. You know that the kinship is called "Wunekosh" or "Blağa" among the Circassians. They are two different concepts. Being "Wunekosh" is a bond that comes from the relation of being from the same extended family. "Blağa," on the other hand, implies a close bond that is obtained through marriages. I mean,

both of them are important. Both of them are regarded within the Circassian sociology. [Qube, Patriots]

Majority of the participants of the study was born and spent their childhood in Circassian villages in Turkey. Respectively, Guldal was born and spent his childhood in a big city. According to the interviewee, Circassians appear to reflect their fictive kinship tradition in the form of regional citizentry.

I consider each and every Circassian as my relative...Circassians from Gönen, Manyas, Susurluk settled around the Edirnekapı, Eyüp and Rami districts of Istanbul. Then Bayrampasa district was founded. Circassians from a certain region of Turkey, became as if they are from the same village. Although he was not from my village, Uncle Kahir from Biga district was my father's friend, and he was as if my own uncle. His wife was my aunt. My mother's friends were also as if they are my own my aunts. [Guldal, Solidarity]

According to Barth, the features of differentiation “are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant” (Barth, 1969a). Therefore “some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships, radical differences are played down and denied” (Barth, 1969a). Member of the Patriots considers kinship practice by circling Circassian ethnicity only. On the contrary, member of the Solidarity group circles all ethnicities of the Caucasus.

Actually, I portrayed this [Wunekosh] term as being the fellow countrymen, as a citizentry. Perhaps it is more accurate to describe it as kinship. It is actually being relatives to each other. In Circassian culture, kinship's importance is emphasized. Circassians are actually people who, as a culture, have discovered being valued by valuing the other. I mean, when you value them, they care about you too. They [Circassians] are people who have built their lives on this. They, therefore, always care about people who are like them, whether they are within the same cultural circle or who come from the same descent line. Primarily, there are family lineages. The people in the same lineage are the relatives of one's big family, Then secondly, it comes the tribes. The people in his tribe is his relative among the others. Afterward, it comes all the Circassians and then Caucasians. Since the people of Caucasus may be descended from different ethnic groups, in other words, the Caucasians may belong to different ethnicities; however, it [the Caucasia] is actually a cultural sphere. All of these people are categorized under the same cultural sphere. Of course, there are different cultures and cultural differences among them, however, if we draw a larger circle around, all these cultures appear similar to each other. Hence, throughout history, they have always been interested and cared and sympathized in one another. [Shogen, Solidarity]

The fictive kinship practice appears to be a welcoming ground for inter-ethnic relations among the Circassian diaspora. Member of the Solidarity group makes a clear affirmation of how they evaluate the boundry marker for exclusion of the “other” by not through the lens of ethnicity. He articulates the kinship ties among the Circassians and the people of Caucasus by evaluating the Caucasian culture as a vessel bonding people fictively.

Therefore, who are the people making these discussions? Such as; "who is the Circassian?" "Does Circassian means just the Adyghe people? Or is it a more comprehensive concept? What is it?" We do not stick around any of these questions. When we say "Circassians," we do not consider this to be an ethnic thing, but as people in the same cultural sphere. Therefore, we feel closeness to them... Consequently, we feel an affinity to the people of the Caucasus. Moreover, this sympathy, especially in times of disasters, causes us to empathize with them in conflicts, wars, and grievances. Maybe that's what it is. [Shogen, Solidarity]

Wunekosh practice among the Solidarity members appears to be a significant trait. Both members of the Patriots -who campaigned against the airbridge operation and not involved in aid organizations for supporting Syrian Circassians- articulate wuneskosh practice as a practice that is difficult to follow in the contemporary world.

At the present day, the practice of solidarity union of people whom we call as being "Wunekoshes" of each other, evolved into something

which is not possible to survive... and which belongs to the past. [Qube, Patriots]

Kinship is essential, but in this continuously evolving age that we live in, the self individualism is at the forefront. When the individual identities come to the fore, cultural issues and identities remain a little more in the background, and since the community cannot act together, can not mobilize in unity...I think this issue brings some fragmentation to the life of the person. [Akgun, Patriots]

I've considered everyone in the village as my relatives, by the time I reached the age of fifty as my generation started to age, the olds were already gone, and I found out that the young generation does not have the same sensitivity as I had. This hurts a lot. [Guldal, Solidarity]

According to the participant among the Patriots, trait of “carrying the Circassian sociology” appears to be a litmus for a member of the Circassian diaspora living under the exposure of or in interaction with different cultures. Therefore, deserving to be treated within Circassian terms, such as enjoying the Solidarity of the Wunekosh practice, needs the one to act within the “Circassian Sociology”.

Syrianism and Circassianism can intermingle. Sometimes it may even overlap. If a person carries Circassian sociology, then, of course, he is a part of the family..." [Qube, Patriots]

In Peter Worsley’s words cultural traits are not absolutes or simply intellectual categories, but are invoked to provide identities to legitimize claims to rights. They are strategies or weapons in competitions over scarce social goods (Eriksen, 2010). Reciprocally, kinship ties among Circassians imposes certain obligations and therefore sanctions to the member of the society.

Wunekosh" is more of a sanctioned rule of the Xabze [The Circassian etiquette]. In other words, if a Circassian who owns means of support and not taking care of a Wunekhos in need, would not be acting in compliance with the rules of the Xabze. Moreover, he/she would be accused of performing a shameful act by the Circassian society. I mean, it is still a shame. They will criticize him as; "He does not support this guy." This degrades his reputation severely, and there is a section of degregating one's reputation. "His Wunekosh is still in need, but he did not help him although he had the opportunity". I mean, this condition humiliates that person. Even today, this condition is valid. It has not diminished. [Qube, Patriots]

4.2.2. Wunekosh practice as a Boundary Marker during the Syrian Crisis and the Airbridge Operation

Circassian Organizations in Turkey delivering aid and assitance to the Circassians of Syria has used the fictive kinship Wunekosh practice as a tool in order to manage the crisis. Through Wunekosh practice, the aid and assitance provided to Syrian Circassians by Circassians of Turkey had the form of an obligation and a responsibilty of a family towards a family member rather than a donation to someone in need. Circassian Solidarity mobilized Wunekosh practice for the Syrian Circassians pulled out from the war zone in Syria and placed temporarily to a district in a refugee camp spared for them particularly during the Airbridge operation. As a second step, Circassian Solidarity searched for the kinship ties of the arrivals through their Circassian family names in order to take them out of the refugee camp and settle them permanently through using the social, psyhcological and financial support that family ties deliver.

We also have benefited from this structure. We have found the family members [among the Circassians of Turkey] of the ones [Circassians of Syria] in the camps, and a part of them settled through this occasion. This is a favorable conclusion of our traditions. [Kushba]

The participant on a managing position in KAFFED Crisis Management Committee mainly delivering aid and assistance to individual cases examplifies how they mobilized the kinship ties of Circassians by following the traditional family naming pattern to find aid and support for Syrian Circassians from Circassians in Turkey. However, he also identifies the set backs of the kinship tradition.

One of our methods for searching for a house was this; someone [a Syrian Circassian] informed us of her arrival. First, we tried to learn the name of the family or tribe that the guest belongs to... Through this way, we found many [donated] homes. Relatives of the Syrian Circassians in Turkey was very active for looking after them, but there are also very large families. The Shagujes are crowded, the Tsey's, Hatqo's are too. Are they a family, a tribe or beyond that? These [Syrian Circassians] belonging to that kind of families were relatively more unfortunate than the other ones. Because, such as if someone from Hatqo family had arrived, no one from Hatqo's in Turkey got mobilized to help them. I'm not saying this to blame them...I'm an Altheskir [from Altheskir family]. I will never question if an Altheskir comes. I know he or she is my relative. It does not matter from where we are connected; It does not matter which branch of the lineage they are from. Because we are a small family, if she or he is an Altheskir, if we sit and give blood, our genetics will appear identical. I accept it from the beginning. However, of course, this [mechanism] did not work effectively in the very large dynasties. Such as a Shaguj lady could still find a job with the Shagujes in the intervening period. As I said, I can not say as this or that family. However, we have used kinship ties. When somebody [when a Syrian Circassian] arrives, our first issue was to find out which family he or she was from. For instance, the Dziba family was fantastic. When I called and said; "A Dzibe is coming". They would reply to me as, "You don't need to go [to the airport], we'll take care of this. We'll welcome them". In fact, one of the arrivals was wounded. Taking care of an injured person is a difficult thing to do. God has mercy on him [he later] passed away, but Dzibe's got organized as a family. They had already established something like Dzibe Family Association. I don't know if it's an official association, but there were facebook pages, web pages. When I said, " Someone from Dzıbe's is coming," they handled it very well. I remember myself saying, "I hope [the arriving Syrian Circassian] is a Dzibe.’ Actually, they are also a crowded family. However, they never got around the issue of the issue by questioning such as " Are they relatives? No, only Wunekosh". They could be able to act like some others, and they could do so. But, they did not. I don't blame those who did. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

The kinship tradition among Circassians as a cultural trait “legitimize[ing] claims to rights” imposed certain responsibilities towards the family members in Turkey of Syrian Circassians whom they were departed more than a century ago. Therefore, despite the acceptance of the kinship [and Wunekosh] practice, some members of the Circassian society in Turkey stayed in silence or avoided to take part actively

in aid and assistance activities. A recently backrupt and in financial distress member of Solidarity examplifies his urge of help as he heard about the struggles of Syrian Circassians but how his fear of “taking thier responsibility” an not able to perform his duties towards them prevented him to act.

Although I have insisted on not to enter, I am very grateful to the friends who attracted me to these processes. This was a test. This was an example — the way Kenan Kaplan stinted himself and volunteered for going Lebanon alone moved me. It is a big deal to go and get the job done at the consulate. Therefore, it is a great honor for me to be involved in such a thing. The reason I stood back at the beginning is apparent...I was in a troubled period. If I weren't in that situation, I'd be running around. [Guler, Solidarity]

The participants from Patriots, who were not involved in aid organizations and campaigned against the transfer of Syrian Circassians to Turkey during the airbridge operation by identifying the process as the "Turkification" of Syrian Circassians, mentioned that they did not have any case of Wunekosh practice. Participants mentioned either absence of the Wunekoshes in Syria or Wunekoshes not being in need. However, they both commented on the Wunekosh practice mobilized during Syrian Crisis among the Circassian of Turkey based on their observations in their enviroments.

Circassians tried to operate the concept of "Wunekosh." Because I know in practice, and I know from the field. In the villages, Circassians tried to back up the Syrian Circassians. I have many friends in Yalova. I mean, through the things I've seen. It would be a little hurtful if some say "we have failed". We [Circassian of Turkey] haven't failed, but could it have been better? Of course, it could. Actually, at this point, Circassians passed the test with a good score. Except for a few exceptions, the Syrian Circassians who went by their "Wunekoshes", have not experienced suffering, and an unjust treatment in Turkey. So they haven't suffered anything. They didn't suffer much. So they [Circassian relatives in Turkey] were able to share their own bread [and give to Syrian Circassian relative]. They were able to give them the half. This is not a bad thing. A good thing after all. It was a good test. So in today's economic conditions, in a time when everyone can only self-

sufficient dividing a bread in half and give it to someone else should be considered as a beautiful value. It's not just only on behalf of Circassians, its universally a beautiful value... There was much support of Circassians of Turkey to the Circassians of Syria in the form of looking after them, supporting psychologically. This has been done. This has been done a lot. Could it be done in a better way? Yes, it could have been much better. However, the Circassians in Turkey was not organized [under a body]. So they did their best. In spite of the negativity of all erosions, The Circassians gave not a bad test around the notion of "Wunekosh" during the Syrian civil war. [Qube, Patriots]

Here? yes we have… or Syria. There is no Wunekosh in Syria. No there is not. No. But there is but I mean no [Akgun, Patriots]

On the contrary of participants of Patriots, members of Solidarity and the participant from KAFFED generalize Syrian Circassians as their relatives and claims a fictive kinship bond which can be evaluated as a projection of the cultural trait of being “Wunekosh”.

Did I know these people [Syrian Circassians] before? No. Circassians are our relatives. Relatives that we haven't met before. A person may not know all of his/her relatives in person. It's like you know about their existence over there. We [members of the Circassian diaspora] have separated from each other 150 years ago. We arrived as a group and fallen apart. For example, I've heard that my relatives are in Sudan, they are in Libya, and I felt very excited. When people from their descent come to Turkey, how excited they would be to find their fellow countrymen. [Baj, Solidarity]

We are the people who can show this resistance after 150 years. So when the Syrians came, my only concern was this; I considered them as my sister, like my sister-in-law. I've never thought of anything else. Forexample, would I run for help a person in difficulty? I swear, I would run. However, I wouldn't run that far. I wouldn't run like as if there is a fire in my house. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

According to Barth, ethnic boundaries in a group may serve in two way extremity. In one end it may function “merely as a categorical ascription or label to classify

people” while on the other end ethnic organization may organise crucial aspects” of one’s life and “have a great importance at the level of society” (Eriksen, 2010)

As Abner Cohen states; “There is the ethnicity and ethnicity...I think that in common sense that the ethnicity of collectivity that manifests itself in the form of an annual gathering of a few of its numbers to perform a dance or a ceremonial is different from the ethnicity manifested by say, the Catholics in the Northern Ireland” (Eriksen, 2010, p. 41). In the example of the Airbridge operation, Solidarity member who by his act of performing an airbrige operation for rescuing people stands on one end, criticizes the other end of the extremity. He articulates performing such an organization could not be explained through a single boundary marker. At this point the participant underlines the Notion of ‘Circassian National Consciousness’ as a driving force.

The [airbridge] operation we carried out, performed by the identity- conscious Circassians who want to establish Circassian politics. It is not something that can only be explained by the kinship. I want to highlight this in particular. Because we are all, Nusret Bey, Kenan Bey, Recep, Ben, Emine Hanim, Faruk Bey, Mustafa Bey, Erol Bey are all in this circle. Therefore, this can not be explained precisely through kinship. In Turkey, there are hundreds of thousands, millions of Circassians, but a small team ran this operation. This is something that goes beyond the kinship. This is something that has emerged by an extremely disciplined, systematic, self-sacrificing effort of an organization aiming of developing an independent, self-conscious Circassian politics, and to present the existence of Circassians to the world. You can't just explain with kinship. Go to the State, demand, go to the Beirut, this is not a kind of thing someone who makes regular visits to an ordinary Circassian Club could be able to do. Those are going to the Circassian culture events and applauds. These are not easy tasks that can be done by people who pretend as if they are superior Circassians when they go to a folklore show and pay ten Lira for the ticket. That's the situation. That's how I define the kinship...On the other hand, [by being against the airbridge operation] What KAFFED has done is not something to be explained with the kinship either. This is something that people who can be conscious of and who can afford to make sacrifices. [Habracu, Solidarity]

Why did I feel connected to those people? Aren't we are the people who are trying to make people feel this connection? Consider me, for example. Why did I sob when I found my family in the Caucasus which we left 155-155 years ago? Do you understand me? Why I invited and hosted them in Turkey? All of those who volunteered for Syrian Circassians were the people with this sensibility. That's the point]. Aren't we the people trying to build national consciousness for years? What is the problem with us? Like I said, under normal conditions, I should be thinking of how to entertain myself this weekend? I should have been a father planning of which guitar course to take for my child? What sports activity should I do? [Altheskir, KAFFED]

Central aspects of ethnic processes at the interpersonal level, including streotyping, under and over communicating , dichotomization and complementation and ethnic stigma (Eriksen, 2002). The participant in a managing position in KAFFED over communicates “them” with thick boundaries through stereotyping by applying standardized notions of the cultural distinctiveness of the Syrian immigrants in Turkey. He identifies Circassians of Syria as “us” by sparing from “them” through kinship bonds. It’s observed that the ongoing polical athmosphere in Turkey shapes the reclections, therefore the perspectives of the participant.

As a physician, when we feel that the patient is not able to cover the costs, we make the treatment free of charge. This is the requirement of the medical etiquette, the necessity of being human. However, I wouldn't be involved as much as I got involved [with Syrian Circassians]. I don't want to make anyone angry. When I saw a Syrian on the street, inside of me, there is no sense of mercy towards him. There is a proverb, "Your life comes first, your love is after." Of course, I try not to let her live on the street in pain. However, I would not worry about sheltering him, finding a place for him to stay. I do not know about these issues. I'm not a State. The one who opens that border gate has to make this calculation. So many uncontrolled people have spread to the cities of Turkey. The social problems that are caused by this and so on. In this sense, yes, I would not say I like it when I see the men who are walking around with such a strange hairstyle. Short-bellied, in tight jeans, hair combed strangely, weird beard types. I don't know if you do like to see this kind of people, but I do not. So...They are also Syrian. I don't like it. They created a strange fashion. They created a peculiar fashion stream. Sometimes I go to Taksim. I dislike the scenery

that I've seen there. However, I'm always going to keep our people apart. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

The member of the Solidarity group who first identifies himself through left ideologies at the beginning of the interview evaluating the kinship through the lens of his political views, he reveals how he was driven by the “signals”, therefore dichotomize between his idelogic perception against class differences and ethnic identity. This example of kinship as a Circassian identity boundary marker proves how ethnic identities are negotiated and how the common sentiments have an effect in this negotiation process:

Kinship is absolutely important. Agnation is also important. However, rather than kinship or agnation or being relatives, I had the urge of helping these people because they were human beings. If there is such a war in Iran tomorrow and there is something I can do, I will do the same thing again. On the other hand, [during airbdirge-operation] you see the [Circassian] flag in the hands of people coming [out of the plane]. As they first enter from the arrivals gate, people were holding the Circassian flag in the hands, even in the hands of the little children, our Adiga flag was there. Do you understand? That very moment touched me a lot. I mean, today I'm saying that I will be helping people from Iran; however, it is not possible to experience those emotions that I had with the Iranian people. Of course, these people [Syrian Circassians] feels closer. [They are] from your own blood, from your own soul, your own relatives. I would like to articulate this event like this; We have said; “whatever it takes for Circassians to survive, to continue their existence in the world, to ensure the survival of Circassian presence, let's do it”. What happened in Syria is nothing small. I, for example, opposed the Turkish State entering Afrin. I'm against entering the Membic [city of Syria]. We must traverse to the war. [Guler, Solidarity]

The common denominators here are two things. The first one is the fraternity of being Circassian, and the second is the brotherhood of religion. These two came together in the Syrian crisis. Our brotherhood with them [Syrian Circassians] are both spiritual and historical; sharing the same history, culture, religion. All of these was all together. [Baj, Solidarity]

The participant who is one of the leading activists of Patriots over communicates the importance of kinship ties among the Circassian community. However, she undercommunicates her involvement in any aid related mobilization or support for Syrian Circassians.

However, despite this fact, the concept of "Wunekosh", the term of kinship, is one of the answers that can be given to social alienation, coldness, technological loneliness. In fact, this is an invisible weapon of Circassians and something that can be used in every effort for existing. I didn't have a Wunekosh practice. There were things that I have only observed. For example, I observed in Yalova, in Reyhanlı. I was invited to a festival there that year. There were things I've been seeing. As to add about Wunekosh subject, I'll be by them if they need me. Because we have learned (educated) like. So this is the way we grew up. The way I grow up was in the way of; besides of Wunekoshes, there are 7 billion people are living in the world, all of the 7 are good. My Wunekoshes had no need for Solidarity and asked for help. That's what we experienced in practice during the Syrian war. We're following that line. Even it is wrong or right. [Qube]

Kinship is practically like this; for example, a majority of settlers settled. When one settled in a place, he dragged the others following him. For example, some groups settled around Zeytinburnu, Topkapı and those areas [of Istanbul], especially in these areas. And then their other relatives, friends came. Yes, "Wunekosh" concept. You're right. Kinship relationships have attracted them to each other. They have welcomed the Circassians whom they already know from Syria, and they began to live in the same districts. This naturally forms a specific colony life. It is also in Turkey, such as Istanbul, a city of 20 million. Keeping such concepts alive is not an easy thing. [Akgun, Patriots]

Participant over communicates the negotiability of kinship ties and tradition among Circassians in the contemporary World. On the other hand, he over communicates the kinship in terms of ‘the first people who gets informed about you’ on social media. Through one’s assertiveness on the Circassian identity forms a social inclusion of the family members to a ‘common we’ zone, a ‘common sentiments zone’:

These are the processes that are expected to be lived. They continue to live that in the virtual world. Something very interesting. I think there are about 300,000-400,000 Facebook users in Turkey. Those are interestingly visiting specific Circassian pages. On some specific issues or days such as May 21st, they get organized, give a response like an organized real established association. I think there is a multiplier effect of kinship here. As an example, let's say a person has 3000 facebook friends and a hundred of them are relatives. When he shares, first his relatives see the post because they had been following him. This is something infectious. So they're contaminating to each other. In this respect, kinship also means strengthening national identities in the virtual world. But on the other hand, in real life (out of virtual) everyone lives in their own lives. Therefore, in such a condition we cannot see a Circassian outside on the street. So just on May 21st, you can see the Circassians carrying their flag during a demonstration. Though they are 1000 people, 2000 people, 3000 people… And it is already in a particular region. Istanbul is a huge city. The ones who can join can join. In terms of being relatives, kinship people can affect each other. It has a side that adds a sentiment to the issue. [Akgun, Patriots]

To analyse and to recapitualate the testimonies of the interviews I made, kinship provides a symbolic and powerful relationship of commonness among the Circassians in Turkey which was particulary mobilized during the Airbridge operation. All three Circassian networks evoke kinship ties with the Syrian Circassians. Two forms of fictive kinship have been utilized: Wunekosh and Blaga practices the Circassian families from Syria were first put in contact with their Wunekoshes and Blaga’s which require certain rights and obligations on the recieving family. These obligations can be so overwhelming that might back fire. There has been some cases of individuals who stayed away from helping Syrian Circassians. Even, the networks Circassian Patriots who actively campaigned againts Airbridge operation, reaffirmed obligations of fictive kinship ties but not helping any Syrian Circassian family because of they don’t have any kins among the familes.

When defined as an ascriptive and exclusive group, the nature of continuity of

ethnic units is clear: it depends on the maintenance of a boundary. The cultural

features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural characteristics of the

members may likewise be transformed, indeed, even the organizational form of the

group may change — yet the fact of continuing dichotomization between members

and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of continuity, and investigate the

changing cultural form and content.

4.3. ‘Xabze’ the Circassian Etiquette as a Circassian Identity Boundary Marker

Circassians social conduct are designed through certain concepts of ethics. The interrelated, time to time overlapping ethics according to Amjad Jamouka in his article, "Circassian Customs and Ethics" are mentioned as Adyghe Xabze, Adigaghe, and Adat. Jamouka has identified Adigaghe as "the Circassianness—the quality of being Circassian”. Jamouka refers Adat; tradition to as the set of rules and traditions within the interrelations of Caucasian nations. Finally, Xabze; the Circassian etiquette which is orally transmitted set of rules and therefore, a "rigid and complex system of morals" (Jaimouka, 2014) designing all levels social conduct among Circassians, and "Regulating the day-to-day aspects of the daily life of Circassians" (Jaimouka, 2014). The Xabze has also served as the law for ad hoc courts and councils set up to resolve contentious cases and other moot issues, and pronounce binding judgments (Jaimouka, 2014). Tsvetkova lays out the similarity of the both terms as; “the Adat is the traditional system of justice among the eastern Caucasian peoples which is based on local customs and popular legal practices. The Circassian notion of Xabze played the same role in the Western Caucasus” (Tsvetkova, 2017).

Circassian Xabze appears to have its roots through the ancient times. Therefore, the Nart Sagas of the Caucasus, which are orally transmitted mythological stories about the stories of the god-like Narts has also carried the essences of the Xabze rules.

According to Jaimouka; “The collective and individual attributes of these legendary heroes have shaped the code of behavior of Circassian society since immemorial times and molded the knightly characters of its nobility”. Jaimouka lays out the characteristics as of the Narts as; “qualities included the love of the fatherland and its defense to the last, idolization of honor, bravery and concomitant abhorrence of cowardice, observance of the code of chivalry, loathing for oppression, loyalty to clan and kin, fealty to bonds of camaraderie, care of and fidelity to one's horse” (Jaimouka, 2014).

Today, Xabze is considered as the most essential and comprehensive cultural trait of Circassians serving as a boundary marker. According to a study done in 1993 among 160 house members of 7 Circassian villages of Uzunyayla district, of Turkey, %28.6 of the householders considered the preservation of the Xabze for the survival of the Circassian culture. Study shows that the second vital element for the householders participated in the study in order to keep Circassian Culture alive was, with %7.4, speaking and writing the [Circassian] language (Eser, 1999).

In this chapter re-negotiation of Circassian Etiquette, Xabze as an identity boundary marker of Circassians among Circassians of Turkey through the lens of Airbridge operation is observed.

4.3.1. Xabze Through the Perspective of Circassians organized or campaigned againts the “Airbridge Operation” during Syrian Civil War.

According to Barth “identification of another through the person as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement. It thus entails the assumption that the two are fundamentally playing the same game” (Barth, 1969a). Therefore, Xabze, Circassian Etiquette, is set of

criterias serving as an identity boundary marker leading Circassians to enter the “common sentiments zone” through the feeling of “playing the same game”. By acting in accordance with the codes of the Circassian way of conduct, Xabze, out of their Syrian identity, Syrian Circassians were considered as ‘among them’ by Circassias in Turkey, as the Interwiee underlines, especially in the Circassian vilages. Despite the fact of the forms of the tangible [housing, etc.] support, sense of trust and ease of adaptation was among the forms of psychological support Syrian Circassians attained because of their ethnic identity.

Xabze turns people into a community which gives the same reactions. Those who go to villages, for example, do not experience conflict with the community there. When Syrian Circassians act by following the same codes, it becomes easier to adapt to society. I think the most important thing here is the sense of mutual trust. When the Syrian Circassian coming out of a war zone and refuging to obscurity but arriving at a space of which is the Xabze's field application, he establishes a sense of trust and feels safe. He can be able to adapt to the environment, and culturally does not feel foreign. [Kushba, Solidarity]

The participant who was among the main organizers of the Airbridge operation articulates the sense of unification and “common sentiments zone” by underlying “a mood maintained by Xabze”. Another striking fact is; this “mood” turns a stranger into a close family member within minutes and consists “love, respect, and Solidarity” among the members of Circassian society.

Circassians of Syria geographically separated from us. However, in there, in our hearts, the Circassians from forty countries of the world are living. The value of all these people is the same for us. Any Circassian living any part of the world too has the same value as if they are a neighbor of us in Turkey or our brother or our mother and our father. We feel the same feelings towards them. This is a mood given by the Xabze. This can not be a result of something that is previously planned. Eventually, we experience the actual examples of this "result" in our community life. In a random place, when somebody introduced another as "oh he is Circassian too" and as the moment we meet, we are able to act in love, respect and Solidarity as if we were sharing the same feelings for 100 years as if we were together for 100 years. This, of

course, is a beauty that Allah has granted to our society. We are also proud of this. [Meretiqo, Solidarity]

The participant of Solidarity, defines Xabze as an institutional framework on the frame “being valued by valuing the other”. Therefore, Xabze is a code of conduct delivering a life standart through humane relations which still is valid and in accordance with modernity.

Now what Xabze means in terms of the Circassian identity is; [first of all] everyone thinks that Xabze is fundamentally essential. They say it is vital. That is true. In fact, Xabze is a culture of life. Circassians have formed a life order, which has maintained a high living order, a humanitarian standard, even during the dark and chaotic times of the world. That [life order] is what's called Xabze. A culture that gives value to human, making the human valuable. A culture that is worthwile by giving value to human. Today in the modern age, this kind of communication is just recently being articulated in social sciences. However, Circassians have discovered this much earlier and applied it to their lives. If you ask me; “What is the Circassian culture is? I would reply in with one sentence. “To give value.” It is a culture based on value. Valuing is essential. It is something that brings the collective consciousness to the front, not the ego. They have realized this. Yes, Circassians are said to have high egos, it is said that their individualism is high, but through Xabze, Circassian society is a society that has learned to take the egos back, learn to discipline it in a way. That's why, for centuries, they have been able to live in peace. Today, at the point where arrive at Xabze is something that we can proudly show as an example which, if taken as an example, can be a remedy for many turmoils in the world. It is a condition, is a culture of life. [Shogen, Solidarity]

Interviewee underlines Xabze as a boundary marker defining “us” versus “them” in the form of all ethnic groups they interact in the former lands of the Ottoman empire [today’s Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Balkan Countries] due to its unique point of view and approach towards one another. Xabze imposes responsibilities to the members of the community, similar to the ones they have towards their close relatives. On the other hand, the kinship structure is rather than race-based defined through one acting within the Circassian culture. Therefore, as the bearer of the

culture, Xabze plays an essential role for dichotomization and classification among the members.

Of course, unlike other ethnic groups living in Turkey or the in Ottoman geography, as Circassians, we have a distinctive culture called "Xabze." We have our own culture. The people of this culture have another point of view and approach to each other. That is a Circassian, feels a responsibility towards another Circassian, as the same responsibility that he feels against his son, his mother, his father, his brother or sister besides he feels the same way of affection, respect to him as he has to his own family. [Meretiqo, Solidarity]

Otherwise, it is not about what is the blood in a person's veins. Just because one's mother is Circassian or father is Circassian, or because both parents are Circassian, this person is not automatically becoming a precious person. When he/she is blended with the Circassian Culture, that culture makes him valuable. The importance of the mother, of the father being Circassian is stressed. Because [these people] are assumed of inheriting this culture from their Circassian mother and father. [Shogen, Solidarity]

As the norm defining and regulating social interaction, Xabze implies a particular set of rules in the form of traditions. Xabze is transmitted from generations to generations within the family regulating the relations among the family members and, as the communal base of Circassians in Turkey, within Circassian villages regulating daily life. Therefore, growing up in a Circassian village or within a Circassian family is considered as the source of learning Xabze. The participant identifies himself as a “relax” and “not in line with the traditions,” which, as he states, is the result of growing up in the suburbs of a Metropol city.

Each and every time we went there [to the camp], or to the Gaziantep airport to welcome them [Syrian Circassians during airbridge operation] I have observed their behaviors were by all of our traditions. I was born in Istanbul. My father and father are from the same village. My wife is from Gonen city, and she is mixed. Her father is Circassian, mother’s family had migrated from Bulgaria. However, she has grown up in a Circassian village. However, I am not in line with the traditions because

I have raised in Istanbul. I have grown up in the suburbs. I am a person who acts in a relaxed way [Guldal, Solidarity]

Participant articulates how as a cultural trait, Xabze becomes visible and bonds Circassians of Turkey and Circassians of Syria in the form of reciprocity for the ones who helped them within Circassian terms. The similarities he has experiences in his closed culture area, like the village, and among Syrian Circassians serves as a boundary between Circassians and the "others", even if the Syrian Circassians were born and raised in a different country.

As I have observed there, the people in the camp [Syrian Circassians] was behaving in the same way, following the traditions, like the ones in our village. I’ve seen they made “Adat” to us. Before, the food in the camp had been cooked and distributed. That practice was over, later the camp management issued and distributed coins. With these coins, they [Syrian Circassians] were able to do shopping from the market in the camp. On the other hand, the amount they got was just enough to feed themselves. A woman from one of the families [settled in the camp after the Airbridge operation] came and said; “I will cook for you, you will come and be my guest.” My friends [members of the Solidarity group] talked with each other. These coins were just enough to feed them. They got worried about how she would cover the cost of the dinner. However, she insisted; “no, you will come and eat!”, “I will cook for you, and you will eat". Menu was chicken and rice. They cooked it beautifully. They have collected the coins among them, shopped from the market and cooked for us. My friends said, “if we don’t eat and refuse, they will get upset.” I am not a picky person, but I mostly eat vegetables. I don’t prefer to eat meat, however chicken, rice and ayran, how we ate those along with such a lovely, friendly chat, such a pleasant atmosphere, we felt so happy and pleased. We suddenly became their guests while we were the actual hosts. I felt so proud of this situation. [Guldal, Solidarity]

Participant from KAFFED over communicates the “us” versus “them” difference between his life at home, life at school, and life at the Circassian association. In the Handelmans typology of ethnic incorporation; ethnic groups form “loose socially almost insignificant” categories up to “tight corporate” groups. Handelman's typology refers to the ethnic category as the least incorporated kind of ethnic collectivity; on the other hand, in ethnic networks, members have interaction with

each other on a membership basis. “When members of an ethnic category feel that they have shared interests...they develop an organizational apparatus”

(Eriksen, 2010) which are called ethnic associations. Therefore, Xabze is invisibly taught and practiced by the members through either at home, in the village and within Circassian associations which are ethnic associations. According to the participant, the practice of Xabze forms an atmosphere and a “rhythm” differing Circassians from the others, where members of the community feel comfort and peace. In the participant's differentiation, there is an attribution to Xabze maintaining gender justice, self-dignity, and universally accepted values of morality, ethics.

I graduated from Ankara Atatürk Anatolian High School. This is a well known high school of Ankara...That school was a place where vagrancy, rebelliousness, being against the teachers, blasphemy all of them was as normal as breathing. Even today, as I recall those jokes done to the teachers, I feel ashamed...There were different rules at home. We were not extending our legs [sit sprawled] in front of our father. I'm actually not trying to tell you what I understand from Xabze. Instead, none of this was forced. For example, it's not forced in my house too. However, my sons also don't sit around me like that right now. When I get into the room, they get up. They don't say, "Oh, have you come?". Because my wife has also grown up in that environment, she raised our children according to that... You are going to school having such an environment. There are a lot of rules in the house you leave every morning. A lot of things were being paid attention, such as from not tossing the feet, to the style of addressing. These were not forcefully imposed either. In the middle of every speech, you hear that; “Look! you are an Adyghe, Adyghe's behaves in this manner"...[at school] There was such a chit- chat scene from the School; 3-5 friends gathered. We are drinking tea. We're in the toilet. Teas are in the hands of everyone. Everybody smokes. Everybody has a cigarette. One says something like this; " Mumtaz squawked again yesterday, I made the bastards settings," he says. The one he calls with the first name as Mumtaz is his father! I remember how I got winced at that very moment. He calls his father as 'bastard', he calls his father with his first name! 'Mumtaz', he talks about how he set his father up. My father was also a very tough man. But not even it is coming to the tip of my tongue, even it comes to my mind, of speaking like, "yesterday our Duran squawked" I mean, I remember how just the idea of such talking gasped my breath...You're out of this kind of [high school] environment. You feel bad, and you feel terrible. But you have to keep up with them. Then you come home. There is a different rhythm at home, the way you breathe. There is a calmness. And none of this has been taught. No one has forced you as; "Watch out! Obey the rules!". Then I finished school...My father said to me, "You're going to the [Circassian] Association. My father took me to the association, somehow. I remember that I never liked it. I remember myself saying, "Please, let me not go to the association." But my father was very resistant. "No, you will go," he said. We went to the president of the association at that time. My dad sat with me and told the president ... "these young guys can't fuse in. You have to do something"...I went to the association. Then I noticed something. Life has found balance. There is no one speaking like "Our Mumtaz Squawked." Everything was in my rhythm. There were people around me breathing in the way that I breathe. And then there was a sense of gratitude. Thank God! I'm here. Being there was fun either. Girls and boys are together. When compared with the ones in my high school, they were approaching each other through a different kind of morality. They approach, they address each other entirely in a different way. We're in Zexes'es28 until the morning. We all trust each other. There's a whole other type of morality. There is an entirely different system. If we do not lose it, this society will not disappear. This is why I am striving for. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

Syrian Circassians in the Camp was “neat", “clean” and “organized” when compared with the “others” as Arabs, and Syrians in the Refugee camp. The camp managers articulated this superiority differentiation to the members of Solidarity through, “Nisantasi and Tarlabasi” example. All participants from the Solidarity network has mentioned the same real-life example from the camp during their interviews. As the reason for this superiority, all participants have pointed Xabze.

We also visited our [Syrian] Circassian compatriots in the camp. There were other asylum seekers from Syria. The container area of the Circassians was separated. It was like a separate neighborhood. The camp managers expressed their contentedness with the Circassians. In fact, there was a wide, street-like section dividing the Circassians

28 Circassian name of a traditional meeting of the young Circassians gathering after a wedding and chat, play various traditional games and make jokes called semerkauw.

district. They [authorities in the camp] said; "The right side of this road," by pointing the region where the Circassians live, "Nisantasi” left side is "Tarlabasi". Indeed, on the right, Circassians had chosen a headman of the neighborhood in accordance with the traditions, by the rules of Xabze. They were governing themselves in line with his directives. They divided the tasks among themselves, which they would do collectively, and when compared, their neighborhoods were more neat and clean. When we looked at the other neighborhood, we saw that the carpets were thrown out, that the plastic bags were making rounds in the air with the wind and that the dirtiness was unfortunately very visible. Of course, we felt very proud of our comPatriots. [Kushba, Solidarity]

Being the Syrian and being the Turkish are among the identities of the Circassian diaspora members who interacted with eachother during the war in Syria. Participant overcommunicates the boundary of being from the different political atmospheres and circumstances specific to a citizentry of a particular country and being Circassian. For the participant, maintaining help and assitance to a Circassian without being in consideration of any other identity is an obligation of Xabze. On the other hand, participant articulates Xabze as an indicator of being the real Circassian among the other Circassians.

Among Circassians, Xabze is undoubtedly essential. Must be implemented in place. To me, a Circassian who is in the claim of living his/her by following the rules the Xabze should have supported the Circassians of Syria coming [refuging] with airplanes [Airbridge operation]. It is not an issue of being relatives or backing up our own relatives. People who believe in Xabze should behave like this. Without looking at who they are. Maybe there were young people among the ones who arrive supporting the Regime [Assad Regime in Syria], perhaps escaped from the military, saved his life. [Such as] The boy knew that if he serves in the Regime's army, he will get killed one day. He ran away. What shall he do? Ran away to save his life. Perhaps maybe there were Circassians among them [in the aircraft] supporting the Syrian opposition. The Syrian Regime in his own country has come to the point of collapse. You cannot tell [declare] a Syrian Circassian that he/she should support the Syrian Regime or join to the Syrian Opposition. These people need to decide for themselves. [Guler, Solidarity]

Xabze as a cultural trait identified as the “[Social-Communal] life style of Circassians”, “law of Circassians”, even “almost like a religion to follow” by the participants. According to the interviewee level of following Xabze is constantly being judged by Circassians to identify the trueness of one's Circassianness. Also, the strictness of the Xabze varies differently in different regions which Circassians have settled. For the Circassians growing up in city meant more interaction with “the others”, therefore them switching to the city’s dominant code of conduct frequently. Participant, a member of KAFFED, born and raised in the City, learned Xabze in the family and mainly practiced in the Circassian Associations and in his visits to the Circassian settlements, articulates the fear and stress of being classified as less Circassian publicly because of him missing to follow a Xabze rule by mistake as a result of growing up in the city.

For example, as a person who has grown up in the city, I may be neglecting many Xabze rules. Every time I go to the village, every village I'm going to a wedding today, though I'm 50 years old, I feel [the stress of not acting by Xabze] the fear. I feel that stress even at 50 years of age. For example, if I go to Düzce, I am much more comfortable. The customs of our Uzunyayla are much more strict. A word which you do no use in the right place comes and finds you. The attitude you don't put in the right place you 'll be criticized as "This man did not grow in the village. He doesn't know anything. He doesn't have the decency of Xache'sh rooms". These are things I've been told at meetings in front of everyone. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

But you can't imply the Xabze rules as "look! This is number one". If you enforce Xabze rules in such a strict way, I could not even make my son sit on my lap in front of my father. In the beginning, I didn't hold my son. Therefore, how, according to Xabze, a mother would teach this rule to his son? Not in the way of; "Look, son; you are going to have a baby boy soon. Do not dare to hold your son in front of your father". That's not what my mother said. That's not how a Circassian woman talks about such issues. She told me; "My son; you know that x person, he is from x place not from Uzunyayla and how your father doesn't like the traditions of that location. He said to your father that "When my son was born, I didn't say Xabze, mabze, I hold my son in front of my father and caressed him"; Do you know what your father had said to him? " He said, “May Allah give you the penalty". The reason behind this story was; I am telling you this story, so never act in this way. This is how a mother is teaching her son. So it's something else. Is there a written rule about it? It's a strange way of giving the warning in the Circassians. I don't know why. You can sit around, think a lot about it. But there is an entirely different pattern of behavior, a code of conduct. What do you think is in essence? The essence is Wherever you go, don't act in a way which humiliates us, don't give them causes to talk bad behind of you. An auto control system. For the way you behave, from the way you dress. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

Acting out of Xabze rules is criticized publicly by degrading the level of Circassianness. Although the participant who exemplifies his stress and fear of missing a Xabze rule, therefore judged and labeled as less Circassian, underlines his dislike against people who establishes interaction with other members without paying any attention to the Xabze rules. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

Xabze is the reason that we can keep this thing going. If I had always met with the people who were completely against our trend of behavior, who had completely forgotten the Xabze, I would have said, "Am I going to deal with them?" Choosing the easy one is easy. Easyness pulls the human being. As we are not able to select the easy, so we're not angels come down from the sky. [Altheskir, KAFFED]

During the Syrian Crisis, KAFFED positioned itself against the airbridge operation. However, the crisis management committee they operated supplied housing and assitance to the Syrian Circassians who reached them individually until they declare the termination of the committee due to scarce sources. During that process, some Syrian Circassians acting against Xabze was a determinant of the conflicts creating “bothering”, “dislike” even “irritation” of the participant, and as he mentions, in the Circassian community in Uzunyayla, the region where he states as the Circassian Xabze is applied more strictly compared to the other regions. According to the participant; Couple of Syrian Circassians violating the Xabze by degrading the assitance given was considered as disrespectful by the community members; therefore, the number of housing support decreased due to the incidents.

Our patience, all our strength is up to a certain extent. All of them were all tested continuously during that period. However, none of us has given up. None of us gave up. I don't believe that there was that type of a human [among us]. We didn't say” let's leave them! let them be by themselves." None of us said it. There were someone times when we got very bothered, for example, the mother-son I was talking about very bothered us a lot. Did it grow a dislike among us about the Syrians [Circassians]? We kept up. Because basically, this was a Xabze. When you meet with someone, the way he or she treats you, how her expressions are, the language they use. As we meet, we were able to say, "oh this is as the same as in the Uzun Yayla!".” [Altheskir, KAFFED]

I also know behaviors that violate Xabze. For example; some families left Uzunyayla because of them not liking the houses they had been placed. They treated those houses as if they are barns. However, the people of that area live under that condition. There are people who spend their winter there. There are people living [working] in the cities but looking forward to summer to come, so they can go to the village. The houses that were not houses like as if; lets put these hays to that corner, and convert that bed into a sofa. All of them were human living houses. I think there were 3-4 such cases Some people were asking us, "Is it this the place you worth us for?". This is my observation; we could have maybe found 100 more houses in Uzunyayla. But these cases caused us not being able to to find a home [get houses as donations for sheltering]. Another example is; a few people left the houses abruptly towards the morning without notifying the responsible people. Well, I think these cases effected of efforts of finding house donations for sheltering by making it even more difficult...That's a shame. Leaving without informing, by ignoring all efforts, endeavors done for you, without informing the host is disrespecting". [Altheskir, KAFFED]

Eriksen underlines the two ends of ethnic boundaries as in one end it [ethnic boundary] may function “merely as a categorical ascription or label to classify people” while on the other end “ethnic organization may organize crucial aspects” of one’s life and “have a great importance at the level of society” (Eriksen, 2010). The members of the Circassian Solidarity network had gone through life-threating, traumatizing conditions during the a-Airbridge operation for transferring mass numbers of Syrian Circassians to a safer zone. According to the participant, this was a “mood” given by Xabze, therefore according to the member of the Solidarity,

Meretiqo who went Beirut at the beginning of the Airbridge operation and had a possible heart collapse explains the mood as;

A Circassian, feels a responsibility towards another Circassian, as the same responsibility that he feels against his son, his mother, his father, his brother or sister besides he feels the same way of affection, respect to him as he has to his own family... Therefore, this is [Airbridge operation] was not done with an expectation of getting something in return, not something to benefit from, not something to acquire any status. Here, the people who support this [World Circassians Solidarity] committee and ensured the success of these works have been spending by their own pocket, by pushing their financial means. But they have never had the purpose of achieving anything on behalf of their own name. This has never been a case. I can express it. [Meretiqo, Solidarity]

As a matter of fact, during this study, three of the Participants identified Xabze as a frozen old Law needs to be updated, if not so “invalid”.

I describe Xabze as the Law as the Code. However, Xabze is a frozen law...Xabze is the Law. It is the Law of Circassians. It is a lifestyle. It's almost like a religion. Because it has been thought from birth. How to stand, how to sit, what to do when you an elder comes, what to do when you go to another village. For all of these, the rules are set. Circassian culture is a very original culture. Under today's circumstances, I define the Xabze as; "loving and respecting the nature and human beings" When you consider at this way, you understand the essence of the Circassian Xabze. But Xase [assembly] has not been gathered for 150 years. For example; How to eat chicken? There is a Xabze about it. Why doesn't the bride talk? Under the circumstances of that day, this rule was set to avoid the conflict between the bride and the mother-in-law living in the same house. All of these rules have reasons. Fathers don't play and demonstrate his love for his child. But [before] there were uncles in the same house, there were aunts, there were grandparents. The child was within such a circle of love that he/she didn't need his father's demonstration of love. But now, the mother and father living in the apartment if both of them are working, going to work, and if they don't care about their children, that children will go into a psychological depression. Therefore, Xabze must also be updated. If not, it is invalid. It is not possible to update Xabze unless there is an organization with such a sanctioning power. Associations can't act in place of it. [Habracu, Solidarity]

The participant is identifying Xase as the determinant of the Xabze, by underlying that the Xase is where the Xabze is being made. The participant identified the concepts under state-like terminologies.

Xabze is the Circassians social [communal] lifestyle and the whole of it. However, the Xase is the determinator for the Xabze. Xase is, actually, terminologically an independent governing body of an independent nation. In other words, if we look at the concepts, if we speak in terms of concepts, the situation which the Circassians are in at present, prevents them from establishing an independent Xase. A Non-Xase nation’s Xabze is evolving through its end as a result of the degeneration. Unfortunately, this is what is being happened now. Xase is a political and military Circassian institution. [Akgun, Patriots]

Another member of the Patriots defines Xase and Xabze positively correlated with each other. Where the of one’s absence bore the other one’s absence.

Because Xabze and Xase are things which can only be executable together. [Qube, Patriots]

We know that Xabze contains a different set of rules. Therefore, under today’s conditions, logic, conscience, human values, and all of our other values, all of them are needed to be updated. To re-evaluate Xabze rules, to develop them, to develop them further. [Akgun, Patriots]

On the contrary, the member of the Solidarity criticizes the understanding of Xabze through state-like concepts.

It is not appropriate to identify Xabze as only as a constitution of Circassians. Xabze is a philosophy of life, code of conduct. Series of manners rooted and coming from the depths of history which affect the emotions and thoughts of human beings. The language and the Xabze are the elements that describe, identify what it means to be a Circassian. Us trying to help the Syrian Circassians is also a condition of Xabze. [Baj, Solidarity]

According to Barth, “The cultural contents of ethnic dichotomies would seem analytically to be of two orders: (i) overt signals or signs- the diacritical features

that people look for and exhibit to show identity, often such features as dress, language, house-form, or general style of life, and (ii) basic value orientations: the standards of morality and excellence by which performance is judged. Since belonging to an ethnic category implies being a certain kind of person, having that basic identity, it also implies a claim to be judged, and to judge oneself, by those standards that are relevant to that identity” (Barth, 1969b). Therefore, as a cultural trait, Adyghe Xabze, is an ethnic dichotomy dividing the Circassian from the “other”, as well as defining “less, assimilated Circassian” from “true Circassian”.

During the Syrian Crisis, Circassians networks in Turkey mobilized for delivering aid and assistance to the Circassians of Syria evaluated their activities as “what Xabze refers them to do”. Participants identified all Circassians as their relatives and articulated responsibility towards them as a consequence of the Xabze. On the contrary, participants who have not involved any aid organization and instead performed politically oriented campaigns for Syrian Circassians directly go the Caucasus, [within the borders of Russia] instead than Turkey, defined Xabze by using terminology similar to a state-like constitution. These participants highlighted a need for an update of rules and sanctions of the Xabze in accordance with the lifestyles and needs of the present day. For them, the update could only be done through a Xase which they define as a parliament. As a matter of fact, Solidarity members, except one, articulates the philosophical side of the Xabze.

CONCLUSION

Even in times of crisis, the ethnic Solidarity networks among the Circassians contest the boundary markers of being Circassian. They do not only mobilize these markers to create commonality but also to exclude and degrade other “Circassians.” Despite the immense humanitarian aspect of the Syrian crisis, this thesis shows that the Circassian networks in Turkey have argued over who is a proper Circassian or who is not during the Airbridge operation aimed at saving people from a war zone. This shows us that ethnic boundary markers can work to promote a humanitarian cause as well as to undermine it.

The specific boundary marker mobilized or negotiated do not exist in a power vacuum. The existing Circassian networks in Turkey engage in a power struggle over who is best qualified to represent the Circassian identity. This aspect can also be supported by the various countries that are viewed as the (il)legitimate protector of the Circassian diaspora.

The primary markers of Circassian identity mobilized during the airbridge operation include religion, language, Circassian etiquette (Xabze), and kinship. Religious symbols and practices are treated as an attribute of the ‘others’ ethnic identity rather than a religious discussion. Such as headscarf being regarded as an ‘Arab’ tradition rather than a Muslim practice. Some practices such as alcohol consumption can be justified as an ethnic, cultural practice even for the more pious members of the Circassian community. Therefore, in this thesis, when the phenomenon of religion as identity boundary marker is examined, the following conclusions are reached. Religion has served as a boundary marker to distinguish between us versus the ethnic other. Some Circassian customs and traditions have been abandoned or justified according to Islamic practice. And finally, Circassians have their own Islamic understanding.

Rather than a tool of communication, Circassian language is a boundary marker that works as “common sentiment zone” bonding the members of the Circassian diaspora during the Airbridge operation. Kinship ties formulated as Wunekosh and Blaga evoke obligations and sanctions which has been very useful to host Syrian Circassians in Turkey. Circassians of Turkey have taken on their Wunekosh and blaga families with an obligation to provide and fulfill all their necessities. Xabze implies a set of principles including generalized reciprocity, which is considered central for being a proper Circassian, despite some caveats. Xabze is not static, but there is a general agreement that a true Circassian should uphold the generalized reciprocity at least for other Circassians. On the other hand, Xabze's definition varies among the members of each group. Time to time, Xabze has been used as an identity boundary marker to define ‘the assimilated’ and ‘the true Circassian’ among some group members, while on the contrary, it is defined as a frozen law that needs to be updated among other group members.

In this thesis, we have compared and contrasted Solidarity-CERKESFED, KAFFED and the Circassian Patriots; however, due to accessibility, the views of Solidarity is over-represented. The examples from KAFFED and Patriots are used to contrast the views of Solidarity. In other words, the examples here given from the Patriots and the KAFFED are not representative of the whole organizations. Nevertheless, the divergent views illustrate to us how and why boundary markers are used to help Syrian Circassians or not. Thus, the persistence of ethnic groups in contact implies not only criteria and signals for identification, but also a structuring of interaction which allows the persistence of cultural differences.

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APPENDICES

Rosenberg’s UCD argues that societies do develop unevenly due to differences in resources, geography, or history. However, they do not remain isolated; interactions through trade, conflict, or cultural exchange drive combined development, creating hybrid social forms. Barth complements this by arguing that ethnic identities are defined not by fixed cultural traits but by social boundaries marked by specific practices, such as language or religion. These boundaries can be rigid, thin, thick or permeable, shaping how “us versus them” is formed and reformed through interaction. Gadamer’s fusion of horizons describes how dialogue between groups reshapes identities, thinning boundaries through mutual understanding. This understanding may be formed artificially by building the “will” as in hegemonic practices. Mardin’s center-periphery model highlights the state’s role in unifying diverse groups, noting that weak ties between the center and periphery do form a loose combination of the uneven ones.

Therefore, do states impose assimilation policies internally and hegemonic strategies externally to manage uneven societies, in order to form a solid base for a tight center-periphery connection of the uneven? Internally, policies like education or legal reforms pinpoint thinning of the identity boundaries, fostering a shared national identity as a strategy of a combination of the uneven. Externally, hegemonic practices keep peripheral regions with the center’s vision. Teschke and Cemgil’s dialectic of the concrete emphasizes that these processes depend on praxis—deliberate actions by agents like diplomats, local leaders, or communities. Through praxis, states negotiate boundaries, either integrating diverse groups or reinforcing divisions.

The early Turkish Republic (1920s–1930s) illustrates these dynamics. The Kemalist government, as the “center,” sought to unify a fragmented periphery, including groups like Kurds and Alevis, that had thick cultural boundaries rooted in religion and tradition. These boundaries clashed with secular reforms, increasing tensions such as Kurdish separatism. However, policies like education and infrastructure development created some sort of permeable boundaries, enabling a fusion of horizons. Nationalistic, assimilative rhetoric between the center and periphery reshaped identities toward a national framework.

Teschke and Cemgil’s dialectic holds that agents negotiate boundaries through dialogue or conflict, thinning them to foster integration or thickening them to resist assimilation. The Ottoman Empire connected regions like the North Caucasus and Egypt through administrative networks and shared Islamic identity, thinning boundaries despite uneven development. Similarly, Britain linked Turks and Caicos to its empire through colonial governance and economic ties, creating a shared imperial identity even the entities were located dispersely and in the presence of strict local distinctions.

In conclusion, integrating UCD with the dialectic of the concrete reveals how states manage unevenly developed societies. State policies shaped by praxis do target identity boundaries in order to navigate the tensions of combined development. Turkey’s experience shows how a fusion of horizons can transform identities. Therefore, assimilative and hegemonic practices can be seen as a praxis of the institution, as a tool for the state to forge a combination of the uneven, dilating rigid boundaries that define the unevenness into a permeable one in order to keep the center and periphery in a tight relation.

If we expand the metaphor, every vision is the truth, unique, yet all are real and subjective.

In IR and FPA, this is the issue: understanding the unmeasurable, untouchable, undefinable, which becomes theoretical. IR’s structuralist theories, like Rosenberg’s Uneven and Combined Development, explain human groups through uneven development and inter-societal interactions, focusing far but missing agency. FPA, zooming on agents’ actions, focuses near but lacks systemic grounding, creating a blurry zone between them. Teschke and Cemgil bring a bridge, the dialectic of the concrete, clearing the blurriness by emphasizing praxis and inter-subjectivity to come closer to moulding this very unique and subjective thing of the truth; the vision. For Teschke and Cemgil, reality is in constant flux, nothing is static, and concepts must change with history. Praxis with a purpose, creative human activity, bridging thinking and action, like humans planning before acting. Praxis starts with agents’ perspectives, reconstructing how reality appears to them.

But how can we measure actions when they are solidified through “the punishment”? In Almodóvar’s movies, a caretaker’s praxis, seen as love through his lens, is seen as an assault through others’ vision and is solidified as a crime with a punishment. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel’s actions, framed as security, or “bringing the light to the world” (Sarna, 2025) philosophically, are visified (I invented the word) as oppression by the others. There are countless praxes, each producing subjective visions, but when actions are solidified with a punishment, how can their truth be measured? The dialectic of the concrete shows these conflicting praxes, linking uneven perceptions, but where does the ethics fall? It reveals that ethics depends on historical context, not universal rules. For instance, punishing a state’s actions requires understanding its agents’ intentions and others’ perspectives, which the dialectic traces. However, if the judgement of the action is a reaction through the lens of the other, where does the uniqueness in vision find itself? If the punishment is a fixed answer and if dialectic offers a clearer vision. Where does ethics find itself, who is the bad guy of the story?

Works Cited: Sarna, Jonathan D. “The Symbolism of Light.” The Jewish Theological Seminary. Accessed May 6, 2025. https://www.jtsa.edu/torah/the-symbolism-of-light/.

“Eurocentrism is a mode of knowledge and a paradigm for ‘interpreting a (past, present and future) reality that uncritically established the idea of European and Western historical progress/achievement and its political and ethical superiority” (Capan 2017, 3) Unlike Westphalian perception, how would the world and our pool of knowledge about the world and political systems would change into if Europe was defined through the measuring units of China, or if dominancy in IR shifted the center to the Arabian Peninsula. If rather than the colonialism, the trade through silk road would be the connection of the agency and the structure. Or nomadic, or sort of a brother-sisterhood; Ummah, based perception. What would IR turn into?

According to Barkawi and Laffey, “the narratives of International Relations establish ‘Europe’ as the central referent and main actor of history, and events outside of Europe become derivative of events that have already happened in Europe” (Capan 2017, 2) So, constructing the other through yourself, defining through yourself, bringing dominancy in the field, the language of IR, isn’t this serving the hegemonic actions of the Center? What’s the purpose of IR serving colonization and hegemony over the other? By universalizing concepts like sovereignty, IR maintains global order while marginalizing non-Western systems. Is a non-serving IR possible?

In her article, Capan avoids a single path, arguing for exploring possibilities like border thinking, demystifying education, and centering non-Western perspectives. The case of Turkey brings another angle. Its state-making strategy of combining the unevenness around the mystification of the duality of the west—defining the West as “enemy” yet aiming to become it. Therefore, where does IR’s serving fall in this duality?

The “dark Caucasian” puzzle shows Eurocentrism’s flaws. A non-Westphalian IR, centered elsewheres, many “where’s” could diversify knowledge. Turkey’s case brings questions about how IR can serve or resist hegemony, but only by questioning binaries can it decolonise, seeking Capan’s “elsewhere”.

Works Cited: Capan, Zeynep Gulsah. 2017. “Decolonising International Relations?” Third World Quarterly 38 (1): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1245100.

In my reflection paper, I propose an alternative perspective on managing and protecting power dynamics within political spaces. Specifically, I bring a different analytical lens to gender-based discussions by tracing cultural practices in the North Caucasus through the spatial articulations of anarchy and the relationship between agency and structure.

As Harvey Molotch (1993) argues, “Space is not simply inherited from nature, or passed on by the dead hand of the past, or autonomously determined by 'laws' of spatial geometry as per conventional location theory. Space is produced and reproduced through human intentions, even if unanticipated consequences also develop, and even as space constrains and influences those producing it” (Molotch, 1993)

Traditionally in the North Caucasus, newlyweds cease direct communication with their in-laws during the initial years of marriage. This practice, identified as a noble act reflecting good upbringing, self-respect, and dignity, exemplifies careful spatial construction designed to offer protection during transitional periods. Similarly, hospitality practices illustrate another form of spatial management. Any passerby can become a guest, receiving food, shelter, and protection without being questioned about their origins, destination, or duration of stay. This custom reinforces familial dignity while simultaneously managing household safety through regulated spatial boundaries.

Additionally, the act of courtesy involves managing personal space through strategic distancing. By consciously positioning oneself within a controlled setting, individuals manage shared spaces for self-protection. Harvey’s insight that “space is produced and reproduced through human intentions” (Molotch, 1993, 887) encourages us to view these spatial practices as protective measures.

The cultural role of the horsekeeper further extends this discussion. In the North Caucasus, practices like kidnapping or horse stealing paradoxically embody bravery and fearlessness rather than negative associations typically assigned to theft. The prevailing attitude—“It is not stealing, it is taking by force”—transfers responsibility to those who must protect their belongings effectively. Here, the absence of a clear sovereign authority creates a scenario of structured anarchy, emphasizing individual and communal responsibility for protection.

From this perspective, anarchy in the absence of chaos highlights a nuanced relationship between agency and structure, built on the transfer of responsibility and protective mechanisms codified through customary spatial arrangements. Extending this interpretation to gender dynamics and power structures prompts a reconsideration of the gendered management of spaces.

Cynthia Weber’s insight of “Western society’s demand that the sexed and sexualized organ/body speak, and it elucidates how the will to knowledge and the games of power are always part of the process of speaking sex and sexuality” (Weber 2016)

Could the horsekeeper’s position represent a spatial strategy aimed at managing gender-based inequalities? By strategically constructing public spaces to be as gender-neutral or secular as possible, without compromising gender-specific practices in private realms, could we overcome the traditional binaries of "order versus anarchy" through gender secularization?

Reversing these customary practices and examining religious traditions typically perceived as perpetuating gender inequality or female suppression (such as managing the gaze, veiling, and creating secluded spaces—mahrem), we might consider whether these practices represent spatial strategies from the horsekeeper’s perspective. Could these also function as responsibility-based spatial arrangements within a framework that differs fundamentally from Eurocentric norms of agency and structure?

As Teresa de Lauretis suggests, there is a need “to rethink the sexual in new ways, elsewhere and otherwise” (Richter-Montpetit and Weber 2017, 3) Could elaborating the horsekeeper’s position offer a pathway toward a decolonized paradigm of gender relations and power dynamics?

Works Cited: Molotch, Harvey. 1993. “Review of The Space of Lefebvre.” Theory and Society 22 (6): 887–95. Richter-Montpetit, Melanie, and Cynthia Weber. 2017. “Queer International Relations.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.265. Weber, Cynthia. 2016. Queer International Relations. Oxford University Press.

To my understanding, the construction of space has its own "organic" modes of movement in the neoliberal world, which can be observed through the lens of uneven and combined development theory. Smith notes that, according to Marx, "capital grows in one place to a huge mass in a single hand because it has in another place been lost by many" (Smith 2008, 197) Smith describes this movement as a "seesaw" movement of capital, where capital flows toward areas of higher profit. "If the accumulation of capital entails geographical development and if the direction of this development is guided by the rate of profit, then we can think of the world as a 'profit surface' produced by capital itself" (Smith 2008).

Brenner adds a dimension and a form of hierarchical fragmentation to space, transforming a one-dimensional map into a three-dimensional form through scalar structuration. Expanding on Smith’s "politics of scale," Brenner describes it as "the most generic function, a catchphrase for summarizing the proposition that geographical scales and scalar configurations are socially produced and politically contested through human social struggle rather than being pregiven or fixed" (Brenner 2001, 604).

In the neoliberal era, capitalism’s need for growth forms its organic (as Smith introduces in the seesaw) movement, a flow among uneven spaces, transforming and reconstructing the layers of space. To maintain its "natural" flow—a term that, as Swyngedouw suggests, should be questioned—this movement often takes on a colonizing character through post-political tactics, particularly in the realm of the "environmental." (Swyngedouw) Swyngedouw describes post-political as a political formation that avoids ideological conflict and reduces governance to managerial, technocratic administration. When viewed through Lefebvre’s lens of the "science of space," capital colonizes by employing post-political formations through depoliticization through consensus where ideology conceals knowledge. This is backed by strong evidence from the Anthropocene era, where climate change is framed as a universal threat requiring technical solutions, limiting political debate.

If Bezos’s space flight releases more greenhouse gas emissions than sanctions on farming, the dominant environmental discourses in the legislative arena reveal Lefebvre’s “mediation of the social for political purposes”.

To conclude, to enrich the discussion with a ruminative dimension: How does the dynamic “seesaw movement” neoliberal capital across space intersect with Homi Bhabha’s concept of the Third Space? For example, how can the scalarity of the space, solidified as a certain territory—such as the imagined homeland which is not only a cartographic zone (in Circassian example; the lands of the brave and the beautiful) in diasporic communities—be analyzed through this theoretical lens?

Works Cited;

Works Cited: Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Smith, Neil. 2008. Uneven Development; Nature, Capital, Production of Space. 3rd edition. University of Georgia. Swyngedouw, Eric. n.d. “Depoliticized Environments: The End of Nature, Climate Change and the Post-Political Condition.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 69:253–74.

As the multicultural society is formed within states; a better living space flourishes for those seeking better opportunities beyond their home countries, that are defined territorially. Mitchell observes that, “Multiculturalism functions as a key national narrative of coherence and unification in countries with a large immigrant population” (Mitchell 2003, 391).

A possible sense of belonging, or not being the “other one” also formed an atmosphere for the migration from unfavorable to the favorable. However such mobility comes with a selection; available for the high-skilled and eligible ones who are strategically able — accepting — to move and adapt. Mitchell further argues that “multiculturalism serves state formation during a period increasingly defined by a contemporary neoliberal economic regime or phase of capital accumulation” (Mitchell 2003, 391) This suggests that cosmopolitanism, often celebrated as a universal ideal, may be a Eurocentric neoliberal construct that promotes Western liberal values while marginalizing non-Western identities and their connections to land.

Upon this framework, I would like to ask a critical question: Is the cosmopolit human one of the tools of colonialism?

According to Mitchell, “The essence of the nation is difference, and what makes the state strong and legitimate is its ability to unify these differences in a single project, that of nation-formation” (Mitchell 2003, 391) Through asymmetric interdependence, the neoliberal world expands by exploiting weaker nations, often facilitated by institutional policies promoting migration, multiculturalism, and the cosmopolitan ideal.

Through “asymmetric interdependence” (Keohane, Robert O., and Nye, Joseph), and constant need of growth of the neoliberal through the exploitation of the weaker, are institutional policies promoting migration, multiculturalism, and the cosmopolitan ideal actually among the set of the toolbox of the colonial? Since these policies enable individuals to leave their homelands and adapt to other neoliberal societies, potentially supporting colonial dynamics. Capan describes the coloniality of power as an “entanglement” or “intersectionality of multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies (‘heterarchies’)” encompassing “sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic, and racial forms of domination and exploitation” (Capan 2017, 4).

Does this exploitation weaken the “essence of a nation” and where does the connection to territorial land fit within this dynamic?

If the Palestinians were to be a high-skilled society that engaged in multicultural dynamics, would there be any other way of using power among them by the oppressor for dominating the land?

Works Cited: Capan, Zeynep Gulsah. 2017. “Decolonising International Relations?” Third World Quarterly 38 (1): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1245100. Keohane, Robert O., and Nye, Joseph, K. n.d. Power and Interdependence. 4th edition. Longman. Mitchell, Katharyne. 2003. “Educating the National Citizen in Neoliberal Times: From the Multicultural Self to the Strategic Cosmopolitan.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 28 (4): 387–403. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-2754.2003.00100.x.

March and Olsen define institutions as "a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources" (Rockman 2006, 163), that are the “common purposes and accounts that give direction and meaning to behavior”. When examining everyday practices, such as driving behaviors in different societies, in the Netherlands, drivers patiently wait in line with minimal lane changes, demonstrating a cultural norm of order and rule adherence. In contrast, in Istanbul, frequent lane changes, overtaking, and a struggle to get ahead comparatively reflect a different set of social behaviors. Could these everyday driving practices mirror the underlying dynamics of institutions of those societies as well? For instance, why do democratic institutions function differently in societies with similar legal structures but distinct cultural attitudes toward authority and collective action?

Two approaches in (new) institutionalism, the Historical Perspective and the Sociological Perspective, due to their multi-faceted angle, adding the dimensions of Certeau’s habitus, would be fruitful when studying comparative politics. Historical Perspective, in this sense, finds studying political interactions is meaningful when they are viewed within the rules and structures that are “human creations” and that are “lived” (Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary CR Taylor. 1996) and are examined as a continuous process over time. As another perspective; sociological institutionalism; presenting a perspective arguing that many institutional forms and procedures are not solely designed for efficiency or functionality but are shaped by cultural norms and societal beliefs.

Ultimately, comparative politics benefits from both approaches. Institutions shape behavior, but in the sphere of Sociological perspective they do so within a cultural context that can either reinforce or resist institutional constraints. While historical institutionalism explains the durability and evolution of political structures and political culture helps us understand why institutions, the plant growing through a soil with its vibrancy inside, succeed —grow or fail —fade in different settings.

Works Cited

Goldthorpe, John Ernest, and J. E. Goldthorpe. 1985. An Introduction to Sociology. Cambridge University Press.

“Hall, 1996, Political Science and Three New Inst.,.” n.d.

Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary CR Taylor. 1996. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.”.” “Political Science 44 (5): 936–57.

Kırış, Emine. 2019. “Fransız Sosyoloji’sinde Gündelik Hayat Çalışmaları (Everyday Life Studies in French Sociology).” Sosyal ve Kültürel Araştırmalar Dergisi (SKAD) 5 (9): 131–45. https://doi.org/10.25306/skad.538256.

Rockman, Binder. 2006. The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford Press.